
























Recent studies in project management show 
that the risk management practices are 
ineffective. When an unexpected event takes 
place, risk management  is rarely enough to 
guide how the managers should act. In these 
situations, project managers face uncertainty 
about the new state in the project, the effects 
of the situations on the project outcomes as 
well as uncertainty about managerial actions 
and their respective effect. This book presents 
and explains the management methods and 
principles to successfully address uncertainty 
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allbeganwith thephonecall I receivedsomeyearsago inmynativeSt.Petersburg fromDr.
Christian Junnelius. Dr. Junnelius can be truly named the godfather of this research project.
I owea lot tohis support, not least inpracticalmattersof settlingdown inÅbo.Hewas the
person who made it possible for me to start the work that I wholeheartedly pursued —







very inspiring. The philosophical standpoints this thesis builds upon were developed with the
assistanceofDr.MagnusGustafsson.Forme,hehasbeenagreatacademiccoachwhochallenged
me to comeupwithmy own innovative ideas, to relate them tomanagerial practice and,most
importantly,tobeabletodefendthem.Thisisaninvaluablelesson.
The comments of the preliminary examiners of this thesis, Professor Rolf Lundin from
JönköpingUniversityandDr.HarveyMaylorfromCranfieldUniversity,helpedenormouslyto
improve the quality of this work. I am looking forward to an interesting and challenging
defensesessionwiththem.
Iamverygrateful toProfessorKarlosArttoofAaltoUniversity forhissincere interest inmy
researchrightfromthestart,andthecriticaldetailedcommentsthatheprovidedonmywork
on many occasions. Dr. Krys Markowski gave me a fantastic opportunity to experience a
differentresearchenvironmentatESIEE.ThefirstversionofthemanuscriptwasborninParis,
and this is a sweetmemory I cherish. I greatly appreciate the assistance of ProfessorGalina






of memorable moments in our doctorate journeys. Dr. Magnus Hellström is a dedicated and
enthusiasticresearcherwhosehelpatthebeginningofmydoctoralstudieshasbeencrucial.Ithank
ThomasWesterholm forhis efforts tohelpmebecomeaprojectmanagementprofessional.With
NataliaReenwesharedboththethesisrelatedideasandagoodlaugh.Dr.RichardWindischhofer
providedhelpfuladviceandcommentsonhowtomakethisthesisbetter.TogetherwithTomas









supportedmethroughthemostdifficult finalpartof thisresearch journey. IamhappythatI
sharemylifewithyou.
Idedicatethisworktomydearparents,AllaandAlexander.Youhaveraisedmeinthespirit
that knowledge and education are the best treasures one can possess. You have always
supportedme inall ofmy studyingprojects: from theviolin lessons tomartial arts, andyou
neverdoubtedme.Thisisatrueblessing.






















en bättre förståelse för ledningsprocessen för att hantera osäkerhet.Undersökningen utördes
genomattstuderaettantalprojektdäroförutseddahändelser påträffas,samtattstuderahur
projektledarna handlar i dessa fall. Teoretiskt ger avhandlingen en djupare förståelse för
fenomenetosäkerhet iprojekt,denförklararförhållandetmellannärliggandevariabler,såsom
riskerochmöjligheter, samt förklarar ledningsprocessenavosäkerhetochdessolikaelement.
Sett ur både en teoretisk och praktisk synvinkel bidrar avhandlingenmed att förklara vilka
ledningsmetoder och principer som kan användas då traditionell riskhantering inte är
tillräcklig för att lösa problem. Studier som nyligen gjorts gällande riskhantering påvisar att
projektledare  uppfattar tillämpningen av etablerade riskhanteringsmetoder som ineffektiva.
När något oförutsett sker är  tillvägagångssättet sällan tillräcklig för att ledaren skall erhålla
riktlinjer för rätt agerande. I dylika situationer utsätts projektledaren för osäkerhet som berör
projektets angelägenheter, hur händelsen påverkar projektet och dess resultat, samt hur hans
agerande påverkar dessa tidigare nämnda aspekter. Denna avhandling ger  en konceptuell
modell och  empiriska bevis på hur osäkerhet kan ledas. Särskilt betonas betydelsen av att
erkänna osäkerhet som en väsentlig del av projektverksamhet, samt behovet av professionella
projektledareförattsäkerställaattmålenförprojektenuppnås.Kunskapenochförtydligandetav
osäkerhetsfenomenet samt beskrivningen av förfaringssätt om hur osäkerhet kan hanteras i
samband med projekt är alla viktiga förutsättningar för prestationsorienterad projektledning.
Hanteringenavosäkerheterskallbetraktassometttankeochförfaringssättsombeaktarattityder,
beteenden, system och processer relevanta för att leda projekt och projektorganisationer. För
forskare inomdettaområde erbjuder avhandlingens resultatmöjligheter att utveckla, testaoch
upptäckanyamekanismerförhanteringavosäkerhetiprojekt.
Dennaavhandlingbidrarpåflerasätttillämnetprojekledning.Förstochfrämstbidrardenmed
en definition på begreppet osäkerhet i förhållande till risker och möjligheter genom att




de reflektivamekanismer sombidrar till transformeringavosäkerhet till säkerhet, tillutökad
flexibilitetochstärktrobusthetinomprojektgenomföring.Fördettredjeförklararavhandlingen
relevansen och nyttan av ett reflekterande tillvägagångssätt gällande risk och
osäkerhetshantering inomprojektledning.Fördet fjärdeuppmärksammasgarantistadiet  som
enviktigfasförreflektioniprojektetslivscykel.Avhandlingenbidrartillettempirisktbevispå
att garantistadiet är en fas därman antingen  bemöter risker eller drar nytta av uppstående
möjligheter. Mina forskningsresultat indikerar att garantistadiet måste beaktas som lika



















































































































































to Philippines. He was quite confident in the endeavor right from the start. After all, the
Finnishbased supplier company, which he represented, specialized on these kinds of turnkey
projects. Themanagerhadassistanceofhisexperiencedcolleagues,knowledgeof theprevious
casesandthecustomerinquestionaswellasthepossibleissuesthatcouldhappenifnottaken
care of.  In other words, he was well prepared and knew his routines. No wonder that the
project execution went just fine: the plant started working according to the agreed
specifications and on time. However, just one detail was missing. As it appeared later, the
customer company in Philippines, although strongly advised by the project manager and his
senior top management colleagues, did not consider well who would be supervising and
operating the plant on everyday basis. It must have been the beauty of the outcome: the
complexsystemsofthepowerplantseemedtobedoingtheirjobeffortlesslywithoutmuchofa
human invasion.Besides, the local staff hired to supervise the equipmentdid receive training
needed to familiarizewith thenew equipment and the everydayplantprocedures.Theprinted
user manual of the plant was not as heavy as one could imagine, and just like any other
ordinary appliance, it hadawarrantyof twoyears.The customer companywas satisfiedwith
the final outcome. So, the plant was successfully commissioned, and the energy production
started.At thispointmany industrial supplier firmswouldconsider their job tobedone.The
project manager would focus more on the other work, and the warranty supervision would
become a task of the other project teammember— the warrantymanager.  The project team
would have a small celebrationwith a glass of champagne and a cake.  Itwas so in this case,
too.But the projectwasnot yet over as it entered the post deliveryphase—warranty— for
twosubsequentyears.Notoverwere theresponsibilitiesof theprojectmanageras the leading
memberoftheprojectteamwhowasinchargeoftheprojectoverall.
In the first year after the power plant started the operations, a large amount of claims were
received by the supplier firm. According to the project manager, the hired personnel did not
have enough of skills to manage the operations and especially the regular maintenance
processesat theplant. Thesituationwassomewhatunexpectedconsideringthat thecustomer
was instructed to hire peoplewith the technical background.As a rule, the supplier company
givesbasictrainingfortheoperatorsandplantmanagement,whichisincludedinthecontract
of the turnkey project. Additionally, the customer is offered to buy the supplier’s services in
operatingandmaintainingthepowerplant.But it isupto theprojectcustomertodecidehow
toproceedaftertheplantiscommissioned.Inthiscase,thesuccessfulprojectexecutionended
up in costly post delivery stage for the supplier. As a result, the project was prospected to
become after warranty less profitable than anticipated at the kickoff. And it is the overall
result of the project that counts. The project manager was wondering how to manage
unexpectedsituationsandtheissuesthatappearedcompletelyunforeseeableduringtheproject
course. He considered several examples from the other familiar projects. A similar project in
Cambodiawhenacritically importantroadconnectionused for transporting theequipment to
the construction site had been completely blocked overnight by the locals in opposition of the
powerplantconstruction.ClimaticissuesinfluencedpowerplantprojectexecutioninSiberian
extreme coldweathers. The technical solutionwas expected to perform according to the tests,
but it didnot.  Industrial projectswith the aim to deliver large capital goods are complex by
definition.Theexecutionoftheseprojectswhentheunforeseenissuestakeplacebecomeseven
more challenging, thus increasing complexity dramatically.  A riskmanagement plan cannot
accommodateall the imaginable issuesas it isneitherpossiblenorreasonableto foreseeall the
events which might happen along the project journey. If the projectbased supplier firm
questions its ownproducts, services andprojectmanagement expertise, itwillnot bepossible
to convince the customer to invest into them. In fact, some of the events might even have a
positive outcome in the longer run.The aforementioned situations and issues are unexpected,
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Watts (1951), human belief grounded on the assumption that the world is certain and
predictableisanillusioninspiredbythedesiretocontrolnature.Thephilosophicalapproaches
tounderstandinguncertaintyaredelimitedbytwoperspectives:ZenianandFaustian(Bradac,








(Savage, 1954), psychology (James and Jones, 1974), etc.  All these sciences have their own
interpretation of the concept; however they share an understanding of certain traits of
uncertainty. The topic of uncertainty has gained plenty of attention inmanagement research
recently.Thetermassuchisoneof themostwidelyusedinmanagement ingeneral.What is
more,itisaverypopularwordusedineverydaylife;something,thatallofuscanrelateto.As






in the fieldofprojectmanagement,partlybecause theresearchers in the fieldgain insights in
differentorganization theories andstrategicmanagement literaturewith regard to explaining
uncertaintyrelated issues.A significant amountofworkhas beendone to conceptualize and
measureuncertaintybytheadeptsof theadministrativescience (e.g.MarchandSimon,1958;
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Duncan, 1972; Child, 1972). They recognize uncertainty as an
importantfactorinfluencingmanagerialdecisionmaking,aswellasactionsandtheiroutcomes
(e.g. Knight, 1921; Head, 1967; Lorenzi et al., 1981; March and Simon,1958; Weick, 1983;
Olga Perminova 
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Sommer and Loch, 2004; Loch et al., 2008). Some streams inmanagement literature go even
further intheirattempts toexplainthe influenceofuncertaintyonorganizations(firms), their
processes,andindividuals.Thus,theconceptofuncertaintymanagementwasestablished,which
studies the interdependencebetweenuncertaintyandotherelementsofmanagerialprocesses
with the purpose of finding ways to cope with uncertainty and even benefit from it. For




someof the achievements of the abovementioned fields, provided that theuse of terms and
theirapplicationtoprojectmanagementrealitiesarecarefullyconsidered.




events and the actions ofmanagers upon them. Theoretically, the thesiswill provide amore
profoundunderstandingofthephenomenonofuncertaintyinprojects,explaintherelationship




of risk management practices show that project managers perceive the application of well
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theadverseoutcomesontheprojectsuccess(KutschandHall,2005).  Ignorancestrategymay
leadtotheuseofriskreservationsinthebudgettocoverforthecoststhatanunforeseenevent
imposes. The failure to address the issue on time can cause project customer or other
stakeholders’ dissatisfaction with the project, which again, has an effect on project success.
Atkinsonandhiscolleagues(2006)provideagoodsummaryofthecurrentviewonuncertainty
withintraditionalprojectmanagementresearchandpractice:
“Conventional (common practice) project management processes are concerned with 
legitimising the project plan, and uncertainty (particularly from fundamental sources) is 
played down. The project manager is regarded as a convenient recipient of project risk, 
providing psychological relief to the project owner (if not actual physical relief) from the 
burden of uncertainty and risk bearing, and someone who subsequently unwillingly 
serves as scape-goat if things fail to turn out as desired by the project owner.”(p.691) 
The current trend in the projectmanagement literature is to discuss different approaches to
uncertaintymanagementwhilestatingthattheissueneedstoreceivemoreattentionand,using
the expression of the aforementioned authors, “be rather more sophisticated than the current
commonpractice”(ibid,p.696).Asnotedbytheresearchersinthefield,theempiricalresearchon
uncertainty and themanagementpractices related to it is scarce (Jaafari, 2001;Chapmanand
Ward,2002;2003).
This thesis provides empirical evidence for uncertainty management and emphasizes the
importance of recognizing uncertainty as an essential part of projects which needs to be
managedbyprojectmanagementprofessionals(projectmanagers)toensurethatprojectsmeet
theirgoals.Inthisperspective,definingandexplainingthephenomenonofuncertaintyandthe
way it can bemanaged in projects is an important element of performanceoriented project
management. In thisworkuncertaintymanagement forprojects andprojectbasedcompanies
will be approached as a mindset, or a set of practices, which includes attitudes, behaviors,
systemsandprocessesoftheprojectmanagementorganizationsandtheirmembers.Inorderto
dothis,thereisaneedtogainbetterunderstandingofwhatuncertaintyinprojectsisandhow
it relates in project management to the wellestablished concept of risk and the concept of
opportunities.
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of researchers in this field. The focus remained on these issues until the 1980s, spreading to
differentindustries,e.g.defense,construction,aerospace.However,thelasttwentyyearsofthe
20thcenturyarecharacterizedbyafocusonprojectorganization,externalinfluencesonproject
performance, development of project management standards, and project risk management.
Needlesstosay,thedisciplineofprojectmanagementishighlyinfluencedbytrendswhichtake
placeingeneralmanagement.
Currently, increased customer orientation is one of the significant trends in general
management as well as management of projects on the whole. Many companies, especially
thosespecializinginlarge,engineeringintensivecapitalgoods,concentratetheiroperationson
the provision of highvalue integrated solutions instead of standalone products and services
(Hobdayetal.,2005;HellströmandWikström,2005;Daviesetal.,2006).Thisconceptseesthe
natureofprojectsasa“mixture”ofgoodsandservices,butitismorethanjustthat.Thegoalis
to create value for the customer: toprovide a solutionpackage that is aimed at fulfilling the
customer’s specific preferences and wishes, which potentially includes a wide range of
financing, consulting, and, operation and maintenance services.   It is argued that these
innovative combinations of products and services constitute the projectbased firm’s
competitive advantage (e.g. Foote et al., 2001; Galbraith, 2002; Davies, 2004; Hamel and
Prahalad, 1994).  Delivering integrated solutions is associated with high complexity (or
structural complexity, in Williams’ (2005) terms) as the size, number and interdependence
between the project elements are extensive.According to the literature review performed by
Williams(2005), there isanother inseparableelement that is inherent inprojectswhichaffects
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restrictionsontime,costs,scopeandquality,inamultiprojectcontexttheseundertakingsoften
haveamorerepetitivenature.Thisprovidesthegroundtoarguefortheneedtokeepabalance
between standardization and customization in order to achieve the benefits that are usually
associatedwithboththeseissues(DaviesandHobday,2005).Suchabalanceinprojectbusiness
canbereferredtoasmodularity(Hellström,2005;Melkinetal.,1999).Furthermore,thesetrends
became the basis for new value logic, where a costeffective well structured offering can be
upgradedwithadditionalmodulesondemand;thusendeavoringtocreaterepeatablesolutions
(DaviesandBrady,2000).Thislogicassumesthatcooperationwithprojectcustomersiscrucial









linewith the other abovementioned traits (P2M, 2005;Kutsch andHall, 2005;Atkinson et al.,
2006; Maytorena et al., 2007; Zayed et al., 2008). Uncertainty is seen as a factor that affects
complexitypositively:highuncertaintyincreasesprojectcomplexity(Williams,2005).However,
thedifficulty lies in the fact that the researchers in the field lack commonunderstandingas to
whatuncertaintyanduncertaintymanagementmeansforprojectprofessionalsandprojectbased
firms. Some researchers include it in the project complexity construct (e.g. Floricel andMiller,
2001;Williams, 2005), theothers treat it as apart of risk construct (e.g.Kutsch andHall, 2005;
Zayedetal.,2008).Projectriskmanagementnormativeliterature(PMBOK,2000;2004;Chapman,
2006referringtoPRAM2004andRAMP2005)hasaratherstronginfluenceintohowuncertainty
is interpreted.Generallyspeaking, itdoesnotrecognizeuncertaintyasan issue that isseparate
fromrisk.AsChapman(2006)summarizes:
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“At present users can be badly served by guides and a broader literature which is 
confusing because it uses very basic words like ‘risk’ in very different ways, and it 
assumes very different objectives are at stake, with very little discussion in the literature 
about the implications of these differences” (p.313). 
Althoughsomeresearchersrecognizeuncertaintyasastandaloneissue(Atkinsonetal.,2006;
Pich, Loch and DeMeyer, 2002; Loch, Solt and Bailey, 2008), there has been little empirical
researchconductedtoconfirmhowuncertainty,riskandopportunityarerelated,andshouldbe
regarded as independent issues that require differentmanagementmethods. The aim of this
workistocoverthisgapbyexploringtheissueofuncertaintyandtheuncertaintymanagement
process. This assumes an inquiry into how project management professionals treat as
uncertainty in projects and how they act upon it— in otherwords, how theymanage it. In
addition, the thesisalsoseeks toexaminehow theuncertaintymanagementmethods thatare








1998;ArttoandWikström,2005). In thiswork, Ioperatemostlywith the conceptsofprojects
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Researchers understand project business as the business of delivering large scale capital
productsand serviceswith all its elements (Hellström,2005).For example,Artto et al. (1998)
defineprojectbusinessasalltheactivitiesofthecompany—aprojectcompany—thatexecutes
and delivers projects for its customers. Wikström (2005) argues that various situations in




by the fact thatprojects are executed in the continuously changing, if not turbulent,business
environmentoftoday.AsstatedbyFloricelandMiller(2001),thecausesoftheturbulenceare
the increasing complexity and the relevant uncertainty of the environment produced by







by themembersof the (project)organizationwith their aimsandunderstandings (Levitt and
March,1988;Weick,1989).Astoprojectbasedfirms,thedaytodayworkofwhich,according
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literature(Midler,1995;LundinandSöderholm,1995;Arttoetal.,1998;TurnerandMüller,2003;
ICBIPMACompetenceBaseline,1999).Forexample,TurnerandMüller(2003)concludethat:
“A project is a temporary organization to which resources are assigned to undertake a 
unique, novel and transient endeavor managing the inherent uncertainty and need for 







A project is indeed a value creation undertakingwith a fundamental purpose forwhich the
project is created and the project is expected to achieve. Such a fundamental purpose— or
mission— is often seen as oriented towards customerpreferences, or evenmore apparently,
dictatedbythecustomer.Itisespeciallytrueiftheoutcomeoftheprojectisnotastandalone
service or product, but a complete solution consisting of products and services specifically
tailoredtocustomerneeds(DaviesandHobday,2005;Daviesetal.,2006;Hobdayetal.,2005).
The latter, solutionoriented logic, isgainingdominance today.For instance,Hellström(2005)
denotes that companies tend to label their activities projects in order to stress customer
orientation. The set of tasks and requirements, definitions of objectives, guidelines, policies,
strategy and essential actionplans is the practical application of themissionwith the aim to
satisfycustomerneeds. It isthetaskofaprojectteamandits leader is tofindouthowtorun
theseactivitiesinordertofulfilltheobjectives.
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“The project’s mental space refers to a space where stakeholders recognize the value of 
a project mission and carry out work; it is the virtual, motivational space where 
stakeholders commit themselves to the project from a variety of geographical, cultural, 
specialized and organizational spheres, and help to build interaction and collaboration 
through mutual exchanges based on monitoring and communications as well as 
information exchanges”(p.20).  
This concept,whichwithnodoubt is of a reflectivenature (at leastasopposed to rigidity in
GustafssonandWikström’s(2004)terms),ishighlyrelatedtothatofprojectperformance.The
latter is assumed to be greatly influenced bywhether or not the project can create an active
project mental space. As noted by Atkinson et al. (2006), key performance issues (such as
quality, duration or costs of the project) are often less related to technology, but rather are
relatedtouncertaintyintroducedbytheexistenceofmultiplepartiesandtheassociatedproject
management infrastructure.SimilarlytoMeijer,HekkertandKoppenjan(2007),theyconclude











It also relates to theway the project is organized and the risks suchorganizationpotentially
entails.HereisthequotefromtheP2M(2005)guideillustratingtheissue:
 “Where a project is executed through international consortium, the project would 
encounter misunderstanding and confrontation if attention is not paid to cultural 
diversity, resulting in higher risk of project failure” (ibid, p.20). 
Theuniquenessofaprojectmightdifferfromcasetocaseeveninanindustrialcontext,and
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somerepetitivenessmightbefeasible(Davies,BradyandHobday,2006).However,industrial
projectsareusuallyassociatedwiththecreationofengineering—andinvestment,aswellas
intensivegoodsandservices.Speaking in termsofdelivering integratedsolutions in typical
industrial contexts such as shipbuilding or oil and gas, there is a certain high level of
complexity involved. Indeed, the outcomes of the projectbased industries are so called
complexproductsandservices(Hobday,1998),whichimplyahighlevelofuncertaintyrelatedto





extant literatureonprojects istheriskand/oruncertaintycausedbyunreliable informationor
lack thereof (Pich, Loch andDeMeyer, 2002;Chapman, 2006;Kutsch andHall, 2005); novel,
immatureorunproven technology (Meijer,HekkertandKoppenjan,2007),projectcomplexity
(Williams, 2005; Floricel and Miller, 2001; Sommer and Loch, 2003, 2004) and other
unpredictable factors. In projects, these risks are overcome by proactively employing project









The contemporary phenomena in project business requires a new body of professional human
resourcesthatareabletodealandsolvecomplexproblemsandissuesthatencompassdifferentfields
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1999)1.  In linewith this thinking, the researchers in the field of projectmanagement come to the
conclusion thatensuring flexibilityandrobustnessofaprojectbased firm is the taskof theproject
managementprofessionals(FloricelandMiller,2001;GustafssonandWikström,2004).
This thesis adopts the following definition of a project management professional: a Project
Manager is described as an individualwho acts in a transparentmanner for the sake of the







1 The ICB contains basic terms, task, practices, skills, functions, management practices, methods,
techniquesandtoolsthatarecommonlyusedinprojectmanagement(PM).





project manager are wider than of the warranty manager. Warranty manager’s project management
responsibilities are limited to the early post delivery stage. In this thesis the term project management
professionalswillcoverbothprojectandwarrantymanagers.
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line with the firm’s top management, project customer and other teammembers (Atkinson,
1999).Furthermore,theresearchersarguethattheprojectoutcomesareinfluencedbythepower
of the project manager (powerdistance in Hofstede’s (2001) terms), and by
individuality/collaboration (Williams, 2005).Among the tasksof theseprojectprofessionals is
theinvolvementandmotivationofotherspecialiststousetheirknowledgeandexperiencefor
thebenefitoftheproject.Anotherprojectmanagementhandbookaimedatpractitioners,Project 
and Program Management for Enterprise Innovation Guidebook(P2M,2005)labelsprojectmanagers
asmissionachievementtypeprofessionals.However,theGuidebookalsonotesthattherehave
beenalmostnoexpertswhohavecoveredsuchbroadfieldsasthemodernprojectsmightwishfor.
In general, both normative project management literature and especially the research in the
fieldpointoutthattheneedhasarisenforprojectmanagementexpertswhoareabletograsp
the overall picture of complex issues, which are usually only comprehensible to separate
experts, or turn issues into highly feasible scenarios as well as create value by utilizing the
different mechanisms and processes. This is especially true in case of dealingwith complex
largescale projects and the situations of uncertainty. In the empirical study, Shenhar (2001)
concludes that themanagement styles andapproachesdependon the level of (technological)
uncertaintyof theproject: thehigher theuncertainty, themore flexibility isrequiredfromthe
managers. Olsson (2007) discusses the need to address uncertainty and opportunity
management inprojects as opposed to rigidprojectmanagement thinking.Hepresents three
majorfactorsneededformanagingopportunities:theabilityoftheprojectmanagertodevelop
a holistic viewwithin the project, the organizational support and interest, and the ability to
understandhowotherorganizationsaffecttheprojectobjectives.Håkonsson(2006)exploresthe
relationship between managerial cognitive orientations and situational uncertainty to
organizationalperformance.Theauthorconcludesthatamatchbetweenmanagerialcognitive
orientationandsituationaluncertaintyhaspositiveperformanceconsequences.
While thenormative literature ismostlyfocusedonplanningandthusstressestheroleof the
projectmanager as the creator and the executor of the Project Plan (PMBOK2000, 2004), the
researchers emphasize the fact that the project mangers (and warranty managers, for that
matter) need to consider a wider array of functions (e.g. a review in Williams, 2005).
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Andersen (1996) criticized excessive focus on activity planning, and proposed an alternative
concept of goalbased milestone planning which stresses project responsibilities as a central
element of successful project execution. According to it, the role of the project management
professionalhelmingtheprojectistomanageandcontroltheprojecttogetherwiththeprojectteam
in suchaway that thegoals areachieved.Loch,SoltandBailey (2008)extend thediscussionby
introducingthemanagementapproachesbasedonlearningandexperimentation(inthiscase,trial
anderror learningandselectionism)asopposed tomanagementwithdeadlinesandtargets. It is
argued that these kinds of approaches are better targeting unforeseen influences and, thus,




project firm are equally stressed in the context of organizational learning, innovation and
management(Atkinsonetal.,2006;Olsson,2007;SommerandLoch,2003;Chapman,2006).
Inthis light,thepracticesofprojectmanagementneedtobeextendedalongwithothertopics




of innovation is not enough in modern society. The mechanism is created by attaching
importance to ideas that create value, and is aimed at developingmanufacturing into a new
business model by combining nontechnological elements with manufacturing. Solution
oriented ways of thinking assumes that there is a shift from traditional controltype project
managers to projectsetting personnel (ibid.). The latter category is assumed to be able to
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“The existing project management approaches advocate partially conflicting approaches 
to the project team, such as the need to execute planned tasks, trigger preplanned 
contingencies based on unfolding events, experiment and learn, or try out multiple 
solutions simultaneously. While all of these approaches encompass the idea of 
uncertainty, no conceptual model currently exists that enables project managers to 
understand why different approaches exist, which one to choose, and when. As a 
consequence, project failures are numerous in practice; for example, budget and 
schedule overruns, compromised performance, and missed opportunities, (see, e.g., 
Morris and Hugh, 1987…)” (p.1008) 




managers use to address uncertainty, why and when they are applied. At the same time, I
attempt to show that themanagerial ability to copewith uncertainty is one of the tasks that






The complexity, innovativeness and certain, although limited, uniqueness of projects, all
presumeadegreeofuncertaintyassociatedwiththem.Beingboundedbybudget,scope,time
andquality,projectsstrivefortheultimategoalofperformingtosatisfythecustomerneeds.In
order toavoidunforeseensituationsandrisks that canchallenge thisgoal, traditionalProject
Risk Management (e.g.  PMBOK, 2000; 2004) particularly emphasizes careful and explicit
planning that “enhances the possibility of success of the risk management processes” (ibid., p.242).
The practical evidence suggests that projectmanagers tend to rely heavily on planning as a
meansofdefiningpathwaysthroughdifferentstagesofaproject lifecycle.Suchanapproach
seemsunderstandableatafirstglance.However,thereisanothersidetothecoin:conforming
to the plan is potentially harmful to customer satisfaction and other project performance
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indicators(e.g.Andersen,1996).Moreover,itcandelimitone’sabilitiestopursueopportunities,
whichappearduringthecourseoftheproject.
This contradiction between planning and performance led the researchers, in the field of
strategy,tocriticallyquestiontheoveremphasisonplanning(Mintzberg,1994;Andersen,1996;
Dvir and Lechler, 2004). The recent project management literature is oriented towards this
trend.Coordinationorientedprojectmanagementis increasinglycriticizedforbeingtoorigid,
stressing conformity to the plan rather than performance (Gustafsson and Wikström, 2004;
Perminova,Hellström andWikström, 2007; Perminova et al., 2008 (b)). The role of a project
managerwithin this approach becomes quitemechanistic in the strict following of the plan,
whereas the constantly changing project environment — and the uncertainty associated
withit—demandsflexibilityfromprojectorganizationanditsdecisionmakers(Youker,1992).
These tendencies bring to light the problem of howuncertainty is treated by the established
projectriskmanagementfield.Intraditionalprojectmanagement,thetermuncertaintyisoften
used as a synonym for project risks. In sum, risk is seen as an uncertain event and its
consequencesasbeingpotentiallybothnegativeandpositiveastotheproject’soutcomes.Thus,
the issues of project uncertainty, risks and opportunities are encompassed by one definition,
which leads to the situation,where the samemanagerialmeans are prescribed to copewith
them. Ifwe consider PMBOK (2004) as one of themost respected andpopular guidelines to
practitioners inprojectmanagementfield,wewill findthat itdiscussesriskmanagementasa
supportivefunction,however,opportunitymanagementanduncertaintymanagementarenot





However, the idea of recognizing project uncertainty as a separate issue, which needs to be
addressedwithdifferentmanagerialapproaches than risksorevenopportunities,hasslowly,
but steadily gained commitment among the researchers of projectmanagement. The studies
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performed during the last decade reveal that project riskmanagement practices tend to fail
when it comes to managing uncertainty (e.g. Jaafari, 2001; Chapman andWard, 2002, 2003;
Chapman, 2006;Kutsch andHall, 2005). The researchers specifically note that the concept of
uncertainty management is strongly related to opportunity management (Olsson, 2007;
Atkinson et al., 2006). They show the need to move from conformancebased measures to
strengthening real performance (Andersen, 1996; Maylor, 2001). The latter has a strong
influenceonhowuncertaintyandopportunitiesaremanaged incomplexprojects (Pich,Loch
and DeMeyer, 2002). Although the researchers in the emerging field of project uncertainty
management suggest that uncertainty requires different approaches in management as
compared to risk, the empirical support of their ideas is to a large extentmissing.There is a
significantnumberofworkstheorizinguncertaintyinstrategicmanagement(e.g.Porter,1980;
Child, 1972) and organization theory literature (Milliken, 1987; Downey and Slocum, 1975;





In the lightof theoutlined limitationsof theprojectmanagement research, there is aneed to
addresstheissueofuncertaintyandthemanagementpracticesrelatedtoitingreaterdetail.The
aim of this thesis is to explore the issue of uncertainty in projects and gain a better
understanding of the uncertainty management process and its elements. Therefore, the
followingquestionsarerelevant:
 Whatconstitutesuncertainty forprojectmanagementprofessionals (projectmanagers
andwarrantymanagers)?
 Howdoesuncertaintyrelatetorisksandopportunities?
 What kind ofmethods or actions projectmanagers and, subsequently, projectbased
companiesemploytodealwithuncertainty?
 How does uncertainty management, according to project professionals, affect
performanceofasingleprojectandaprojectbasedfirminawhole?
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and how they relate the results of these activities to project performance from the supplier
company’s perspective. The nature of uncertainty in projects, its relation to risk and
opportunity, is described as viewed by the projectmanagers and thewarrantymanagers as
professionalsleadingtheprojects.
The unit of analysis lies on two interdependent levels:  at the project level and the project
manager (project management professional) level. To some extent, the research questions
encompasstheprojectbasedsupplierfirm.Insuchacase,theprojectbasedfirmisseenasaset
of more or less repetitive projects — a multiproject context — governed by project
professionals.Inotherwords,bylookingatprojectsofasupplierfirm,whatcanbesaidabout







in individualprojects, i.e. the issuesofprojectmanagement.  It isan inquiry intohowproject
managementfunctionsareappliedinpractice.Inaway,thisentailstheinterestintotheimpact
uncertainty and uncertainty management practices have on the overall performance of a
Olga Perminova 
Managing Uncertainty in Projects 33
projectbased firm. At the same time, it also entails certain interest in how projectbased
companiesareorganizedby lookingat theprocessesandcompetences thatarebeingutilized
anddevelopedovertime.Thisresearchsharesthepointofviewthataprojectbasedcompany
canbetreatedasanorganizationformedanddeterminedbyprojectmanagementprofessionals,
a consideration,which allows the extending of their expertise and opinions into the project
organizationcontext.Suchadesireisjustifiedbytherecenttrendsinprojectmanagementand
organization research as well as studies of professional experts (Olsson, 2007; Miller, 1993;
FuglsethandGrønhaug,2000).
Theoretically, thiswork contributes first and foremost to the field of projectmanagement by
providingamissingconceptualandempiricalbasisforuncertaintymanagement.Itprovidesa
synthesis of the theories of project management, strategic management and organization
theories to explain the relevance of the concept of uncertainty and its implications for
managementpractices.Furthermore,itpartiallycontributestostrategicmanagementliterature












tohavean impactonuncertainty.Oneof thequestions raised in the literature in the fieldof
cognitivesciencesisreflectedin theresearchquestionof thiswork(e.g.Miller,1993;Fuglseth
andGrønhaug, 2000):whatkindof (uncertaintyrelated) issues thereareandhow theyaffect
the performance of experts (managers). The question can also be looked at from a different
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angle i.e. themeans bywhich expertsmanagers utilize and transfer their experiencewithin
organizationandwithotherprojectstakeholdersandtheeffectsthishasontheoutcomes(risk
or opportunity). These two bodies of science regard expert performance as related to the
handlingofa task,which isuncertaintymanagement in this case.Since theperformanceofa













the actualprocessofdelivery, inotherwords, theproject executionphase.Themoment,
when the endeavor enters the warranty phase (sometimes called the handover from
project execution towarranty), is seenas the endof theproject.At the same time, some
studiesinthefieldsuggestthatthepostdeliverystageisanimportantreflectionpointto
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onthebasisoftheresultsfrom127projectsamultidimensionalframeworkformeasuring
project success.Threeof the four criteria chosen for themeasurementbelong to thepost
deliveryphase,andone inparticular, referring to the customer satisfaction, isattributed




attention both in project management research and practice lies in the fact that warranty is
perceivedasmerelyalegalobligation,theresponsibilityofthemanufacturerintheeventofearly
product failure (ChattopadhyayandRahman,2008)ratherthanamanagementprocess.Another,
perhaps,more important reason for the practitioners is thatwhen theproject is at thewarranty
stage,itsoutcomesarealreadyinusebythecustomer.Indeed,thebeginningofthewarrantyphase
implies the startof theoperations— theprocess,where the supplier isnot in chargeanymore.
From this perspective, the main role of the warranty is in stating higher reliability of the end
productandgivingpeaceofmindtothecustomer.Thisiswhytheroleofthewarrantymanagersis
seen as rather reactive in responding to claims. However, recent trends in many industries,
especially the automobile industry, indicate that the warranty is important to the company’s















representatives and the project team’s internal perception of the project, expectations and
satisfaction with the overall project results (Gustafsson, Smyth, Ganskau and Arhippainen,
2010).Ultimately, the internal level of satisfactionwith the projectwork, the output and the
customer’s—oranyotherstakeholder’s—perspectiveonitcanbegraspedandevaluated,so
thatcorrectiveactionscanbeimplementedaccordingly.
Thestartof theoperationsmarks thebeginningof thewarrantyphase in theproject. At this
point,itisthecustomer(orthecustomer’srepresentative),whoisatthehelmoftheoperations.
However, the supplier company stays in the picture: its role as a contractor is to provide a
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deficiencies under his/her control for a given period of time (Cui et al., 2004). Most of the
warrantyprovisionsrequirethatthecontractoragreestocompensatethecustomerforthefailed
itemswithina certain time limit—after the timeof saleor/andafter a certain timeofusage











main stakeholders, especially the customer. The costs stemming from the customers’ claims
represent themain impact that the project faces during thewarranty phase.Moreover, they
affect not only the financial result of the project as such, but also the performance at the
companylevel.Intheoperationalresearchliteraturethedurationofwarrantycoverageandthe
costsarecloselylinkedwiththeissuesofriskanduncertainty.Namely,thelongerthecoverage
period of warranty the greater the risk due to uncertainty of failure mechanism and costs
(ChattopadhyayandRahman,2008).Someauthorsinoperationsresearchlinknegativebusiness
consequences of uncertainty to customers’ imperfect beliefs about the quality of products and










resultofmy5yeargraduate studies,wasdedicated to the insurancemarket for international
aerospaceprojects.Itindeedenhancedmypreunderstandingofthetopic,especiallyintermsof
thedifferencebetweentheconceptsofriskanduncertainty,whicharecentraltotheinsurance
field. However, this work explored the insurance provider perspective rather than that of a
projectbased company. The latter perspective was gained through my participation as a
researcherandamemberoftheResearchInstituteforProjectBasedIndustryinseveralstudies
and development and implementation projects for various industrial suppliers (e. g.
Westerholm and Perminova, 2007; Perminova, Gustafsson, and Arhippainen, 2007 (a), (b);
2008).Theseprojects servedasaplatform fordatacollection, investigation,developmentand
testingof theconceptsandprocesses,whichwillbepresented in this thesis. Iwaspartof the
team of researchers and practitioners, who were pursuing a common goal to explore the
relevant issues and interdependences, to analyze their relevance and impact and to cocreate
and test themanagement processes in the projects. PBI Research institute employed a wide
variety ofmethods including those under theumbrella of clinical, collaborativemanagement
andconstructivistresearchinlinewiththemoreconventionalapproaches.Thisfactexplainsthe
choiceofmethodsemployedinthisthesis,especiallywhenitcomestoCompanyBcaseswhich
constituted a part of the development and implementation research project (Perminova,
Gustafsson, andArhippainen, 2007 (a), (b); 2008). Thesemethods assume that the role of the
researchersand thepractitioners in theprojectswasnotequal.Whilemyroleasa researcher
assumed involvement in all the stages of the research: from theproblem formulation todata
collectionandanalysis,aswellasthedevelopmentoftheconceptsandmodels,theroleofthe
practitioners was mainly concerned with shaping the problem, providing the data for the









of projectmanagement, strategicmanagement and organization theory. The third chapter of
this thesis is dedicated to themethodological standpoints.The researchprocess adopting the
multiple case study approach is described following the logic of the acquisition of empirical
data, analysis andvalidationof results.  The empirical core of the study, the eight cases, are
described in the forth chapter. They are divided in accordance with the industry and the
companies from which they originated. The Data analysis and discussion part includes the
classification and comparison of the studied cases as well as the results of the qualitative
analysis of the main concepts in question. These are discussed in the light of the extant
literature. The last chapter is dedicated to summarizing the conclusions of this thesis and
providesinsightintothepossibilitiesoffutureresearch.
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Uncertainty has been named a fundamental problem with which toplevel organizational
administrators must cope in organization theory (Thompson, 1967). Strategic management
literature views uncertainty as a major factor affecting key strategic decisions (Porter, 1980;
SutcliffeandZaheer,1998).Indeed,uncertaintyisoneofthemostimportanttopicsintheories
oforganization,strategicmanagementandorganizationeconomics,especiallythosethatseekto












Economics Risk refers toevents subject to
known or knowable probability
distribution(Knight,1921)
In business literature, a
positive environmental
impact is usually described
as an opportunity (Ansoff,
1980)
Uncertainty is a situation




Uncertainty is a state in
which individual actors

















enables or contrains that
person's task performance




Uncertainty is a state of
mind characterized by a
conscious lack of
knowledge about the
outcomes of an event
(Head,1967)











The possibility of something
unfortunatehappeningatsome
timeinthefuture;thesituation
that could be dangerous or
have a dire result (Oxford
Dictionary of Current English,
2005)

A favorable juncture of

















Managing Uncertainty in Projects42
OnthebasisoftheinformationshowninTable1itispossibletoconcludethefollowing:
 Theconceptofuncertaintyisdifferentfromtheconceptofriskinthepresentedfieldsof
science. However, project management does not make a straightforward distinction
betweenuncertaintyandrisk.
 Risk isdescribedasanevent,a factoraconditionwithcertainexpectedconsequences





 In a general sense risk has a negative meaning. A mirroring concept for risk is
opportunity, which is “a favorable juncture of circumstances”, or a good chance of
advancement, progress or gain (MerriamWebster Dictionary online, 2010).  Risk
managementintegratesriskandopportunityundertheumbrellaofoneconstruct.
As one can see from Table 1, project management discipline includes uncertainty into the
conceptofrisk.Thisisanimportantstandpoint,whichhasimplicationsforhowtheconceptof
uncertaintyisoperationalized.Ifriskanduncertaintyareoneandthesameconcept,thewaysto








etc. influence uncertainty. As mentioned earlier, significant research attempts to define













true uncertainty — exists in junction with unique, very complex events, circumstances or
contextswhichcannotbeassessedorpredictedinadvancebyanylogicalmeans:
“Business decisions, for example, deal with situations which are far too unique, 
generally speaking, for any sort of statistical tabulation to have any value for guidance. 
The conception of an objectively measurable probability or chance is simply 
inapplicable... the… more important task is to follow out the consequences of that higher 




“It is this true uncertainty which by preventing the theoretically perfect outworking of the 
tendencies of competition gives the characteristic form of "enterprise" to economic 
organization as a whole and accounts for the peculiar income of the entrepreneur” (ibid.) 
Inotherwords,onespeaksoftheriskofaloss,buttoindicatethepossibilityofagain,oneuses
theconceptofuncertainty. Knight’sexplanationofprofit asa reward forbearinguncertainty


4 retrieved from http://www.econlib.org/library/Knight/knRUP6.html#Pt.III,Ch.VII, last assessed on
30.08.2010.
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“We can also employ the terms "objective" and "subjective" probability to designate the 
risk and uncertainty respectively, as these expressions are already in general use with a 
signification akin to that proposed”5 
Hepostulates thatuncertainty is inherentlya subjective,perceptivephenomenon. Thus, ina
givensituationdifferentindividualswillexperienceuncertaintydifferently,andsomewillnot
experienceitatall.Asimilardefinitionisusedindecisiontheory,whichdenotesbyuncertainty




Tosummarize,Knight shows that riskanduncertaintyaredifferent concepts.Risk isknown,
calculable and it can be foreseen, hence eliminated or avoided. Uncertainty is not subject to
calculations,itcannotbeeliminatedcompletely,butitcanbeactedupon,forexample,togain
benefits. However, the validity of the Knightian constructs is questioned by some scholars
(Friedman,1976;LeRoyandSingell,1987).
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principle it builds upon is the uncertainty principle asserted by Werner Heisenberg. The





cannotbe certain),Heisenberg challenged thenotionof simple causality innature (American
Institute of Physics andCassidy, 2002). The logic is the following: ifwe cannot establish the
stateofnature(inthiscase,aparticle)atagiveninstant,wecannotdetermineitsfuturestate.
Thephilosophical implicationof thisworkdoesnot conclude everything in thisworldbeing
uncertain;itrathersuggests,accordingtoHeisenberg,wherethelimitsofuncertaintylie(1927)6:
“In the sharp formulation of the law of causality-- "if we know the present exactly, we 
can calculate the future"-it is not the conclusion that is wrong but the premise”. 
The concept of uncertainty in physics builds upon the individual’s lack of knowledge and
understanding about the current state of the nature and theway this statemight evolve. In
other words, it is subjective as well. Compare this definition of uncertainty to the one that
comesfrompsychology,where it isdescribedasastateofmindcharacterizedbyaconscious
lackofknowledgeabouttheoutcomesofanevent.Thisdescription, incontrastwiththeones
presentedabove,allowsus toassume that theexternalenvironment isnot theonlysourceof
uncertainty; the latter can take the form of mental reaction of a human to the external
environment.Inthissense,uncertaintyexists“inthemindofthepersonwhodoubts”(Head,1967:
206). In management science, this approach gained support of the authors distancing
themselves fromadeterministicandrationalisticview in favorofamorerelativisticview.At


6  According towww.aip.org/history/heisenberg/p08.htm by American Institute of Physics and David
Cassidy,retrievedon25.05.2009.
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“Uncertainty can be defined as  a state that
exists when an individual defines himself as
engagingindirectionalbehaviorbaseduponless
than complete knowledge of (a) existing
relationshipwiththeenvironment,(b)existence
of and knowledge of conditional, functional
relationships between his behavior and
environmental variables to the occurrence of a
future (t1) selfenvironment relation and (c) the
place of future (t1) selfenvironment relations
within the longer timeframe (t2…tn) of a self
environmentrelationshierarchy.“(p.571).
Uncertainty arises from the individual losing
control of both of the situation and of one’s
self. Need for control, in turn, is dependent
upon learning. Interpretative process of
cognitive mapping of the environment is
triggered by uncertainty in order to gain the





More information is required to remove
ignorance. Sense making is seen as means to
createmoreinformationandremoveequivocality








“[Individuals] experience increasing uncertainty
as the likelihood of event occurring or not
occurringbecomesequal.”(p.479)
Seeking or avoiding information, adapting to
(chronic) uncertainty, social support and
managing uncertainty management are stated





“Unforeseeable uncertainty refers to the
inability to recognize influence variables or
interactions at the outset (the system state
spaceisnotfullyknown).”(p.1343)
Insituationswhenunforeseeableuncertaintyis
present two strategies can be used:
selectionism or trial and error learning. The
choicebetweenthetwodepends,amongother
parameters, on the nature of complexity. In
situations where the project team could have
foreseenthevariablesandinteractions,project
risk management methods and contingency
planningisrecommendedtobeused.
Olga Perminova 





The authors adopt the definition provided by
Lipshitz and Strauss (1997, in McMullen and
Shepherd, 2006): “uncertainty in the context of
action is a sense ofdoubt thatblocksordelays
action.”(p.135)
Action, specifically entrepreneurial action, is a








The authors treat uncertainty as somewhat a
perceptual phenomenon. They conclude that
“uncertainty results from vagueness, ambiguity
andcontradictionsassociatedwithlackofclarity
because of lack of data, incomplete and
inaccurate detail, lack of structure to consider
issues, the working and framing assumptions
beingusedtoconsidertheissues,known
andunknownsourcesofbias, limitedcontrolof
relevant project players, and ignorance about
howmucheffortit isworthexpendingtoclarify
thesituation.”(p.688)
Knowledge management and learning, both
organizational and individual, are emphasized




“Uncertainty is lack of certainty in the simple
common language sense… risk is the possibility
ofdepartures fromexpectationswhichmatter.”
(p.309)
Application of “Indentify”, “Structure” and
“Ownership” phases of PRAM 2004  (in
Chapman, 2006) “to associate each source of
uncertainty with a preliminary view of
appropriate responses, each source of
uncertainty and possible responses









ways managers can either reduce or absorb the negative consequences of environmental
uncertainty, which has been recognized as an important variable in the explanation of
organizationalstabilityandperformance.Ithasbeennotedthatfirmsdonotnecessarilyreceive
negativeimpactfromuncertaintyandrisks;theycancreateopportunitiesoutofit.
At a first glance, itmay seem as if there is a commonunderstanding as towhatuncertainty
standsfor.Atleast,theresearchersinmanyfieldsofmanagementscience,includingtheoriesof
organization, interpret it as if there is agreement,when in fact, this concept does not have a
common interpretation. One can take environmental uncertainty literature as an example. It
interpretsuncertaintyasbothastateoftheenvironmentofafirm,andastateofapersonwho
perceives herself/himself lacking critical information about the environment (Milliken, 1987).
Consequently, there are different definitions and operationalizations of the construct:
environmental uncertainty and perceived environmental uncertainty. Generally, environmental
uncertainty is defined as a perceptual phenomenon, especially within the contingency and




1. Aninability toassignprobabilitiesas to the likelihoodof futureevents (Duncan,1972;
PfefferandSalancik,1978).
2. A lack of information about causeeffect relationships (Duncan, 1972; Lawrence and
Lorsch,1967).
3. An inability topredict accuratelywhat the outcomes of adecisionmightbe (Downey
andSlocum,1975;Duncan,1972).
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“Uncertainty is an individual’s perceived inability to predict something accurately. An 
individual experiences uncertainty because he/she perceives himself/herself to be lacking 
sufficient information to predict accurately or because he/she feels unable to discriminate 
between relevant data and irrelevant data.” 
ThemeritofMilliken’swork(ibid.)isinprovidingausefulcategorizationofuncertainty,which
takes intoconsiderationnotonlythesourceofuncertainty(suchasmarket, technical,etc)but
also specifies the types of it (e.g. lack of knowledge or understanding, or inability to predict
something).Theauthoridentifiesthreemaincategoriesofuncertainty:
1. state uncertainty is experienced by organizational administrators as a lack of
understanding of how components of the environment might be changing. This
constructistheonlyoneinthetypologythatreflectsthestateoftheworld.
2. effectuncertainty isdefinedasaninabilitytopredictwhatthenatureoftheimpactofa
future state of the environment or a change in the environment will be on the
organization.Essentially,itreflectsalackofunderstandingofcauseeffectrelationships;




concept in the sense that the latter is used by, for example, Duncan (1972) and Pfeffer and
Salancik(1978).Milliken’sresponseuncertaintyisverycloseconceptuallytothedescriptionof
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uncertainty and ambiguity7 in decision theory literature (Conrath, 1967;Weick and Sutcliffe,
2001).  The benefit of the framework proposed by Milliken is in its ability to explain the









interpretable results due to the way the constructs were developed and operationalized.
Milliken (1987) argues that there should be no expectations of correspondence between
objectiveuncertaintymeasuresandsubjectivemeasures,because“perceptionsvaryasafunctionof
contextualfactorsandasafunctionofindividualattributes”(p.135).
A more important merit of Milliken’s framework is in explaining how different types of


7 The latter, to which project management adepts often adhere to when it comes to the issues of
uncertainty(asknownunknownsinwidelycitedDonaldRumsfeld’sterms(DepartmentofDefense,2002)
and ambiguity (as unknown unknowns (ibid.), describes ambiguity as the inability to recognize and
articulaterelevantvariablesorinteractions(SommerandLoch,2003).WeickandSutcliffe(2001)provide
anexampleofambiguity,whicharisesfromcoordinationincomplexprojectswhensomeagentsarenot
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uncertaintymight affect the strategy of an enterprise. In order to copewith state uncertainty,
whichassumesunpredictabilityof theenvironment, theauthorsuggests“muddlingthrough”






how their firmmight be affected by the environmental changes. Outlining threats (risks) or
opportunities is a significant part of the process. Milliken (ibid.) suggests that this type of
uncertaintyismostlyassociatedwithcontingencyplanning.Responseuncertaintyisexperienced
bydecisionmakersas they try tounderstandandassess the rangeofstrategic responses that
are available to them in the lightof thebenefits the responseoutcomesmightbring for their
endeavor.Strategically,thistypeofuncertaintyischaracterizedbythetendencytoimplement
theactionsthatimitatethoseofe.g.competitors,segmentleaders,businesspartners,etc.Thus,
response uncertainty is associated with the need to acquire information and discover how
similarorganizationshavecopedwithsimilarproblemsinthepast.Forecastingtechniquesand
modeling of the effects of various responses under varying conditions are expected to be
utilized by managers that experience response uncertainty. To summarize, the framework
constructedbyMillikenprovidesanimportant insightintohowdifferent typesofuncertainty
experienced by decisionmakers correlatewith the organizational internal strategy formation
process.However,theauthorconcludesthattheuncertaintyconstructsneedtobebetterrelated
to the organizational processes that they evoke,which could extend the knowledge on how
organizationsaredifferent in termsof effectiveness.Millikenparticularly stresses theneed to
investigatetheprocess,bywhichthemanagersbecomecertainthatthisorthateventorcondition
represents a threat or an opportunity for their organization: sensemaking. In the following




Managing Uncertainty in Projects52
2.2.2 Uncertaintyinrelationtointernalprocessesofafirm

The idea of how uncertainty can be acted upon— or in other words, managed— plays a
significant role in the works of organization theorists.  Organization theory researchers see
uncertainty as “emanating from some set of objective (but largely unmeasured) environmental
characteristics” (Jauch and Kraft, 1986, p. 778), thus proclaiming that uncertainty sources are
external to organizations. However, there are several concepts referring to firm’s internal
processesandattributesthathavecloserelevancetotheuncertaintyconstruct.Therelevanceof
managing uncertainty can be traced inMaxWeber’s work (e. g. 1968), whose views on the
issues of fact and value impacted the formation of the organization theory. His ideas on
bureaucracyandrationalization (and theproblemsassociatedwith those issues)gaveground
fortheideasofMarchandSimon(1958)thathighlightedinternalvariabilityofgoalsandgoal
displacement in organizations. The goals — which can be also interpreted as values — are
different among individuals that constitute different groups within the organization due to
differences in setsof facts, resourcesand immediateaims that theyhave. Inotherwords, the
experiencesandsituationsthattheyoperateinvary.Notonlyarevalues,attheindividualand
group levels divergent, but theymight create conflict at the organizational levelmaking the
overallorganizationalgoalsfailinfavorofthoseofindividualsorgroups.Variabilityingoals
stresses the likelihood of organizational conflict, and so does the inherent interdependence




the structure (Galbraith, 1977; Mintzberg, 1979) with the latter correlating with the
organization’s profitability and effectiveness (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Thus, uncertainty
stemming from the organizational environment is seen as a significant factor influencing the
performance and structure of an organization,where the latter includes not only the formal
rules, goalsvalues, and policies of a firm, but also the communication style and frequency,
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particularly interesting result showing that subgroups (departments)within an organization,
possessing different values and experiences, to deal with different segments of the
environment,and thus, theuncertainties that they facealsodiffer.Thestudy that theauthors
performedshows,amongotherresults,thatcommunicationaspartoftheintegrationprocesses
help to resolve internal conflicts andachieve competitive success for thewhole organization.
Theprocessesofcommunicationandinformationacquisition,andorganizationalstructureare
recognizedashavinganeffectonuncertainty.
Tosummarize, thetheoriesrepresentedabove lookat thestructureofanorganizationand its
communication patterns as decisive factors for managing uncertainty. In fact, uncertainty is
regardedasacontinuousorganizationalsituation.Someauthorsregarduncertaintyasnegative
for the firm because itwithdraws organizational equilibrium, and thusmanagers attempt to
eliminate it (Lorenzi, Sims and Slocum, 1981). Others came to the conclusion thatmanagers
cannotcontroluncertainty(FordandHegarty,1984),andthereforetheyignoreit(March,1981).
However, most of the works mentioned focus on uncertainty reduction strategies and
informationgatheringforthepurposeoffacilitatingdecisionmaking,especiallyifweconsider
contingency theories. These theories discuss decision premises such as goals, values,




However, this view on organizations as programmed and rigid stable structures faced certain
criticismfromtheadeptsoftheotherstreamofthoughtinorganizationaltheorizing.Thisstream
proposes a social constructionand sensemakingpoint of viewon thenature of a firmand its
processes(Weick,1995;Schön,1983).This trendhasgainedconsiderablesupport in thecurrent
literatureonorganizational communication,knowledgemanagement and integrationprocesses
thattraditionallyconsidereduncertaintyasanimportantvariable(McPheeandZaug,2001).
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presence in economic and management literature is taking into consideration a relational
individualisticperspectiveversus thatof straightforwardrational thinking.Suchanapproach
implies that a wider variety of elements of economic andmanagerial interactions are given
value, such as for example, emotions and other, rather individual,manifestations.However,
and most importantly, these streams in research pay much attention to the element of
uncertainty in economic andmanagerial action, and they do it from a different angle.  The
researchers adopting a relational approach regard uncertainty as an element complicating
meansendslogicofrationaldecisionmaking, leadingtothefactthat thereisaneedtoadopt
management principles different fromutilitymaximization (Bandelj, 2009). There are several





the understanding of reflection at the level of the individual (Popper, 1996;  Weick,1995;
Reynolds and Vince, 2008). Although the individual actor’s level is the starting point of the
discussion, uncertainty at the organizational level is not a sum of individual perceptions;
neitherisitsuchattheprojectlevel.Rather,theperceptionofuncertaintyimpactsthewaythe
tasksareperformed(seealsoGalbraith,2002).
Any human action is constituted of the threemain elements: the actor’s past experience, the
perception of the present context and the intentions to achieve certain future contextual
changes.AccordingtoLaneandMaxfield(2005),actioncanbeinterpretedas:
“A bridge that actors construct in the present, liking their past towards a desired future” 
(p. 8).  
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which each single action takes place, are in a constant state of change incurringmany other
actions,contextualdevelopments,aswellasthenaturaland“humanmade”8lawsguidingthe
processes. That is why the outcome of an action does not necessarily match the original
intentionoftheactor,becausethecontext,inwhichtheactionhasbeenexecutedandtheresults
that occur, may have changed during the process due to the abovementioned factors. This
processiscontinuous:humansacttoadjustthefuturecontextbasedontheirexperienceandthe











As the first bullet point suggests, reflective processes (e.g. interpretation, sensemaking,
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appear to be theprocess ofmaking things certain.As itwill be shown in the following sub
chapters,thereisagrowingtendencytorecognizereflectionasanessentialpartofmanagement





the seminal work of Donald Schön “The reflective Practitioner: How professionals think in
action”(1983).Herefersto“reflectioninaction”asembeddedin:
“On-the-spot surfacing, criticizing, restructuring, and testing of intuitive understanding 
of experienced phenomena; often it takes the form of a reflective conversation with the 
situation.” (pp.241-242) 
Similardefinitions of reflection and learning canbe found in theworksofKolb (“experiential
learning”,1984)andKnowles(“selfdirectedlearning”,1975).Thesescholarsusetheconceptions
oflearningandexperienceasthestandpointtodrawupon.Oneofthescholarsthathashadthe
most influence, particularly on thework of Schön is JohnDewey,who depicts reflection on
experience as aprocessof thinkingwith theprocessesof sensing, observing, elaborating and
empirical testingalsobeingapartof it (1916).An importantaspectofreflectiveexperience is
action aimed at achieving the anticipated result, which is the equivalent of testing the
hypothesis.Allthesescholarsshareacommonfocusonindividuallearningandtheapplication
of learning rather than observing the reflective processes on an organizational level.
Organizational learning is the most recent field under the umbrella of learning theory and




As Reynolds and Vince (2008) notice, the concept of reflection has become somewhat
unquestionable,aprocessthatneedstobedonebythemanagerstostrengthentheabilitiesof
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theorganizationtosurvive.Thisconceptiscloselyrelatedtotheissuesofknowledgecreation
andexchangewithinfirmsaswellaswiththeoutsideworld.AsGrant(1996)states(p.375):
“If the strategically most important resource of the firm is knowledge, and if knowledge 
resides in specialized form among individual organizational members, then the essence of 





“…a process of periodically stepping back to ponder the meaning to self and to others in 
one’s immediate environment about what has recently transpired” (Raelin, 2001, p.11)        
Whilereflectionhas itsmanagerialvalueindetachingmanagersfromtheirhabitualbehavior,
waysof thinkinganduseofpower— inotherwords, itgives theability to critically review;
individual manifestations (emotions, behaviours, attitudes)  act as a lens enhancing or
distorting the factswithin a situation, and even influencing the learning process (Swan and
Bailey,2004).Theyareseenasapartofthereflectionprocess,theireffectscannotbeneglected
while interpreting and implementing reflection on and at an individual level. The trend to
recognize the impact and value of personalityrelated issues is penetrating into the project
management science. Although the traditional rational approach to project management
professedbythevarious“BodiesofKnowledge”istheprevailingtrend,theemergingliterature
on soft issues— the effects of changingmorale, schedule pressure, political issueswithin the
company, lossof trustbetweenclientsupplier, etc.— isprovidingevidence that the factorof
human sensitivity and emotions can be considered as adeterminant of project behavior (e.g.
Williams,2005).BuildingupontheworkofHofstede(2001),whichstresses the importanceof
looking at national culture rather than just organizational, Winch, Clifton andMillar (2000)
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reflective  processes  in  decision‐making  and  acting  that  builds  upon  real‐time  situational 




that  focus  on  following  a  strict  plan  tend  to  be  disadvantageous  for  projects  under  high 




As  compared  with  the  rational  approach,  the  theorists  of  reflective  stream  look  at  the 
organization as an evolving endeavor with  its specific qualities emerging as a response  to  the 
situations  that  occurred  in  the  past.  Organizations,  together  with  the  processes  and  elements 
which  constitute  them,  are  viewed  from  a  different  angle:  as  being  socially  constructed. 
Organizations are seen as: 
“nets of collective action, undertaken in an effort to shape the world and human lives” 
The contents of the action are meanings and things (artifacts). One net of collective 
action is distinguishable from another by the kind of meanings and products socially 
attributed to a given organization." (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992, p.32). 
The processes that take place within firms are, consequently, socially constructed by everyday 
interaction  between  the  members  constituting  them,  their  beliefs  and  interpretations  (e.g. 
Bittner,  1965;  Weick,  1977,  1995;  Giddens,  1976).  Salancik  and  Pfeffer  (1978)  go  even  further 
suggesting  that  not  only  attitude‐needs,  but  also  task  environment  characteristics  are  socially 
constructed.  Interpretation  is  seen  as  one  of  the  most  important  mechanisms  of  organizing, 
which both emerges from it and constrains it (Ranson et al., 1980; Louis, 1980). In other words, 
organizations are viewed as only temporarily stable. Karl Weick’s research showed examples of 
organizations  “proactive  toward  their  environments  rather  than  reactive  to  them”  (1977,  p.  271). 
Furthermore,  he  argues  that  understanding  and  sense‐making  affect  strategic  decisions,  and 
consequently, the performance of the firm. 
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Decisionmaking theories try to develop systematic approaches to giving answers and





order to grasp the changes and increase the flexibilitywhen adapting to them.  Ifwe speak
aboutaprojectanditsenvironmentthatareinacontinuousprocessofchange,thereisobvious
importanceinreflection—inordertoforeseepotentialdangersandopportunitiestothefullest
possible extent (Schön1983). In this context, theprinciplesof sensemaking canmakea solid
contributiontothemanagementofuncertaintyinprojects.
ThecoreofthisprocesshasbeendescribedbyKarlWeick(1995,p.15):
“…to talk about sense-making is to talk about reality as an ongoing accomplishment that 
takes form when people make retrospective sense of the situations in which they find 
themselves and their creations. There is a strong reflexive quality in this process. People 
make sense of things by seeing a world on which they already imposed what they believe…”  
One should notmix the process of sensemakingwith interpretation. The former is amuch
deeper process. In contrast, interpretation implies that the reality is taken for granted; the
objects of this process are evident,whereas sensemaking does not have such presumptions.
Thus,sensemakingimpliesalessdeterministicapproach.Itaddressestheissuesofcomplexity
and ambiguity from the perceivers’ point of view with major processes grounded in
description,observationandreflection.Weick(1995)seesuncertaintyasaconditionforsense
makingthatcouldbetransformedintoriskoropportunities.Ingeneral,sensemakingincludes
very many valuable principles that can be utilized in project management in respect of the
management of uncertainty. This is especially true considering that sensemaking implies
dynamic, flexible, adaptive processes, precisely those that the current state of the art project
management needs to address in greater detail (Floricel andMiller, 2001; Pich, Loch andDe
Meyer,2002;GustafssonandWikström,2004;Maytorenaetal.,2007).
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 Organizationalcommunicationandinformationhandling,
 Organizationallearning,






and perception of risk by managers (e.g. March and Shapira, 1987; Sitkin andWeingart, 1995,
KahnemanandTversky,1979).Thedefinitionofriskhasbeenapointofdiscussioninthisfieldas
well(seeMarchandShapira1987).Oneimportantconclusionthatcanbedrawnfromorganization
research and applied to project business is that most managers do not treat uncertainty about






using skills to control the threats. It is important to mention, that these authors make a clear
distinctionbetweengambling (“where odds are exogenously determined and uncontrollable”) and risk
taking(ibid:1410).Thelatterisassociatedwithuncertainty,whichcanbereducedwiththehelpof
skills or information. Risk taking propensities vary across both individuals and contexts. They
dependonpersonalqualitiessuchasexperience,incentivesandinterpretation(ibid.).
Ifbusinessmanagerstendtoavoidriskratherthanacceptit(e.g.CyertandMarch1963/1992),
the handling of risk will be emphasized as compared to identification and analysis: risk
managementbecomesinsuranceoriented(Close,1974).Ifmanagementtheorytakesanexternal
viewpointon theorganizationasanentity, seeingrisksas forcesactingupon it; organization
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theory treats organizations as a complex goaloriented system with subparts that are in a




words, riskmanagers should begin by attempting to identify and classify risks in relation to








With regard to theprojectmanagement field, the issueofuncertaintyhasgainedattention in
conjunctionwiththeconceptsofriskandriskmanagement(Jaafari,2001;WardandChapman,
1995; Chapman and Ward, 2004; Flyvberg et al., 2003; Olsson, 2007). According to various








havepositiveconsequencesonprojectobjectives.Thedefinition implies thatrisk isobjectiveand
measurable(andsoareuncertaintyandopportunities).Ingeneral,thisdefinitionisacceptedbythe
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research in the field,but as in thecaseof theenvironmentaluncertaintyconcept inorganization
theory,therearemanyinterpretations.LetustakeMillerandLessard(2001)asanexample.They
adoptthefollowingdefinitionofrisk(p.438):
“Risk is the possibility that events, their resulting impacts and dynamic interactions may 
turn out differently than anticipated. While risk is often viewed as something that can be 
described in statistical terms, uncertainty applies to situations in which potential 
outcomes and causal forces are not fully understood: we refer to both as risks”. 
Here risk isnotanuncertainevent; rather it isapossibility thatanevent (interaction,condition)






project plan), the expression “understood” (when referring to uncertainty) indicates that risk
becomes somewhataperceptualphenomenon. UngerandEppinger (2006)presenta“traditional
categorizationofriskbysourceofuncertaintyunderlyingtherisk”(p.2),describingeachriskcategoryas








“A risk is a threat to project success, where the final impact upon project success is not 
certain. Some risks may appear to be internally generated but in fact are inherent to the 
nature of the project. For example, creating a breakthrough new technology carries a risk of 
failure simply because it is pushing the boundaries of what is possible. That risk would apply 
to any project team, in any organisation, that was trying to do the same work. It is inherent in 
the nature of the work and does not arise from the rules, policies, processes, structures, 
actions, decisions, behaviours or cultures of the project organisation or its host.” (p. 584) 
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Barber’s definition is different to the ones presented above because it stresses the negative
natureofriskbydescribingitasathreat,andpositionsitasanimportantprojectsuccessfactor.
Therearemanyotherdefinitionsthatareessentiallysimilartotheonespresentedabove.Oneof
themostpopulardefinitions recentlyquoted indifferent sources (ChapmanandWard, 2004;
Hillson,2002,2003)istheonefromthePRAMGuidebytheAPM(1997,InChapmanandWard,
2004).Accordingtothisdefinition,riskisanuncertaineventorsetofcircumstancesthat,should
it occur, will have an effect on the achievement of the project’s objectives. In general, the
definitionsofriskinprojectmanagementcouldbeclassifiedinthefollowingcategories:




3. Definitions of risk as an event/condition/interaction with negative consequences on
project’sobjectives.Inotherwords,itisathreattoaproject.
ThebestwaytosummarizethemultitudeofperspectivesonriskisbyquotingHealy(2004):
“Risk is conceived as either an objective, numerical property of the external, material 
world or as a qualitative, human or cultural construction” (p.277). 
Therearemorevariations inopinions regarding the issueof riskamongwriters in this field.
Nevertheless,thereisonefeatureinunderstandingthistermthatallthescholarsagreeon.They
refertoriskasuncertainty, indicatingthatitcouldbealsointerpretedasthechanceof lossor




management in essence is all about.Asprojects areabout creating somethingnew, i.e.hence
somethinguncertain,whatprojectmanagershavetodoistocopewiththatuncertainty.Inthat
sense uncertainty is mainly derived from the unknown things. In traditional projects where
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projectmanagers’main concernweremeeting time, budget and quality constraints thiswas
very likely to be the case.As a consequenceproject (and) riskmanagement became equal to
information collection (see e. g. Armour, 2002). Despite this, it still does not mean that
uncertaintycanbemanagedbytheriskmanagementmeans.
Projects are influenced by internal and external risks. Under internal risks the researchers
understand the risks that originate within the project. This category includes all processes,
policies, actions, behaviors, cultures relevant for the project. Externally generated risks arise









There have been a number of distinctive approaches to project risk management since the




process in a similar manner (e.g. Artto, 1997; Chapman and Ward, 2004; Barber, 2005). Risk
management inprojects includesseveralsteps.PMIdefines6stages(seeFigure2): identification;
qualitative risk analysis, quantitative risk analysis; response planning; monitoring and control,
advocatingstronglytheimportanceoftheplanningstageforthepurposesofriskmanagementas
wellasfortheprojectasawhole.Someresearchersreducethenumberofprocessstepsorphases
(Boehm,1991;Turner,1999), someextend it further (CañoandCruz,1998;ChapmanandWard,
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Thefore,onekeyareabecomesastructuredapproachforthat informationcreation(Eppinger,




situations. Traditional project risk management identifies the socalled upside (with positive
impactontheproject’soutcomes)anddownside(withnegativeimpactontheproject’soutcomes)risks.
However, the focus of management lies on the planning of activities for mitigation and
preventionofthenegativerisks(ordownsiderisks).







“Since response to some urgent issues may be started when their ultimate significance is 
still unclear, a critical general management responsibility is to exercise strategic control 
over such issues. This means continual re-evaluation of the significance of issues and 
redefinition of both priorities and the direction of projects”  
However, this assumes the implementation of actions when the issues are known; their
probable consequencesareevaluatedaswellas theirpriority for theorganization.Whenyou
know that something is an issue, you are certain. There is no uncertainty any more. Issue
managementassumesthatthereshouldbeenoughofinformationandknowledgetoactupon
theissue.Ansoffcontinues(ibid:144):
“Every new event will pass from a sense of turbulence to the 'full knowledge' level, but 
the speed of evolution will differ.  From the point of view of an enterprise, the important 
moment in the history of an event is the time of its impact, which is the point after which 
it is too late to respond: either the opportunity will 'have passed by' or a threat can no 
longer be avoided. If the response is to have a chance of being effective, it must be 
completed before the time of impact”.  
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However, there is a need to addressuncertaintypreciselyduring the time,when an event is
only “a sense of turbulence” or evenbefore that. Theproject issuemanagementdiscipline is
concernedwithissuesasrealizedevents.Thisprocessisnotenoughtoaddressuncertainty,but
some elements of it are of value: for example, continuous monitoring, tracking of changes,
assigningresponsibilitiestothememberswhopossesscontrolovertheissue,etc.
Themethodologyofsystematicprojectmanagementoforganizationswithaspecialemphasis
on effectiveplanning, communication and evaluation to achieve thedesiredoutcomes is still
dominanttodayasadmittedbytheresearchers(Maylor,2003;Aldermanetal.,2005,Wikström,






firm’s goal of creating competitive advantage through projects (Maylor, 2001). Risk itself is
traditionallydescribedasanuncertaineventboth innormativeandresearchliterature,which





The new trend opposing the traditional view on project risk and uncertainty management
emerged from strategic management literature (Mintzberg, 1994) and represents a critical
insight into the role and influence of strategic planning on the performance of a project
company(Andersen,1996;DvirandLechler,2004). Themainassumption is thatplanningof
projectactivitiesatanearlystageisnecessary,butnotasufficientcriterionforprojectsuccess
(Andersen,1996).Taking intoconsiderationthe fact thatprojectsarecomplexendeavorswith
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restrictionson time, costs, resourcesandprecise specificationsof theproduct tobedelivered,
planning seems to be a difficult task.However, there are constraints and unclear areas, that
neither the customernor theproject company is able to recognize at an early stage.The real




As illustrated by Shenhar (2001), project managers can apply routine, formal procedures to
projectswith lowuncertainty,whereashigher levelsofuncertaintywill requiremore flexible
approach. Inasimilarvein,Loch,SoltandBailey (2008)suggest thatneitherselectionismnor
learning areneededwhenuncertainty (or unforeseeableuncertainty orunknownunknowns as








fact that theprojectand itsenvironmentare inacontinuousprocessofchange, it is turbulent
and creates uncertainty, there is obvious importance in reflection— in order to foresee the
possibleextentofpotentialdangersandopportunities(Schön,1983;Loch,SoltandBailey,2008;
Olsson, 2007; Maytorena et al., 2007). Indeed, projects are better described as journeys of
explorationinagivendirection,ratherthanstrictplanfollowingendeavors(Perminovaetal.,
2008(a),(b)).Nevertheless,largescaleindustrialprojectsareverycomplexand,thus,uncertain,
which emphasizes the need for greater flexibility and reflection as a newway of generating
knowledgeandfunctioning(Wikström,2005).
As noted byLundin andSöderholm (1995), theprominent argument in normative theories on
project management suggests planning as a means of ensuring project success. The same
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limited sources of help in decisionmaking under uncertainty. Consequently, uncertainty as a
contextforrisksandopportunitiesrequiresadifferent,lessmechanisticapproach,thantraditional
project risk management is currently suggesting. The critique of traditional project risk
managementaspromotedbythenormativeprojectmanagementliteratureisratherstrongdueto
the fact that the need to manage uncertainty by different means than risk management is







thatmight bring newopportunities into the project (Chapman andWard, 2002). Thus, risks are
understood as one of the implications ofuncertainty, in contrast to traditional riskmanagement
approach,assumingriskisuncertainty.Suchaninterpretationhasgivengroundtoanewtrendin
project riskmanagement science referred to as project uncertaintymanagement (Chapman and
Ward,2003;Green,2001;Jaafari,2001).However,thisapproachcannotbeconsideredas“strategic”.
Forthemostpart,projectuncertaintyisdescribedbytheprojectuncertaintymanagementschoolas
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Theweaknessofthisapproach,inmyopinion,isinitssimilaritytotraditionalprojectmanagement
view in terms of over exaggerating the planning procedures as being crucial for the project’s
success.However,projectplanninganddocumentationisseennotonlyasanadministrationand






Improvement ineffectivenessandefficiency indecisionmaking is akeyprocess in clarifying
situations. The success factor lies in the ability of the management to see, understand and
handle accordingly different projectspecific aspects of risk and uncertainty threats and
opportunities—thatemergethroughoutdifferentstagesoftheprojectdevelopment.According
toKarlPopper (1996,p.24):“the situation changes the possibilities and thereby the propensities”.The
philosopheremphasizesthatadeterministicapproachfailsinmostofthecases.Theseideasareof
special importanceformanagementofcomplexand innovativeprojectsasanencouragementfor
greater flexibility as opposed to strict planfollowing (Floricel andMiller, 2001; Gustafsson and
Wikström,2004),newwaysoffunctioningandgeneratingnewknowledge(Atkinsonetal.,2006),
especiallylearning(Meijer,HekkertandKoppenjan,2007;Loch,SoltandBailey,2008).Inasimilar
vein, it canbeargued that learning through improvisation shouldbe seenasa legitimate, if not
profound,approachtomanagingprojects (RehnandWikström,1999;Lindahl,2003). Insum,the
uncertaintymanagement adepts consider reflective processes of importance for the projects and
projectbased organizations as tools on increasing flexibility in decisionmaking and response
implementation. There have been certain attempts in research to show the value of uncertainty
management by reflective practices for project performance (Shenhar, 2001;Meijer,Hekkert and
Koppenjan, 2007). But in general, it can be concluded thatmost of the research on uncertainty










































































































































































































































































































































































literature review into a theoretical framework. There are two bodies of literature that I
considered most relevant for the thesis: project management literature and the literature on
perceiveduncertaintywithinstrategicmanagementandorganizationtheoryfields.Inorderto
relate the existing theory and research with the empirical case study of the thesis, I shall
constructaframeworkcombiningtheliteraturesinquestion.Thereisnoriskthatthethesiswill
become toodeductivemerely supporting the chosen theories. This is due to the fact that the
startingpointof this research,whichtoa largeextentdeterminedthechoiceof the literature,
was the need to contribute to the solution of practical problems. The use of the results in
practicalempiricalcasesalsosupportstheinductivenessoftheundertakenresearch.Asitwill
be shown in the next chapter onmethodology, themethods used in data collection and the
iterativeprocessofdataanalysisrepresenttheinductiondeductioncycles.





 lackof empirical research regarding theactions that themanagers take in response to
uncertainty,
 lackofexplanationofwhatuncertaintymanagementstandsfor,
 lack of attention to the earlypost delivery stage and its importance for strengthening
learningandknowledgepracticesaspartofperformanceorientedprojectmanagement.
In line with the argument of Eisenhardt (1989), the construct of uncertainty (as well as the
constructs of risk and opportunity) for this thesis has been developed on the basis of the
iterative process,which assumes sharpening of the concept through its application.Drawing
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and/or understanding of the relevant project elements, its environment and their
interrelationship, so that no conclusion can bemade as to if and/or how any of those can
impacttheprojectsuccess.
Thisdefinitionadoptstheviewonuncertaintyasaperceptivephenomenon(Milliken,1987;
Meijer,Hekkert andKoppenjan, 2007)which encompasses the viewonuncertainty as e.g.
lackofinformation(Duncan,1972;LawrenceandLorsch,1967;Håkonsson,2006referringto
Galbraith,1974),inabilitytopredictaccuratelytheoutcomesofeventsordecisions(Downey
and Slocum, 1975) or inability to assign probabilities to their likelihood (Pfeffer and
Salancik,1978).Itaddressestheunforeseeableuncertaintyorunknownunknownsastheyare




Risk is an event, condition or interactionwith the negative consequences on the project’s
objectives and consequently, project success. Opportunity is an event, condition or
interactionwiththepositiveconsequencesontheproject’sobjectivesensuringsuccessofthe
projectactivities.
Incontrast touncertainty,riskandopportunityarefactbased,concrete,knowableissues. It is
importanttonotethatthisinterpretationofopportunitytreatsitnotonlyasfavorableeventsor
cumulative good luck in projects, but also as more effective responses to both negative and
positiveevents,or any (inter)action that affectsprojectperformancepositively.This extended
view on opportunities in projects has been gaining attention in project management field
recently(Chapman,2006;Olsson,2007).
Having constructed the uncertainty definition with regard to research question Qb, it is
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important tooutline thevariableswhichaffect it tobeable toaddress theQa. The literature
review showed that there are several variables that have an influence on uncertainty in the
context of complex largescale projects: complexity (Sommer and Loch, 2003, 2004;Williams,
2005), information: itsavailability,relevance,correctness,etc.(Weick,1995;Pich,LochandDe
Meyer, 2002), availability of project managers’ knowledge to perform the task and/or the
experienceinperformingit(sometimesitisalsoreferredtoasinnovativeness,novelty,orlack
ofknowledge/experience,asine.g.Atkinsonetal.,2006,Meijer,HekkertandKoppenjan,2007),
projectmanagers’ individual characteristics andmanifestations (Håkansson, 2006;March and
Shapira,1987)aswellastheorganizationalstructure(seeTable3forareview).Consideringthe









foster flexibility and learning. As a result of reflectionbased mechanisms functioning,
uncertainty is resolved into knowable issueswhich are, according to the adopted definition,
risks and opportunities.  They are successfully addressed with risk and opportunity
management mechanisms because there is no high uncertainty any more (Shenhar, 2001;
Davies,BradyandHobday, 2006;Loch,Solt andBailey,2008). It is stated that learninghasa
significantpotentialtoreduceuncertainty(LevittandMarch,1988;Atkinsonetal.,2006;Meijer,
Hekkert and Koppenjan, 2007).  Learning is emphasized as a mechanism to secure that the
experience gained in a project stays within the organization as a part of the organizational
culture (Lundin andMidler, 1998, Atkinson et al., 2006) and is further utilized as a part of
strategyformationprocess(Milliken,1987),asthecommonpoliciesandpracticesoftheproject
based organization. Thus, project strategy contributes to the organizational strategy andvice
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versasupportingthefocusoncompetitiveadvantageratherthanmerelyavoidingthenegative
potential of projects (Maylor, 2001).This is how project performance is related to the
performance of the projectbased organization. Shenhar and colleagues (1995) as well as
Atkinson(1999)pointouttheimportanceofearlypostdeliverystage(warranty)inevaluation
of theprojectperformanceandsuccess.Atkinsonetal.(2006)argue thatpostdelivery (or the
post implementation stage, as they refer to it) is crucial for knowledge management and
organizational learningas the results of themanagerial actionsmaynotbe realized for some
timeaftertheprojectexecutionisfinished.Consequently,focusonthelifecycleoftheproject,
as compared to focusing on project execution only, emphasizes value management (ibid.),
customerorientationandtrustbetweentheprojectstakeholders(Gustafssonetal.,2010)aswell
as communication (March and Simon, 1958;McPhee and Zaug, 2001) and learning from the
others(LevittandMarch,1988).Inthecontextofprojectsastemporaryorganizations(Lundin
and Söderholm, 1995) which a subject to continuous change (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1998),
learningandknowledgemanagementrepresentachallenge(Atkinsonetal.,2006),especiallyif
the judgment about the project success is based solely on projectmanagement professional’s
intuition and individual expectations of performance (Jaafari, 2001) without considering the





during theproject lifecycle including thepostdelivery/post implementationstage.Thus, it is
important to studyuncertaintyand the reflectiveprocessesaimedatdealingwith it from the
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To the latterbelongthepsychologicalclimate (JamesandJones,1974)9andtheorganizational
climate (Denison, 1996). They are interrelated with the individual manifestations of the
organizationalmembers.
The conceptual framework of the study is presented in Figure 3. In line with the research






















































With reference to Denzin and Lincoln (1998), this thesis adopts the qualitative research
perspective. As the authors state, the choice of research practices and tools available for the
qualitative researcher, is not set in advance.  Furthermore, the authors state that qualitative
research is inherentlymultimethod, attempting to achieve an indepth understanding of the
phenomena in question. As is the case with most qualitative research, generalization to a
broaderperspectiveisnotthemainconcernofthestudiesinthisfield(LincolnandGuba,1998),
which are thus descriptive having implications for the choice of method explaining the
phenomena.Nelsonetal. (1992,inDenzinandLincoln1998,p.5)attributesselectionofthose
methodsandtoolstotheresearchquestionsandtheircontext.
However, simply admitting that this research is of qualitativenature isnot enough to justify
methodological choices. I need to allocate myself within the fundamental domains of
epistemology,ontologyandmethodology.Tostartwith,thisresearchisdrivenbyandaimsto
contribute to theworld of practice,which is in linewith the pragmatist and critical realism





To summarize, this traditionwithinwhich I ampositioningmyself, provides a goodbalance
betweenrelativismanddeterminismontologically.Intermsofepistemology,itisconsideredto
be subjective (at least in contrast to positivism), since it allows researcher to intervene and
maintainadialoguewiththeresearchobject.Infact,thepragmaticcriticalrealismtraditionsees
this subjectivity as an advantage for solving the problem and completing successfully the






Althoughqualitative research, as a set of interpretivepractices, doesnot implypreference to
anysinglemethodologyoveranyother(DenzinandLincoln,1998),themethodologicalchoices
ofthisworkareinfluencedbytheadoptionofpragmaticcriticalrealismviewofsocialscience.
Hence,given theabovementionedmetaphysical commitmentsandkeeping inmind that this
research is driven by an endeavor to build a bridge between theory and practice, it is
descriptive,explanativeandexplorative;itisbestdescribedasmainlyqualitativemultiplecase
study with a grounded approach to data gathering and analysis with the focus on critical
events.Therationaleformultiplecasedesignandtheselectionofthecasesweretheorydriven
to some extent and derived from the expectation of replications (Yin, 1994), and the aim to
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achieve a certain degree of generalizability of the research outcomes. As suggested by














each of the case projects was between 1,53 years from the sales until the warranty
phase;




were selected. The choice was led partially by the theoretical requirements and by the
availabilityofthedata.WhileworkinginresearchprojectsIhadtheabilitytoobservedifferent
interesting cases, but only sevenof themwere chosenbecause they represented the problem
area best.As evaluated, the increase in the number of caseswould not addmore value, but
rathermakeitdifficulttocopewiththeincreasingvolumeandcomplexityofthedata.
The research within the scope of this thesis was conducted as a part of ongoing research
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projects within Research Institute for ProjectBased Industry (hereinafter referred to as PBI
Research Institute).The fact thatPBIResearch Institute employs avariety ofmethods,which
can be classified under the collaborative management research, constructive research and
clinicalactionresearchapproachesandmethodologies, influencedtheselectionof theprojects





influence fromSIAR,aScandinavian researchgroup focusingonapplied research (Rhenman,
1970).TheappliedresearchprojectsthatPBIiscarryingoutarepractitionersdriven(orclient
driven in action research terms) seeking to provide deeper understanding of the phenomena
frommultipleperspectivesandgiveanswersastohowtosolvetheproblem.Suchanapproach
can be paralleled with Lewinian or, perhaps even better, the Scheinian traditions of action
research.However,itismorethanthat,sincenotonlyestablishingquestions,butalsoseeking
the answers is a joint effort between the clientpractitioner and PBIagent.  A continuous




as described in collaborative management research (see, e.g. Werr and Greiner, 2008).  The




the latter is lacking in traditional academic research, mainly because of it is driven by the
universality andcommonalityof resultsandanoveremphasisonscientificmethodsanddata
(Werr and Greiner, 2008). Thus, the goal of this thesis — is not only in providing applied
knowledge,butalsointhedevelopmentofmethods,toolsandapproachestocomprehensively
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solve the contemporary problems of management in projectbased industries and to outline
“best practices” within the field. In other words, the development of purposeful designs as
Pasmoreetal.(2008)describethem.
Thecombinationof these twoperspectiveshelps toavoid the trapoftenassociatedwithpure
consultant research: criticism andunrecognized accomplishments in the eyes of the scientific
community (Salaman, 2002, inWerr andGreiner, 2008).An importantpart of theknowledge
creation process within the PBI Research Institute is supporting doctoral thesis’ projects in
maintaining a continuousdialoguewith the academicworld:documentingknowledge in the
form of scientific articles, presenting findings to peer academics (and practitioners) at
conferences, seminars, etc. This dialogue with a larger audience provides a basis for












Managing Uncertainty in Projects84
Table5.Methodsofdataanalysisandverification


















for the project case (as in Tenkasi and
Hay,2008;Silverman,2001);
 systematic development of the coding
system to achieve the common
dynamics of integration of theory and
practice observed across cases (as in
TenkasiandHay,2008);
 systematic construction and

































for each of the project cases (as in
Tenkasi and Hay, 2008; Silverman,
2001);
 systematic development of the coding
system to achieve the common
dynamics of integration of theory and
practice observed across cases
continues(asinTenkasiandHay,2008);
 withinandacross case analysis to
compare the projects, events and
outcomes with the aim to outline
similarities and differences (as in
Eisenhardt, 1989;  Tenkasi and Hay,
2008),
 systematic construction and




























 enriching a narrative sequence of
events for each project case with
relevant information collected in the
formofmemosofmeetingsandemail
correspondence;
 withinandacross case analysis to
compare the projects in Phase I and
PhaseII,eventsandoutcomes;
 systematic development of the coding
system to achieve the common
dynamics of integration of theory and
practiceobservedacrosscases;
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 mapping the projects using the
framework of Fuglseth and Grønhaug
(2000,seeTable19andTable20inthe
Appendix);
 Forming a narrative of each case
project,alsointheformofpictures(see
subchapter4.4CaseDescriptions);
 systematic construction and
development of the relevant models
andprocesses(Kasanenetal.,2003);
 external verification of preliminary
results (uncertainty management
process)withinCompaniesAandB via
workshops and discussions with
practitioners: project and warranty
managers, their superiors as well as

























 Early phases of implementation of the






ongoing projects at PBI Research Institute (see summary in Table 5). Along with the





research in the way William Pasmore and his colleagues propose: as aiming at bringing
researchers and practitioners closer together to boost the progress in understanding and
addressing various issues concerning management professionals, organizations and their
relationtosociety,suchasinnovation,organizationaleffectiveness,change,etc(Pasmoreetal.,
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“Collaborative research is an emergent and systematic inquiry process, embedded in 
agreed-upon partnership between actors with an interest in influencing a certain system 
of action and researchers interested in understanding and explaining such systems” 
(Pasmore et al. 2008, p. 13). 
The core of this inquiry process is in integrating the scientific knowledge andmethodswith
practicalknowledgeandrelevance.Themainqualitycriterionforcollaborativeresearchisthe
sameasfortheactioninquiry: actionability (as inBradbury,2008).Inotherwords, theresults
shouldbeactionableforthosewhointendtopracticallyapplythemtoinfluencethesystem.
I would like to highlight the fact that collaborative research is often mixed with action
research as it is grounded in similar principles. In general, action research studies are
considered to be under the umbrella of pragmatist philosophy, hermeneutics and
phenomenologyasascientific legitimatingbasis (SusmanandEvered,1978),which isalso
true forcollaborativeresearch.Theothercommonalties includethreeotheraspects: (1) the
integrationknowledgeproductionandactionprocesses, (2)bindingtheresearcherandthe
researchedinateamtoworktogetherandlearnusingscientificmethodsand(3)combining
inquiries from inside and outside by forming a joint insider/outsider research team
(Pasmoreetal.,2008).Actionresearchcanbeseenasamodeofmutuallearning,andthus,
asthecasewithlearning,requirestransformationofexperiencethroughreflectioninorder
for action to takeplace (Kolb, 1984).A similar statement canbemade about collaborative
research. However, there is a significant difference between action and collaborative
research in terms of aims. Collaborative research is specifically interested in purposeful
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designs that are intended to manage the systems towards desired outcomes and the
understandingofe.g.firmsandotherorganizationsascomplexsystemsofmembers,actions,




As will be explained in the following paragraphs, the study of Company B cases has some
characteristicsof  collaborativeresearch,partly in termsof theresearchcycle (diagnosing—>
action planning —> action taking —> evaluating the consequences —> learning) and
orientation towards the interests of the collaborating partnerspractitioners. However, such
elements are not unique in collaborative inquiry. Furthermore, adopting a collaborative
researchstrategyallowsmetoutilizedifferentelementsof(action)researchpracticestopursue
my goals. For instance, the chosen approach assumes that the research process is driven by
multiplegoals of theparticipants, and thusdoesnot require tobe strictly followedphaseby
phase, as is the case with the abovementioned traditional action research cycle. On the
contrary, collaborative research encourages a combination of descriptive and prescriptive
elements of the process, provided such a combination aims at solving the problems and
questionsoftheresearch.Thisthesisprojectcanberelatedtosomeelementsofactionresearch
traditions:primacyof thepractical elementas inclientdrivenclinical research (Schein,2001),
encompassingactionandreflection (ArgyrisandSchön,1996), stressingdialogueasawayof
achievingbetterunderstanding(Bohm,1996)andsoforth.
Being fieldbased, longitudinal and engaged, collaborative research is often associated with
actioninquiryintermsofmethod,butisnotlimitedtoit.Infact,itissuggestedthatresearchers
committing to collaborative inquiry employ a combination of experimental and unobtrusive
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TheresearchprojectsinPBIarecarriedoutinteamswithmembersofsuchteamsparticipating
at all stages of the project development: from problem formulation to data collection and
analysis,andthereportingofresults.Thisprocessofmaintainingcollaborationandverification
(in the sense that the collaborative research approach gives to this word) within the
organizationisyetanothercharacteristicofacollaborativeresearchapproach. Ingeneral,PBI
exploitsmethodologicallyaninductiveapproach.
In sum, the PBI Research Institute provided a platform for this doctoral thesis by making
available themeans bywhich to carry out realtime empirical studies in terms of tools and
meansfordatacollectionandanalysis,generationofknowledgeandtestingofthefindingsboth
withinpractitionerandscientificcommunities.SomeofthosestudiesthatIparticipatedinasa
memberofPBIconstitute theempiricaldataof this thesis (seeTable6). Table6 indicates the
articlesandconferencepapersthatwereproducedasaresultofthestudiesinattempttobring
theresults fordiscussion toa largeraudienceofacademicsandpractitioners.However, these
contributions indicate only intermediate results.This thesis studybuildsupon someof those
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Table6.Projectlogs,reportsanddocumentationofresultsaccordingtoindustry
3.2.1 Datacollection
In this section Iwilldescribehow thedatawasacquired.Thiswillbedone in relation to the









A detailed study of one project with the
focusonrisk,uncertaintyandopportunity
management20062007
(Perminova, Hellström and Wikström,
2006; Perminova, Gustafsson and
Wikström, 2007;  Perminova, Hellström
and Wikström, 2007; Perminova,
Gustafsson and Wikström, 2008 (a), (b);
PerminovaandHellström,2008)
 A research project for Company B aimed at developing and
implementing a method for uncertainty, risk and opportunity
management at warranty phase of industrial projects with a special
emphasis on  competence management 2007  2009 (Perminova,
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ItisnecessarytomentionthatIhavenotbeenapartofthestudiedorganizationsatanypointof








management and contracting services for oil and gas exploration andproduction companies.
This company can be characterized as an entrepreneurial (Bird, 1992; Krueger and Brazeal,
1994).Althoughthecompanyischaracterizedassmallinsize,intermsofpersonnel(lessthan




central subjectwas their participation as one of the twomain contractors in a large offshore
project,theaimofwhichwastoproducetheoilandgasdrillingandproductionplatformstobe
operatedon the FarEast offshoreofRussia. In the scopeof their contract for theoil andgas
platforms of a CGBS type were: coordination of MMO engineering including method




10 Information according to: www.deltamarin.com/references/offshore/Offshore_reference_list.pdf,
retrievedon16.12.2008.
Olga Perminova 
Managing Uncertainty in Projects 91
main topic ofmy interviewswithmanagers of this company, the other examples from their
projectportfoliowerementionedquitefrequentlyasexamplesofsomewhatsimilarendeavors
fortheoilandgasindustry.
Iperformedthe investigations in thisproject intwosteps.Firstly, Iconductedfive interviews














an active part in assisting with issues in the project requiring their competence,
brainstorming sessions and other formal and informal discussions/seminars together
withtheprojectteammembers.
At that point in the timeline ofmy research, I was particularly interested in how project
uncertaintyandriskaremanaged.Specialattentionwasdrawntograspingwhetherthereis
a difference between risk and uncertainty and how this difference is reflected in
management practices. All the interviews were transcribed and combined with the
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frameworkdifferentiatinguncertainty from risk,whichwaspublished in several scientific
and practitioner projectmanagement journals, and also presented at several international
management conferences (Perminova, Gustafsson and Wikström, 2007;  Perminova,
Hellström and Wikström, 2007; Perminova, Gustafsson and Wikström, 2008 (a), (b);
PerminovaandHellström,2008).
The secondpart of this studywas conducted in autumn2007,when thewarrantyphasehad
partlyended.However,thecontracthadnotyetbeenclosedduetoseveralopenissuesbetween




was to understand how the project had developed within one year as well as how it had
affected Company A as a whole. Theoretically, my intention was to increasingly focus on
verifying how risk, uncertainty and opportunity are understood by project management














Managing Uncertainty in Projects 93
3.2.3 PhaseII:CompanyBcases
ThisstudyisbasedontheresultsofthedevelopmentandimplementationprojectthatthePBI























finalized (Spring 2010).  My practical tasks as a project participant included data collection
(interviewing,participationindiscussions,reviewingrelevantdocumentation,etc.),qualitative
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During the firstphase, a studyof the current stateanalysisof the riskmanagementpractices
under warranty within Company B was performed on the basis of the observations of the
sampleof10projects.TheprojectsthatIobservedwereevenlysplitintotwogroupswithinthe
sample:shipbuildingprojectsandpowerplantconstructionprojects. Thescopeofsupplyfor




possibility to follow them up to the end of the warranty.  The analyzed data consisted of
differentsources(alloftheminEnglishlanguage):
a. Interviewswith thewarrantymanagers responsible for these projects aswell aswith
someoftheprojectmanagersforthechosenprojectsregardingrisks,uncertaintiesand
opportunitiesthatappearedintheprojectsinquestion,thecausesofthataswellasother
problems and obstacles in their current way of working and ways to improve the
drawbacks;heldinEnglish;
b. Specificprojectdocumentation: contractual agreements,memosofmeetings (e.g.kick
off,customermeetings),projectplans,etc.;
c. General policies, manuals and procedures used by Company B (e.g. risk registers,
warrantymanagementprocessguidelines,etc.);
d. Generaldiscussionsintheformofmemosregardingriskmanagementpracticeswiththe
company experts from sales, project execution and technical service departments
deliveringprojectsformarineandenergysystems(powerplant)industry.
The second phase of the research concluded with the development of a risk/uncertainty
screening, a management process, and a tool using the results of the previously conducted
currentstateanalysis.The tooland theprocesswere testedwithinaperiodof8monthsona
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similar sample of another 10 projects. In August 2008, another workshop with the senior
managementofCompanyBwasheldtoevaluatethefirstresultsofthetest.
Thethird,implementationstageofthisresearchproject,hasstartedinautumn2008andison
goingat themoment,while this thesis isbeing completed (Spring2010).The implementation
stage involvesall theprojects in theportfolioofCompanyB.During theperiodfromAugust
2008untilMay2009, twomoreworkshopswereheld toaddress theresults. It isnecessary to
mentionthatIhavenotusedtheprojectdatafromtheimplementationstageintheanalysisin
thisthesis.Rather,atthatstage,Iusedtheopportunitytofurtherdiscusswiththemanagersthe
model of uncertainty that had emerged, as well as test the ideas and fine tune it for
implementation.Hence,thatperiodservedasavalidationofthethesisresults.
Thesummaryof theprojectsand interviews that Iusedas cases in this thesis ispresented in
Table7.AlthoughthenumberofprojectsthatIobservedduringtheassignmentwithCompany
Bwasmuchmorethanseven, Iultimatelyonly includedsevenofthemasstandalonecases.
The reason for thiswas the limitedaccess toprojectdata, since the assignment restricted the
periodwhen thedata analysis had to be complete. Thus, the rest of the observed endeavors




There were no strictly followed questionnaires at the interviews. Rather themanagers were
encouraged to tell their “stories”: to give examples of different occurrences/ events, the
unforeseensituationsthattookplaceduringthecourseoftheprojects.However,Iemployeda
general topic matrix as a personal reference tool to ensure that the relevant themes were
coveredduringthemeetings(seeFigure26andTable13.),althoughtheset oolswerenotstrictly
followed.TheinterviewswereconductedinEnglishlanguagebytheauthorof thethesis,and
then transcribed by a professional translator for the English language. In addition, the
correctnessofthetranscriptionwasverifiedwiththeintervieweestoavoidmisinterpretations.
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thewordsrisk, uncertainty and opportunityinquestionsunlesstheintervieweehadalreadyexpressed

































Total: 8projects 22interviews 6workshops
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and verify the results of the research. The latter, in accordance with collaborative
research principles, served as means of data collection, interpretation, analysis and
verification,
5) systematic development of the coding system to achieve the common dynamics of
integrationoftheoryandpracticeobservedacrosscases(asinTenkasiandHay,2008),
6) systematicconstructionanddevelopmentofthemodelsoftheprocessesonthebasisof






and verify them according to new emerging understandings. All the interviews were
transcribed;thedatafromCompanyAandCompanyBwascombinedandtransferredtoQSR
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NVivo 7 software program which enabled content analysis and categorization. I worked
towardsvalidityoftheconstructs(uncertainty,risk,opportunity,etc.)bycategorizingthedata
in such a manner that relationships between the categories were evident. I strove towards
connecting the elements of the categorization to achieve process logic in their interrelations.
WhatIcallinitialcodinganalysiswasdoneimmediatelyafteralltheinterviewsandmaterials
were collected from the projects.  After the initial coding, I continuously revisited and
significantly developed the emergingmodel with the latest version being the one discussed
here.The inspirationsbehind themodeldevelopmentwere theworkshopswithpractitioners
andthepeerdialoguewithfellowresearchcommunitiesaswellasconceptualdevelopmentof
the framework and continuous literature studies. My position in the project as an actively




Onelimitationof thestudy,whichneedstobespelledout, is thatthe interviewsandworkshops
werecarriedout in theEnglish languageandnot in the interviewees’or the interviewer’snative
languagewhichmayhavedistorted someof the information.However, itmustbe said that the
EnglishlanguageistheofficiallanguageusedinCompanyAandCompanyBintheirlocaloffices
all over the world including Finland. Thus, the good command of the English language a
prerequisiteforalloftheemployeesincludingtherespondentsinthisstudy.Atthesametime,this
bias was triangulated methodologically via application of several data gathering and analysis
methods(e.g.workshopsanddiscussionswithpractitionerduringwhichtheunclearissueswere
resolved, brainstorming sessions, using the otherPBI researchprojects as sources to confirm the
data)andby involvingseveral investigators (thePBIcolleagueswhoparticipated in theresearch










1978; Lincoln and Guba, 2003).  In positivist science, the quality criteria for research are
determinedby internalandexternalvalidity, reliabilityandobjectivity (Bryman,2001). Non
positivisticresearchdoesnotseemtohavesuchawidelyestablishedsetofevaluatingmethods;










 testing and shaping of the results through implementation in the participating
companies.




of quality in collaborative management research (Bradbury, 2008; Argyris, 1996). Bradbury
(2008) outlines the following subcriteria included in the concept:  practical value (1), social
interaction (2), cyclesof actionand reflection (3), andactive experimentation (4).Actionability
encompasses, among other attributes, the ability of the research to help people and
organizations to systematically meet their goals with regard to sustained desired practice
(Bradbury,2008).Themoretheresearcheraddressestheneedsoftheresearchobject,oftheco
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inquirers (which can be the same as the research object), the better the research quality is
deemedtobe.Thenotionofactionabilibtyissimilartotheconceptofcredibilityactivelyusedin
qualitativeresearch(e.g.GubaandLincoln,1998;Bradbury,2008).Theprincipleitselfisinthe
emphasizing of collaboration, continuous dialogue between research subject and research




this thesis utilizes data triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory triangulation and
methodologicaltriangulationinsomewayoranother(seee.g.thetwoprevioussubchapters).
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described projects represent different industrial segments: shipbuilding and energy. The
descriptionsof thecasessituationsarepresentedtogetherwiththeanalysis,andaimtoexplain
thephenomenonunderscrutiny,andtheelementsandactionsmanagersundertaketoaddressit.
Tobeginwith, Iwouldliketopointout that thesetofdatathat Ianalyzedincludesdifferent
examplesofrisks,uncertaintyandopportunities.Inthischapter,Iprovidethedescriptionsof
stories—situations inprojects—thatpresented themselves inmy interviewswithmanagers
fromthetwocompanies,whichwillhereafterbenamedCompanyAandcompanyB.
Aswasalreadymentioned in thechapteronmethodology, theentiresetofdata includesnot
only thedescriptionsof stories andpersonalmanagerial reflections that canbe found further
on, but alsoothermaterial on routine processes (as in terminologyusedbyMarch andSimon,
1958): theapplicablecompanypolicies,projectplans,charts,meetingsmemos,etc. setofdata
was combined with the managerial reflections to provide a more complete picture in the
descriptions. The general discussions regarding business processes of the projectbased
companiesaswellasseminarsandworkshopswithbothpractitionersandacademicsplayedan
equallyimportantpartinthedataanalysis,andespeciallyinverifyingthefindings.






 Lessons learned in the formofmanagerial reflectionsonwhat couldhavebeendone to
improveoraltertheoutcomes.
As it is often argued in the projectmanagement literature, nearly any project can be labeled
unique.However, thepractitioners in the companies that I have studied tend to seepatterns
andcommonalitiesintheprojectsthattheydeliver,andthusoperatewiththeterms“standard”
or “nonstandard” project. Both approaches to assessing projects have their truth since it is
merely amatter of perception i.e. which characteristics of the project the judgment is based






all the relevant characteristics can be grouped. One parameter, project organization,
encompasses the issues that are projectspecific. The other is internal organization, which
























project ismanaged can also vary from project to project. There two reasons for this. Firstly,
organizations are constitutedof theprocesses that originate from theirmembers,whoareby
naturedifferent.Secondly,evenonesinglepersonunderchangingcircumstanceswouldmost




themanagers indicatedasbeing the important facts, inotherwords, the certainties that they
learnedatthebeginningoftheirprojectduties.Ashortdescriptionisprovidedforeachofthese
alongwithmarkingsincolor:redindicatesaweakpointandgreenisastrongoneaccordingto




















































Technical complexity is a category that encompasses the issues that are
related to the hardware outcomes of the project – the product, its
components and tools associated with it. It is an internal parameter of the
supplierorganization.Itmustbenotedthattheprocessesthatareassociated
with the product, such as the technology and the product development, its
new applications, the services around it,  are included into the following
category–internalprocesses,managementandorganization.

It isanexternalparameterthat refers to thecharacteristicsof thecustomer
organization as such. The respondents stressed several qualities of the
customercompany:knowledgeoftheindustryoftheproject(marine,energy,
etc.),experience in the industry (numberofyears,projects,etc.),numberof
projectsdeliveredtogetherwiththesupplierinquestion,experienceinhowto
operatesupplier’sequipment(knowledgeofspecificationsandoperator/user
requirements by model), customer’s commitment to the project goals
(perceived as willingness to communicate/cooperativeness), regionspecific
way of working. It is an external parameter from the perspective of the




the tasks and responsibilities of the counterparts that enter into such an
agreement.Inotherwords,itisaformalstatementoftheresponsibilitiesof
the parties executing the project. The contract and its supplementary
documentation, including amendments stating the changes in the originally
agreed scope of supply, constitute one of the main sources of relevant
informationinfluencingmanagerialactivitiesintheproject.

The term network I understand as concerning the issues related to the
structureofprojectstakeholders’network,thehierarchyandpowerrelations


























What is meant by organizational experience here is the sum of single
individualexperiences,resultsofreflectivelearningbydoingprocesses,atacit
knowledge that the members of the organization in question possess and
utilize in theirwork. Indeed,experience is bydefinition reflective,aswellas
communication.
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Communication is seen on two levels taking the perspective of the supplier
firm in question: internal within the company (between departments,
divisions,etc.)andexternal(withtheprojectstakeholders,authorities,etc.).

In contrast to experience, skills (explicit knowledge) of the organization

















All the three industries have their own specifications, although the two latter industries —
power generation and the offshore oil and gas segment— are encompassed by the general





twenty first century have been influenced by the trends in shipping, especially those of the
continuedexpansionofworldtrade,fleetrenewalandcapacityexpansion,allofwhichledtoits
Olga Perminova 
Managing Uncertainty in Projects106
current status of being truly global (Hellström,2005). Although traditional shipping nations
maintain a significantmarket share in ship building, the competitive edge hasmoved to the
EastwithJapanandSouthKoreaalreadybeingthetendsettersbythe1960’sand70s.Duetothe
overcapacity in the industry followed by the price slump in the early 1980s, the regime of






In general, the luxury cruise vessel industry is a special segment in shipbuilding, aiming for
morethanjusttransportationofpassengersfromonegeographicalpointtoanother.Thecoreof
thecruisebusinessistheuniquecombinationofsailingwithawidearrayofcustomeroriented
services, which can be generally classified as leisure and entertainment. The modern cruise
shipsareoftendescribedasfloatingtownsorluxuryhotelswithallthenecessaryattributesto
justify the name: restaurants, wellness and fitness centers, swimming pools, casinos, night
clubs,shoppingareasandmore.Intermsofshipbuildingthismeansthatagreaterfocusisput
intotheoutfittingwork;andthetraditionalimportanceofassemblingthesteelstructuresinthe
cruisevessel segmenthas somewhatdiminishedas compared to thevolume segmentsof the
industry(AndritsosandPerezPrat,2000).However,thecustommadeoutfittingisnottheonly
reasonwhythecruisevesselsdeservetheirstatusamongsttheveryuniqueandmostcomplex
products in any industry. Themachinery requirements are high aswell: the vessel needs to
maintainhighmaneuverabilitytogetherwithspeed.
Thesafetyoftheequipmentaspectisalsoverydemandingsincethevesseloperatesinhighseas
with a significant number of passengers onboard. Any cruise vessel must comply with the
demanding safety standards before it leaves the building dock, both those imposed by
InternationalMaritimeOrganizationaswellastheConventionforSafetyofLifeatSea(SOLAS)
beinganecessity.Fromthisperspective,thereisnoroomfortraditionalriskmanagementwith
the aim to minimize potential negative impact of the event on the outcomes (or the safe
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transportationofapassengertothedestination,inthiscase)sincetheriskofnegativeimpacton
thepassengers’livesshouldbezeroaccordingtotheprocedures.Whileitisanecessitytoapply
precautions prescribed by themaritime standards,— the action that can be regarded as risk
managementperse,—onecannotpreventaforcemajeureeventonboardbecauseofitsnature
ofbeingunknowninadvance.Evenwhatwasnotsupposedtohappen,happens.Moreover,it
can be difficult at times to judge the severity of its impact on the equipment and people on
board beforehand. In otherwords, the event and its causes are uncertain and not known in
advance. If the event occurs, it has to be handled not only according to the rules and
procedures,butmoreimportantly,insuchaveinthatpassengersandcrewhavenodangerto
their lives.Theactions thathavetobe implementedtoreachanacceptable levelofsafetycan
sometimesgobeyondtherecommendationsandrequireproactivethinking.Thisisanexample
of the relevance of uncertaintymanagement, where risk management becomes a supportive
function inpreparation foranypotentialnegative impact evenat thevesselassembly. In this
sense, the uncertaintymanagement process becomes an ongoing process having continuous
relevancethroughoutthewholeproject,fromvesseldesignandconstructiontowarranty,when
theshipisoutintooperation.
Generally speaking, ship building is composed of information processes and production
processes,which are inherently integrated (Andritsos and PerezPrat, 2000). The information
processcoversinformationintensiveactivitiesrelatedtothedesignoftheship,including:
 conceptdesignactivities,withprecontractualphasefeasibilitystudiesandpreparations
of predesigndocumentation such as specifications, principal systemdescriptions and
diagrams,etc.,



















industry is oriented towards a more extensive use of subcontractors consisting of inter
disciplinaryteams,whichareexpectedtoassumeturnkeyresponsibilityforwholesystemsor
segmentsthattheydeliver(ibid.).Consequently,thecorrespondingconceptfortheshipbuilder
isnamed“assemblyyard”. Incontrast tousing fieldorprofessionspecific subcontracting (e.g.
electrical,mechanical etc), theuse of turnkeydeliveries is expected to givemultiple benefits:
shorten lead times, provide highly skilled personnel to execute demanding work in limited
periodsoftime.Oneofthegreatestchallengeswiththe“assemblyyard”conceptinpracticehas
been to teach the new first tier suppliers to handle their projects in terms of planning and
scheduling,whichwasearlierdonebytheyard (BradyandDavies,2004;Hellström,2005).A
shift from traditional subcontracting to the turnkey deliveries employingmodular approach
constitutesasignificantinstitutionalchangeforboththeshipyardsandthesubcontractors.The
example of the modular approach is reflected in Figure 5. Ship production and assembly
hierarchy.
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Generally speaking, the present status and the changes that are taking place in both power






gas production is recently accelerating due to the appearance of new technologies (Ronalds,
2006). In addition to its traditionaluse ofheatgeneration,gas receivesnewapplications as a
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substitute for coal in electricitygenerationbecauseof lower carbondioxide emissions. It also
showspotentialindisplacingoilintransportfuelsthroughgastoliquidsandgastohydrogen
technologies. These trends justify the emergence of a new era which has been dubbed the
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in the optimal plant size shifting from that of centralized largescale systems to distributed
energy systems. In terms of equipment manufacturing, economies of scale are likely to be
realizedthroughmovingtowardssmallergeneratingunits(IEA,2002).
Intermsofoilandgasoffshoreproductionefficiencyandeffectiveness,thecomplexityoftheoffshore

















environments. There is a diverse typology of offshore installations according to different
criteria,inthiscasethewaterdepthandwellcount(Ronalds,2006):
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Additionally, the offshore installations differ in terms of operator presence (attended and
unattended) and well exposure. In this thesis, I analyze a fixed production installation: a
concretegravitystructure(CGS).
Thetechnologiesinthepowerplantcasesofthisthesisconcernadieselandnaturalgasfuelled
reciprocating engine. This power production technology can be considered an old invention




costefficiency challenges. Moreover, the suppliers are requested to provide diverse
technologicalsolutionsduetotheincreasingcustomerdemandsfornotonlyelectricityorheat,
butboth,orevenincludingairconditioningcapacities.Forexample,combinedheatandpower
(CHP) and chill, heat and power (CCHP) solutions are among the newest technological
concepts that the suppliers have developed in order to stay competitive on the market
(Hellström,2005).
The researchers studying the trends in the oil and gas industry indicate that in spite of the
commonendeavortowardsdevelopmentsthataremainlyhightechdriven,thusfarthehuman
and organizational aspects have become the greatest challenges that require addressing
strategically (Liyanage, 2006).  It implies that more holistic sociotechnical approaches are
necessary to develop and implement highperforming systems given the level of complexity
andthenatureofchange(ibid.).Oneofthemainthemesinthisrespecthasbecomethehuman
safety aspect along with the increasing concern for environmental performance. The special
attentiontohealth,safetyandenvironmental(HS&E)performancefromoperators,contractors
andregulatorsworldwideistransformingtheindustry’sculture(Jablonowski,2007).
In the last decade, significant efforts have beenmade to develop and implement stateoftheart
proceduresforevaluationandassessmentofaccidentstakingplaceontheoffshoreinstallations—
or unplanned situations of hazard and accident, as they are sometimes referred to in the
literature(Vinnemetal.,2006).Inthisrespect,riskanduncertaintymanagementpracticesareof
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high relevance. It is often argued that the potential of future major accidents cannot be
measured directly, thus constituting uncertainty. However, it is possible to study prior
accidents that have takenplace at somepoint in the past: factors behind their evolution and
physical phenomena in question (fire, leaks, gas dispersion etc.), which are considered as a





 the documentation of the occurred events is incomplete or imprecise in some cases,
whichhasanimpactonthewaydataisinterpreted.
In general, uncertainty has been one of thewidely used concepts in the oil and gas offshore








Bothpowerplantsandoffshore installationsessentially consistof standardizedparts,but the
engineeringworkmaydiffersignificantly fromproject toproject.Thewaystandard technical
processesareembodied into the structuresandcomponentsdepends foremoston the typeof
the project, yet there is a wide array of other factors (e.g. floating power plant barge vs.
mainland power generation plant; floating offshore installation vs. fixed concrete gravity
structure etc.). The detailed design is usually performed by an engineering company or the
supplier of the component in question (Hellström, 2005). The companies that I have studied
Olga Perminova 















with civil structures to incorporate the mechanical parts to be assembled, after which the
electrical equipment is installed. The commissioning phase ends the construction process. In
practice,thedeliveryactivitiesoverlaptosomeextent.Althoughtheconstructionprocessstarts
with civil structures, it very often ends with their development after the mechanical and
electricalpartshavemostlybeencompleted.
Whilst the oil and gas offshore installations follow three similar steps in their construction
process, they require further transportation to the operation site at some point. Hence the
buildingsiteandtheplaceoffutureoperationsattheoilfieldarenotthesame,incontrasttothe
power plant deliveries considered in this study. In the case of delivery of a fixed concrete
gravity structure,CompanyAused several building sites indifferentparts of the country of
deliverywithvaryinggeographicalandclimaticproperties.Theywerethousandsofkilometers
away from the operational destination of the installation at sea. The control system together
withproductionequipment is themostsophisticatedpartofanyoffshore facility.The former
ensures the integrity ofwork between the two systems—drilling and oil/gas production—
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The final period in the project lifecycle from the supplier’s perspective is warranty.  The
warrantyphasestartsthedaythecommissioningprocessendsandlasts1—2yearsonaverage
forthefacility.Incomparison,powerplantsareexpectedtooperateforseveraldecades.From
theday theoperations start, installations requiremoreor less continuousmaintenanceworks
and possibly other supporting services. This is the reason why even small issues in the






cases had only a 1 year standard warranty unless specified otherwise. However, the

















to filling outwarranty claimdocumentation, the customer’s contact personwho is usually a
memberofthetechnicalstaff,contactstherespectivesupplier’spreappointedrepresentative—
awarrantymanager.Warrantymanagers, themain interviewees in theCompanyBcases,are




representative(s). Thus, when the warranty issue takes place, the initial contact can be less
formal in the form of an email or a telephone call to the assigned warranty department
representative.
Fortheclaimtobeaccepted,thecustomerhastoprovidesubstantialevidencethatthefailureis
nota resultofnegligenceon theirpart.Aswasmentionedbefore,most industrial equipment
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unless the contract suggests otherwise12. The maintenance intervals differ depending on the
engine type and operational conditions (e.g. type of fuel) and are stated in the equipment
manuals.Thewarrantymanager’s responsibility is toverify that thecauseof theevent is the
issuewiththeproductstructure,andnotfailuretoperformmaintenanceonthecustomer’spart.
Although the latter is no case forwarranty compensation, the studied projects show that in











be able to establish causeeffect relationships.As itwill be shown later, thewarranty period
















Thisprojectwhichhad the aimofdelivering two concretegravity structures (CGSs)— fixed
offshoreinstallations—belongedtothescopeofCompanyA,amediumsizedengineeringfirm
basedinFinland,whichactedasoneofthetwomaincontractors.
Theproject organization,project teamcompositionand scopeofworkweredescribedby the
projectcoordinatorasoutstandingintheirperspectiveasakeysupplier.Toputitbriefly,itwas
a consortium of multinational private and stateowned companies from different business
segments. From the perspective of the offshore installation delivery, there were two main




perform project management and controls, procurement and support services. The scope of
work of the company in question concerned mainly mechanical outfitting work for the


















The country of deliverywas theRussian Federation.Due to legislation concerning industrial
products, the prefabrication and other manufacturing activities had to be executed in the
country of delivery together with the assembly of the structure. The engineering and




factor in taking this decision was the continuous changes in the legislation concerning the
operationsofforeigncompaniesintheRussianmarketwhichimposedadditionalresponsibility
on the company to follow these changes carefully. The legal establishment of such ventures
required extensive juridical work. Furthermore, all the interviewees noted that the above
mentioned arrangements were possible due to the network of local business contacts they
established with the help of the other contractor and the Russian end customer.  The end
customer,aRussianstateownedorganization,wasanexperiencedpartythathadconsiderable
influenceontheactivitiesoftheproject.
To be able to meet the demanding circumstances, Company A acquired a local ship yard
specializinginoffshoreconstruction,whichbecamethemainoneofthethreebuildingsitesfor
the installations.Additionally,CompanyAestablished its own recruitmentagency todelimit
the dependency on the availability of the skilled workforce in the Russian market for
mechanical services.Most of the personnelworking on the building site in Russia including
senioradministrativestaffwerelocalnatives.Despitethefactthattheteammembershelming
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theprojectwereestablishedinFinland,atleastonemanageroftheteamwaspresentduringthe
weekly project meetings at the site. This required the team members taking shifts in
continuouslyshuttlingbetweentheheadquartersandthesite.Thegeneralmanagementstyleof
Russiancounterpartswasdescribedbytheteammembersassomewhatdifferentwithextensive




the costwas justified, it was covered by the customer. For an extra efficient performance, a
bonussystemwasarrangedbythecustomer.
The fixed offshore drilling and production platforms in question are highly customized
products. These facilities are part of a larger offshore project in the Russian Far East,which
bears the title of the world’s largest integrated oil and gas project (according to
http://www.sakhalinenergy.com13).Theinstallationshavethefunctionalitynotonlytoextract,
butalsoprocessthehydrocarbonsbeforetheyaretransportedbytwoseparatesubseapipelines
(one for gas and another for oil) connecting the platforms with the shore. One of the two
facilitiesunderscrutinyoperatesinwatersatadepthof30metresandtheotherat60meters,
whichimpliesthatthetotalheightoftheentirestructureoperatinginshallowerwatersismore
than 50meters (and the second one is up to 100meters). Each platform— or topside— is
positionedabovethesealevelandsupportscontrolsystems,anaccommodationmoduleforthe
personnel, processing (e.g. hydrocarbons and liquid/water separation systems) and power
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Thetopsidestandsonfourlegs,whichcontaindrillingequipment.Thefacilitiesaredesignedwith
highprecisionto fit theseabedtheyare fixedon.Sincetheyaredestinedtooperateall theyear
round in harsh climatic conditions out in the open sea, the equipment is designed towithstand
severeice,roughwindsandseismicchallengesoftheFarEastregion.Theinstallationscomplywith
all the relevant national and international standards on health, safety and environment (HS&E).
AfterthelastgreyliteraturereviewinApril2009,bothinstallationswereoperating.
Unforeseenevent
After the partial assembly at the building docks, the civil structure with drilling and partly
installedproductionequipment(bothmechanicalandelectrical)wastransportedtotheoilfield.
According to theproject coordinator,most of thepreinstalledequipment concernedoffshore
drillingandwerelocatedinthelowerpartofthetowerlikestructure.
Itmustbenoted thatanyfixedoffshore facility ismore than80%underwaterwith themost
sensitiveandessentiallyvitalproductionandcontrollingequipmentontopofit,abovethesea






the structureswere already installed on the location.Continuation of the topside installation
workrequiredobligatorytests tobeperformedtoconfirmthat thefour legsofeachstructure
arestablyfixedontheseabed.
TheevaluationsoftheseabedconditioninthelocationofoneoftheCGBShadshownthatithad
changed since the time of the last measurements. In terms of project execution, it meant that
certainadditionalworkon the concrete structurehad tobeperformed to secure itspermanent
position on the oil field. In accordance with regulatory requirements, specific tests had to be
performedtoprovethestabilityofthestructurebeforethetopsideinstallationprocesscontinued.
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Actions
Astheprojectcontrollerexpressedit,neitheroftheprojectstakeholdersexpectedthissituation
to occur. The end customer was especially concerned over the situation. As the Project
Controllerexpressedit:
“I think this is… uncertainty which is very hard to think of beforehand, if there is some 
remarkable additional scope… in this case it has affected on the long run…it has 
changed the whole focus [of the project]…”   
Itwasdecidedbythemanagementteamthattherewouldbeanextraphasetotheprojectaimed
at completing the mandatory requirements in the fastest manner possible. The project
contractorsandthecustomerexpressedmutualunderstandingthattheissuewasunforeseeable
andalthougheffortwasrequired toeliminatedtheproblem, itessentiallydidnot representa
threattotheprojectoutcomes.However,itwasclearthattheeventwouldaffecttheoriginally
planned schedules for all the stakeholders. As for the responsibilities for thework, both the











approved.Thiswas consideredas anachievement. Theadditionalphase affected theproject
schedule for all the stakeholders causing a delay in topside equipment installation bymany
months.Evenafterthetroubleshootingworkshadbeencompleted,therewerecertainpointsof
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concern for the stakeholders. As for Company A, which was not directly involved in the
executionofadditionalwork,theirworkingroutineswerestillaffectedbythedelay.Allthings
considered, theyhad toextend theiroriginal schedulebyalmostonecalendaryear.Firstand
foremost itwas their internal bookkeeping anddivisionof staff resources thatwere affected.





partly because the additional scope issues were not fully settled in terms of bookkeeping. It
causedfurtherdisputesastofinancialcompensationstodifferentparties.
These consequences of the unforeseen event had been related to several factors. The project
organizationasaconsortiumwithacommonmanagementteamwasnamedasonejustification
for both beneficial and negative outcomes of the unforeseen event. The members of
management team attributed the fast decisionmaking and ease of reaching agreements,
communicating and mobilizing resources on time to positive aspects of organizing by the
consortium. Thus, the success in technical completion of the structure stability problemwas
attributed to theway project stakeholders and themanagement teamwas organized.At the
same time, all the stakeholders — no matter if they were involved in solving the problem
directlyornot—facedthenegativeeffectsofit.Asoneoftherespondentsmentioned:
“…the consortium agreement is of such a nature that if one of the parties wins, 
everybody wins; if one of the parties loses, everyone loses; it will have an effect on your 
company no matter whether it is directly involved or not [in the task execution]” 
Manyof theproblems that followed theevent,especially thoseofdivisionof responsibilities,
wereattributedtothefactthatthepeople,whowereinvolvedintheprojectexecutionfromthe
beginning andhandled theproblem,were about to leave theirmanagementposts. This gave
rise to problems in coordination, communication and information handling within the
consortium. This situation combined with the fact that there was a lack of documentation,
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The first case isbasedon thediscussion ofa cruisevesseldeliveryprojectwith thewarranty
manager, for which company B delivered part of the machinery equipment including the
engine.Fromthesupplier’spointofview,theprojectunderquestioncanbelabeledasstandard:
the scope of delivery, the contractual obligations, and the assembling yard were familiar to
CompanyB.Moreover,theprojectcustomerinthiscasewasnotneweither:CompanyBhada
longhistoryofcooperationwiththisorganization.Forexample,theshipownerwasdescribed









final product in such away that those preferences aremet and function. Contractually, it is
normally arranged so that the supplier of the equipment (Company B in this case) signs a
separateagreementwiththeshipyard.Inthisproject,theresponsibilitybetweentheshipyard
andthesupplierwassplitsothat the installationof theengineroomequipmentwasdoneby
the shipyard, but the supplier was to provide the recommendations for it by keeping the
supervisingengineeronsiteforanagreedperiodoftime.
Unforeseenevent










“…it was not known that it was coming, absolutely not. It was an unforeseen claim…”  
Actions
The result of this event had a serious impact: the vessels that do not fulfill the SOLAS
requirements cannot be operated.  AlthoughCompany Bwas the organization receiving the
claimsfromthecustomerandtheshipyardwastheonehandlingthem,CompanyBwasfacing
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thatprovided the equipment inquestionhad responsibility for the situation.FromCompany
B’sside,aseriesofactionsweretaken.Aspecialprojectmanager(andeventually, theproject
team)was appointed to communicate and reach an agreement between the parties involved.
Thesuppliertreateditasaseparatesubproject:
“Therehadbeenaprojectmanagerandaprojectteamnominatedtodealwiththisspecial
claim…and [also] fuel pressure problems…nowwe seem to have a solution [for these
problems]”.  
The tasks of the sub project team included investigation of the cause of the overheating,
communicatingwiththeshipyardandthecustomertoplantheactionstobetakentoresolve





exposed itself in the specific technical setupof theoverall installation. Quoting thewarranty
manager:
“Some [specialists] from our technical department said that there might be problems 
with these [elements of equipment before the event], and then it happened…we could 









the supplier’s perspective, it assumed substantial losses at the company level. Since the ship
yard was also liable in this case, the total costs of troubleshooting were split between the
supplier and the ship yard. Such an agreement was negotiated with the help of the special
projectteam.
As to the opportunities, the interviewee and the workshop members — project managers
familiarwiththesituation—expressedanopinionthat itfacilitatedthedevelopmentof the
technology.The technical causeof theproblemwasdiscoveredandeliminated, althoughat
thecostoftimeandresourcesforthisproject.Therewasabenefitperceivedatthecompany
level.Themodificationswereappliedtoothervesseldeliverieswheresimilartechnologywas
applied. In some cases, thiswasdoneearly enoughduringproject execution to avoid large
scale replacements. Company B had a chance to prepare for possible malfunctions taking
place on the vessels in operation by arranging adequate stocks of spares, scheduling and
maintenance,etc.
Ontheotherhand,theeventforcedthecompanymanagementtothinkofhowtoreinforcethe




The interviewee stated that similar situationshadhappenedprior to thediscussed event.He
described another marine segment project of Company B, which concerned a cargo vessel
installation.Theprojectconcerneddeliveryofequipmentwhere thecompanywas toprovide
onlytheenginesystem.Theproblemappearedatatechnicallevel:amechanicalpartconnected
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was discovered, that the lubrication pipe had been built ignoring the instructions of the
supplier. This was why the mechanical component did not receive enough lubrication to
perform as itwas originally intended to. The customer received the appropriate repairwork
from thesupplier inaccordancewith thewarranty termsat thesupplier’sexpense.The latter
wasabletoforwardtheclaimtotheshipyardaskingforcompensationfortheworksincethe
shipyard ignored its liability to follow the instructionsof the supplier.Thenegotiationswere
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Case2BDesignPhaseFailure
Projectoutset
This project by Company B is a turnkey delivery of a power plant barge. It is a socalled
extension projectmeaning that the company had been delivering projects of the exact same
type,intheverysamesettingtothatparticularcustomerbefore.ThelocationontheJamaican
coast where the barge was meant to operate did not represent any particular concern: the
engines were tested in those conditions and had run without any serious problems. The
responsible warrantymanager as well as some uppermanagement representatives involved
described thepriorproject as a successfulendeavor.They stressed the importanceof the fact
that the customer was wellknown to them and had the experience in working with their
equipment.Inthewarrantymanager’swords:
“The customer has been operating the engines of the same type for ten years already; 
they know what they are doing.” 
ThefactthatthecontractsinbothSouthandNorthAmericanregionsincludethesocalledno
cost to the owner clause played a significant role for Company B. The clause imposes an
obligation on Company B, as a supplier, to cover all the costs during the warranty phase
whenevertheequipmentfails:beitanenginevalveorjustabulbinthecorridorofthebarge.
Although it assumedextensiveobligations, this clausewas common to the contractsusedby
CompanyB.Astheintervieweeexplained,suchaformulationservedasmeanstosupportthe
customers’assuranceintheproductsandservicesprovidedbyCompanyB.However,theway
in which the clause was interpreted depended to a large extent on the traditions of legal
interpretationinthecountryofdelivery.ThemanagersofCompanyBwereawareofthisand
wereprepared for the fact that theunderstandingof“nocost to theowner” in theAmerican
marketcouldimplymoreextensive,orevensomewhatextreme(suchasthecasewithchanging
thebulb),liabilities. 
At the time when the discussions took place, the project was at the warranty stage. To
summarize,thewarrantyroutinewasstandardandclearforthecompany.
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change was that some key members of the originally appointed team left their posts at the
company. As a result, a completely new team had to step in. As the warranty manager
describedit:
“Thewholedesignteamwaschangedinthemiddleoftheproject.Thepeoplewhowerein





the ongoing work, which implied learning about the previous activities, agreements,
weaknessesandstrengths.As thewarrantymanagerexplained, thekey tounderstanding the
result of the event lies precisely in the way that this information was handled by the
newcomers,andthesupplier’sorganizationasawhole.
Actions
Since the project tasks were considered to be rather clear and straightforward due to the
repetitivenatureoftheproject,thenewcomersreliedupontheirexistingskills,experienceand
knowledge.Therewerenomeetingsarrangedwiththecustomertopresentthenewteamand
discuss the next steps. The event was not considered unusual, rather the routine work
continued.Furthermore,itwastheinterviewee’sunderstandingthatthetwoprojectteamsdid
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for theproject’soutcomes.Asaresultof thechange, therefaultshavebeenfoundinthe later
designs that have affected the performance of the product in a negative way. Those faults
concernedboththehullstructureofthebargeandtheenginecomponents.Fortheinstallation
to function properly, considerable technical modifications needed to be done during the
commissioningandwarrantystages,causingadelay.
Outcomes
The identified outcomeswere negative.Most of the design errorswere corrected only at the
warranty phase in the form of equipment replacements. For this Company B managed to
contacttheformerdesignteaminvolved,whichwasnoteasysincesomeofthekeyactorshad







thecontractor stillhad to reacha suitableagreement.TheuppermanagementofCompanyB
perceived the problems with the long term partner as serious damage to the company’s
reputation.  The customer was not satisfied with the outcome due to the need to replace
equipment thus causing delays. Financially, the supplier had no possibility to make change
orders that could cushion them from severe financial loss. The project that was taken for
grantedtobeasuccessturnedouttobeafailureaccordingtotheinterviewee.
Figure9describeshowtheprojectproceededfromtheperspectiveoftheunforeseenevent—
the replacement of the design team.  As one can see from the diagram, the project did not
represent any particular concern for the supplier — Company B. Even the regionspecific
peculiaritieswereknownandaccountedfor.Onecanevenclaimthatthesupplierwasassured
of the success of this endeavor. This partly explains why the former design team was not
involved in the project after the replacement (unforeseen event) took place. The actions that
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“we should have used the same designers [up to the end of the project] or at least 
consulted with them, I mean, interview, discuss, check…” 
2. Theexperiencegainedfrompreviousprojecthasnotbeenutilized:
“ we should have done a proper design review, checkups and discussions with the other 
personnel, for example, the warranty managers, who handled the earlier 
project…because the knowledge exists in this organization”; 
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3. Therewasalackofinformationcommunicationandcoordination,particularlywiththe
customer:
“the customer could have helped us at the design stage [when the replacement took place] to 
realize what was done incorrectly, even though they do not go deep into details”.   
It isworth tonote that thewarrantymanagerdidnot indicate that theculturaldifferences in
doing business between the South American company and the Europeanbased Company B
were the obstacles in executing the work, although he admitted that there are certain
peculiarities.Inhiswords:
“there are not more [working culture-related] problems [in this region] than anywhere 
else…although they [the American customers of the Company B] are not trying to fix the 
problems themselves, they try to invoice as much as possible [put it as the warranty cost]…due 
to the special provisions of the contract [replacement of spare parts at no cost to the owner]”.  
Forthewarrantymanager,culturaldifferencesdonotrepresentabarriertosuccessfulproject
delivery.Rathertheyarean issuethat the (project/warranty)managerhastobeawareofand
take into careful consideration before implementing any actions. Similar opinions have also
beenexpressedwhendiscussing theotherprojects aswellasduring theworkshopmeetings.
Thecodinganalysisshowedthattheregionspecificwayofworkingislinkedtocommunication
fromthesupplier’sperspective.Furthermore,ithasaneffectonhowinformationisperceived







UnitedStates, the coreofwhich constituteda setofprototype engines.The lattermeans that
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thesetypesofengines,operatingongas,includedmodificationsthathavenotbeentestedinthe
particular environmental conditions before: thepower plant site is located inNevadadesert.
Technologically,thescopecanbecharacterizedasnovel,oreventinnovative,forthesupplierat
the time of the project kick off.However, the supplier had already delivered projects to the





for the organization of the project, Company B acted though its local representation in the
country,althoughthewarrantymanagerfortheprojectwasestablishedinFinland.Moreover,
localsubsuppliersandalocalworkforcewereusedintheproject.Thecountryofdelivery,the
United States of America, is known to its customs for its extensive use of legalmethods of






“…it took only two weeks before the engine start [up] to fall apart…”  
Theproblemsandfailuresconcernednotonlythemainelement—theengines—accordingto
the controllingmeasurements,but also theelectrical and the constructionparts of theoverall
workwereinvolved.Thetechnicalfailuresweredescribedas:
“…unexpected, yes, because we could not imagine that it should be something wrong 
with the catalysts, but when the government [environmental controllers] came and made 
the exhaust emissions [measurements], and it showed that the limits were exceeded…” 
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To summarize, the equipment failed to pass the start up tests, which was not expected to
happen.
Actions
The supplier had to take immediate actions to correct the faults, so that the requirements on
environmental safetyweremet in order to start the operations of the plant. As a result, the
equipmenthadtobereplaced,partiallycausingadelayintheprojectschedule.Thewarranty
reservation,whichthecompanyintendedtoapplytocoverthecostsofreplacements,wasnot
sufficient, so they had to draw extra funding from other sources. It was not possible for
CompanyBtousethechangeorderssystemtocushionthemselvesfromthefinancialdamages
due to the contract terms. In terms of quality of the outcome, Company B had to reach the




the lack of quality.  The availability and performance of the power plantwas unsatisfactory
fromtheowner’sperspective.Asthewarrantymanagerputit:
“…the owner said that all these issues must be fixed [before certain date]…this was not 
the installation the customer had been buying...”  
CompanyBfacedexcessivewarrantycosts,whichoverranthewarrantyreservation.Infact,the
supplier suffered warranty losses estimated to be millions of dollars, because part of the
equipment had to be replaced. Aswas noted by the warrantymanager, the weak points in
technology used in the installation were, only to a certain extent, to blame. The parts that
needed untimely replacement were subsupplied by the company’s local American vendors.
The product as a whole system originated from Europe and thus the European technical
standards were applied, which are not the same as the American. The warranty manager
suggested that Company B should be more precise and detailed in the specifications they
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providedtotheirsubsuppliers,andthenthequalityandfunctionalityoftheoverallinstallation
wouldnotsufferinsuchasevereway.
The location of the plant site in the Nevada desert with the changing conditions from +50
degreesCelsius in summer to 10degreesCelsius inwinter season also had an effect on the
event. That autumn inwhich the event took place saw thewinter season starting unusually
earlywithheavysnowandminustemperaturesatnight.Asthewarrantymanagerclaimed,at
the time when the project was contracted, the sales department was not aware that the
environmental conditions were so unpredictable in the region. In his opinion, selling a
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Lessonslearned
According to the respondentwords, the company learned a great deal from this event in an
expensiveway.Hesuggestedseveralmeasures thatcouldbedoneto lessen thepossibilityof
suchunexpectedevents:
1. The interviewee pointed out the need to address the internal communication in the
companybyutilizing extensively theopinionof technical experts before theproject is
soldinordertodeterminetheabilityofthefutureproducttoperformaccordingtothe
requiredlevel.




“I would say that the project people should be able to think a little bit deeper what they 
are doing…If I should sell [a power plant] I should take [it] carefully and look what are 
the …environmental [conditions] and… look at the whole scope…” 
Inotherwords, thewarrantymanager inhissuggestionsreferstoreflectionastheprocessof
assessmentofthegivenconditionsoftheproject.Reflectioncanbedescribedastheprocessof























Naturally, if theengines stopworkingcompletelyasa resultofblackoutathighseas, thevessel




vessel isnotservingitscommercialpurpose. If theeventhappensduringwarranty,thesupplier




blackout occurred that caused damage to the main engines, which stopped immediately.
Luckily, the crewwas skilledenough toget theengines running in emergencymode, so that
they couldmake it to thenearestharbor. The request for assistancewas sent immediately to
CompanyB’swarrantyandcustomerserviceoffice.Thelocalportauthoritiesrequestedthatthe
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“at first, we weren’t even sure…they [the customer] weren’t sure as to how to deal with 
[the problem], since we did not know what caused the failure…” 
The confusion on how to proceed was fuelled by the fact that there were three different
componentsthatwereundersuspicionasthecausesoftheproblem.Tocutdownthetimethe
ship had to be out of commercial operations and, thus,minimize the costs on consequential
damages,allthethreecomponentswerereplaced.This,however,wasnoteasy:
“with the pilot [project] it is always that the availability of spare parts is difficult… and 
skilled service men availability as well…the whole service department was not ready for it”.  
Theinternalsupplierinvestigationstookplacelateron,andtheproblempartwasdiscovered.
However, it did not affect this project. The customer’s awareness of the novelty in the
purchasedproductandtheiractiveassistancehelpedthesuppliertoresolvethesituation:
“they were patient, acted upon the information they received from us…doing 
troubleshooting, testing the new parts on-board and so on”.  
Although the customer was aware of the application novelty and gratefully recognized the
supplier’seffortstoeliminatetheproblem,therespondentstressedthatthisshouldnotbethe
casefornotreachingtheagreedperformancelevel:
“as the warranty ended last month, we still have a couple of issues we promised to take 
care of, but this is goodwill from our side [to the customer]”.  
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Outcomes
The performance level of the installation aswas stated in contractwas not reached, and the
customerwasaffectedbythatinanegativeway.Intheend,thesuppliermanagedtosettlethe
warranty issues, and replace the necessary parts. Company B faced extra costs due to the
contractual arrangement prescribing an extended warranty time instead of the normal, but
mostlytheexpenseswereduetotheneedforextensive,andinfactunnecessaryreplacements.
Since these actions were unforeseen and thus not anticipated, obtaining spare parts in time
provedtobeachallenge.Theprocesswastimeconsumingsincethesupplier’sownproduction
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
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Lessons learned 
The  warranty  manager  at  the  helm  of  the  project  characterized  this  endeavor  as  “totally 
different concept” for Company B, in which the customer played an important role. It made the 
team re‐evaluate the importance of cooperation with the client:  
“we were lucky to have this kind of a customer” 
as  the  interviewee  noted.  Special  attention  in  the  interview  in  terms  of  the  learning  was 
dedicated to the contractual arrangements of the company, which should reflect more, not only 
at  the outset of  the project at stake:  stakeholders, network,  country  of  delivery as well as  the 
supplier’s current status in terms of production volumes and occupancy with the other projects, 
etc.  It  was  stressed  that  the  supplier  should  not  think  in  terms  of  project  execution  only,  but 
rather be concerned with the delivery and the warranty:  
“[They] are actually short term, but we are taking care of the [product’s] life-cycle that 







due  to  the specific business conditions  in  the country, which, once  they became  familiar with 
them were easier to cope with. He briefly mentioned the specific management style, extensive 
bureaucracy and logistical difficulties that are part of the business culture in Russia. At the same 
time,  he  stressed  that  the  Russian  customer  was  also  aware  of  these  problems.  These  are  his 
comments when comparing the two projects:  
 “if [the claim] comes from Sweden, they would expect [a fix] tomorrow. If I receive it 
today from Russia, they expect it within next week…there is a cultural difference…I have 
to keep it in my mind when I deal with [customers]”.  
Overall, the relationships with the customer were characterized as very good. The warranty
manager admitted that there have been no claims from the Russian customer related to the
engines,which tohimwasan indicationofagoodprojectperformance.Theprojectmanager
confirmed this evaluationbynoting that the customerwas satisfiedwith the outcomeof the
project.Heattributedittothefactthattherehasbeendirect contactwiththecustomerandthe
operatorsthroughthelocalofficeinthecountryandthesupervisingengineersonsite.Thelocal
branch had been in touch with the customer and immediately reported any events to the
managers responsible through an online communicating tool. The onsite representatives
trainedtheoperatorshowtouseandmaintaintheequipment,explainingthewarrantyterms.
Moreover, the warranty manager had personal meetings with the responsible operators. He
particularlystressedthisfact.Henotedthatthecommunicationshouldtakeplaceattherighttime:
 “already during commissioning those [operators] who will be running the plant are on 
site, helping out, learning during that period, then they have a better understanding of 
the whole system. Because it is not just pushing the button and the engine will run… 
Because every power plant is different, it is working in a different way.”  
Sincethesupplier’slocalofficewassituatedinoneofthemaincitiesofRussia,theinternetand
telephone connectionswere available andworking properly. In contrast, the onsite internet
connectionwasmissing,whichmadethecorrespondencebetweentheonsitesupervisorsand
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Case5BJapaneseApproach
Outset
Another onlandpowerplantproject that I studied anddiscussedwith awarrantymanager,
who had an extensive 13 years of experience at leading project deliveries in many eastern
countries,wasdeliveredtoJapan.Theproject,atthetimeofdiscussion,wasatthebeginningof
the warranty phase. The discussion concerning this particular project was only brief as the
scopewas rather standard, no new technology and operating conditionswere involved. The
contract was standard for power plant deliveries, apart from the fact that the contract with
Japanese companies isusuallymoredetailed than thatused inother countries,with a longer
warrantyperiod. The customerwasalsowellknown.During thediscussion, it became clear
that therewas only one peculiarity in this project: that it had been executed for a Japanese
customer.Asthemanagerexplained,theattentiontodetailandperfectionismwhenitcomesto
technologyarethecoretraitsofJapanesemanagersthatCompanyBhadtoface:
 “we have to pay full attention to them… a claim in Japan is something much bigger than 
anywhere in the world…they have extremely high demands”.  
TheJapanese,byright,considerthemselvesastheworldleadersintechnologicaldevelopment,
so being chosen as a supplier for them had been regarded as a great achievement for the
companyinthemanager’seyes.Atthesametime,itimpliedthatthesupplierwouldprioritize
the Japanese customer, immediately reacting to any claims anddemands, and implementing
correctiveactions:
“When the other customers are happy with receiving a new component, the Japanese 
may require very detailed investigations leading to the fact that we made a mistake… [if 
so], they will require redesign for not only that engine, but all the engines we supplied for 
them in the past”.   
Unforeseenevent
In this case, the event concernednot theparticularproject thatwewereoriginally todiscuss
withthewarrantymanager,buttheprojectsdeliveredtothesameJapanesecustomerpriorto
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that. The scope of supplywas nearly the same in every project—power plant engines of a
particular type. The supplier had a specific technological weakness in these engines: an
electronic component called CCUbox lacked stable performance, which in turn affected the
engine.Intheworstcasethecomponentwouldneedurgentreplacement.However,atthattime






 “… we could not tell that this [component] was the problem… we were not willing or 
capable [to develop it]…”    
OncetheenginesweresoldtotheJapanesecustomer,theCCUboxproblem“hitthebottomline”
— the CCUboxes started to break down. The customer not only requested the immediate
change of the failed component, but also performed a root cause analysis that revealed the
groundsforthepoorperformanceoftheCCUbox:
“the Japanese themselves made strength calculations, risk analysis; they told us which 





Themodifications of theCCUbox, sending themback to Japan, updating the engines of the
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Considering the project that was under question at the beginning of this discussion, the
warrantymanagersaid that therehadbeennooccurrences.Heevaluated theperformanceof
the project as well because the project outset was not new to the company. The technology
employedintheprojectwasmatureand,thus,theydidnothavethetechnologyrelated,ashe
called it, initial failuresanymore.Tohim,thekeytothesuccessfulperformancesofar inthe
projectwasthefactthatthesupplierandthecustomerwerecollaberatingextensively.Dueto





“we can thank the Japanese for being so tough that we have been developing our 
products at a pace which was much faster than we have ever seen before…we developed 
and improved our products, and the Japanese with their high demands have forced us to 
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researchonnewproducts,theoutcomesofwhichissucceedingontheothermarkets:
“all our customers are happy to get new improved technology”.  
Themanagerparticularlystressedthatitisabsolutelyimpossibletomakeanyjobinstructions
ormanuals, and project plans that give guidelines on how to act in  the different situations
occurring in projects.When it comes to unforeseen situations, themanager in charge has to
respondquickly:
 “It takes too much time to search the answer in a book. You have to react very quickly 
and work based on your experience. Working based on written instructions appears to me 





“I was nominated to be a warranty manager for Japan because I have extensive project 
















The respondentsdidnotknow thatbothwere tobe interviewedabout theproject before the
interview.
This power plant delivery toCambodia byCompanyBwas characterized as having a repeat
setup. As with most of the other cases, the outset was quite standard for the power plant
deliveriesinthatgeographicalarea.However,astheprojectmanagerforthisdeliveryadmitted,
fromtheorganizationalpointofviewtheprojectwassomewhatdifferent.Itwasaconsortium:
“it is not so easy from the management point of view, but we had done before similar 
projects, we knew the basic setup, what to do and when to do it”.  
IncontrasttotheJapaneseapproachcase,thecustomer,alocalcompany,deliberatelychosenot
tobe involved inthetechnicaldetailsof thesolutionbecausetheyreliedontheexperienceof
theprovider,CompanyB.Astheprojectmanagercommented:
“they expected us to be able to handle that… and it [such approach from the customer 
side] made the execution easier”.  
Moreover,thecustomerfollowedthesupplier’sadvicebyhiringexperiencedoperatorstorun
the power plant, which is not so common in the power plant business. Otherwise both the
projectandthewarrantymanageragreedthattheprojectwasroutine.
Since for thisproject I had two interviewees responsible for theproject (however, theproject
managercarriedtheoverallresponsibility),therearetwoviewsbothworthpresenting.Thatis
why this case is in a slightlydifferent format. First, Iwill describe theunforeseen event that
happened at the project execution phase, the actions taken, the outcomes and the lessons
learned.Second,Iwillpresentthewarrantymanager’sperspective.
Olga Perminova 













Alas, the political gesture was successful, and the supplier had to urgently conceive a new
transportationroute.Fortunately,thegeographyoftheareaallowedforfastchangestobemade.
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Unforeseenevent





“if the people are not committed, it does not matter how well prepared the contract is… it 
is a bigger issue than contractual or technical risks”.  
Helinkedthisorganizationalissuewithperformanceoftheproject:
“Speaking of the performance… we have the system [process of project delivery] in 
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Thewarrantyphase
Unforeseenevent






The engines were at the field test on time, and the replacements of the abovementioned
elements were due as soon as the technical services department found a better solution.
Althoughthewarrantymanageradmittedthathecouldnotjudgethesetechnicalaspectsasan
expertwoulddo,hemaintainedthepositionthat:
“Nobody could foresee that we would have a problem with the rollers and lifters. It was a 
surprise for everybody”.  
Inthemanager’sopinion,thiswasnotanuncommonsituationfortheCompany,itwasquite
normaltohavesuchissues.Themanageradmittedthattheproblemwaspurelyinternalforthe
supplier, especially considering the fact that the customer employed trainedoperators to run
thepowerplant.Hesaid:
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“I assume that the technical service discussed these issues with the technology R&D 
department. The quality mistakes will be corrected in the new engine models and solution 
designs… if not, it will be a disaster”.     
Lessonslearned
Regardless of the quality problems, the warranty manager was similarly positive about the














again, Company B acted as a turnkey supplier in this case. The solution that Company B
provided was rather standard, the technology was tested, so that the possible faults were
knowninadvance.Theprojectorganizationwasrathercomplicated,accordingtothewarranty
manager. The end customer was a consortium of companies from different regions that
outsourcedthepowerplantoperationstoaspecializedcompany,whichwasnotinvolvedinthe
ownership.CompanyBprovided theplant supervision and training services to the latter. The
operationscompanylackedpowerplantmanagementskills.Theendcustomerwasdescribedas:
“having internal problems, not communicating internally”.  
Themanager said that theywere difficult to collaboratewith. However, themost confusion
from the warranty manager’s point of view was caused by the location of the plant in the
middle of the desert. It was erected in a remote area 700 kilometers away from the capital,
where the local representation of Company B was established. Moreover, the country of
delivery is known for its bureaucratically extensive customs clearance procedures. Politically
thecountrywasperceivedbythesupplierashighlyunstable.
Unforeseenevent
At somepointduring theproject execution, the customerordered extra spareparts from the





Adifferent subsupplierwas used, this time a European company,whichwas known to the
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supplier,butrarelyengaged.Duetothefactthatthesubsupplier’sfactorieswerefullybooked
with other orders at the time, it took them an extra 6 months to produce the required
equipment.Therewerecertaincomplicationswiththecustomsaswell.
Outcomes
After the spare parts had been manufactured, they were delivered to Sudan at the supplier’s
expenseandinstalled.Fromtheinterviewee’sperspective,theactionsthatthecompanyperformed
represented troubleshooting.  The supplier had to cover the costs of the factory delay, which
affectedtheprojectschedulesandconstitutedalargesum.Asthemanagerconcluded:
“it was a big disaster… but it was the only unforeseen event I can remember [in this 
project]”. 
Atthesametime,hepointedoutthatthissituationhadanotheraspect:thecustomerperceived
their efforts as a gesture emphasizing the commitment of Company B to the customer. The








“if there is emergent meeting to be held, the visa is a problem for our manager, although 
we have a good agent locally. When it comes to the management meetings, the operations 
company [not the end customer] is the one we talk to [when we have to fix a problem]. 
But nobody seemed to be interested to deal with problems. The clients were a big mess”.  
Thecustomerinvolvementwasofspecialconcernbecauseofthefurtherproblemsorrisksthat




taking intoconsiderationthecustomsof thecountryofdelivery.For thecustomersuchdelay
wouldmeanalossofbusiness:powerproductionwouldbeinterrupted.Fromthisperspective,
there is an emphasis on the supplier’s role as an expert company that needs to beproactive,
taking the initiative to communicate their advice and guidelines to create trust and mutual
learning,sothatmistakesresultingfromlackofcommunicationareavoided.
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This chapter isdedicated to thediscussionof theconceptofuncertaintyas such, its elements
andactionsthatconstitutemanagementofuncertaintyinprojects.Itisdonebycomparingthe







another. In order to do that, I haveused a framework,which builds upon the logic adopted in
existing classifications in the field of project management (Fuglseth and Grønhaug, 2000;
Windischhofer,PerminovaandGustafsson,2009;Wikströmetal.,2009;Loch,SoltandBailey,2008;
Hobday, 1998). The idea behind it is to map the studied projects in terms of uncertainty and
complexity using the available data about the projects. Complexity has been chosen as the
comparativeparameterbecauseofthecontextofthestudy:largescalecomplexindustrialprojects.
Most project categorizations and conceptualizations, including those by Baccarini (1996), Laufer,
Denker and Shenhar (1996), Williams (1999), Kerzner (2001), analyze projects mostly using the
complexitydimension.Uncertainty is treated as either a part of complexity construct (Baccarini,
1996;Williams,1999,2005)or,whenlookedatasaseparatedimension,itreferstotheenvironment
inwhichtheprojecttakesplaceanditsdynamics(Loch,SoltandBailey,2008).Itakethestandpoint
that complexity and uncertainty are independent issues, even though they are interrelated.
Adopting the logic of Fuglseth and Grønhaug (2000) and Windischhofer, Perminova and
Gustafsson(2009),thestudiedprojectsarecategorizedalongthetwodimensions,uncertaintyand





represented in the projectmanagement literature, and is sometimes referred to as structural
complexity(Williams,2005;Baccarini,1996).Intheinterpretationadoptedhere,complexityisa
parameter that constitutes of size, volume, variety, intensity or number of elements in the
project and the interdependence between these elements. In basic terms, complexity is
understoodasanumberofvariablesand the interactionsamong them: themore interactions,
the higher the complexity (Sommer and Loch, 2004). According to Simon (1968, In Loch,
DeMeyerandPich,2006),complexityisgroundedin:
 “a large number of parts that interact in non-simple ways [such that ] given the 
properties of the parts and the laws of their interactions, it is not a trivial matter to infer 
the properties of the whole.” 
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Inorder toposition the studiedprojects along the complexitydimension, I have adopted the
complexityparameters(seeTable20intheAppendix)fromHobday(1998).Asimilarapproach
to the evaluation of projectswas used inWikström et al. (2009). Table 20, in theAppendix,
shows that the elements are both organizational (e.g. intensity of supplier involvement,
intensityof regularity involvement), andat thesame time reflect thecomplexnatureofwork




16).Thenumerical scale, Ihaveusedascale fromzero toahundredwhich isdivided in five
sectors: 0255075100. The logic is the following: the higher the number that is given for a
statement,thehigherthecomplexityoftheprojectatstake.
Althoughtheunforeseeneventstookplaceatdifferentphasesofthestudiedprojects,andthe
causes of those were not necessarily related to the warranty phase, comparing them to one
anotherononemapisarguedtobeimportant.Someauthorsintheprojectmanagementfield
(see e.g. Loch, DeMeyer and Pich, 2006) believe that the level of complexity of the project
changes during the course of the project. This finding is relevant if it is assumed that
uncertaintyisapartofthecomplexityconstruct.Themanagersmightthinkthatthecomplexity
increases during the course of the project because they perceive uncertainty: things tend to
appearmorecomplicatedwhenpeoplearenotcertainofthings.Thisstudyislimitedintesting
thisassumptionduetothefactthatcomplexityistreatedasastaticparameter.Theperspective
of thestudiedcompaniesis takenintoaccounthere: whatkindofcomplexity level isusually
expected in a project of a particular type. Thus, it is not possible to test the dynamics of
complexityduringtheprojectanditsdependencyonthechangesinuncertaintyperceptionand
the outcomes of the implemented actions.  The applied complexity parameter is oriented
towardsidentificationofcomplexityoftheendproduct(seethestatementsinTable20).Itwas
proposedandusedbythecompaniesintheirprojectportfolioassessment.Theevaluationsare
normally done during the project kick off by project managers, and then the information is
passedontothewarrantymanagers.Theprojectsremainedactiveinthewarrantystage,sothat
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theoverallperformanceoftheprojects—thefinancialresultandcustomersatisfaction—was
determinedafter thewarrantystagewasover. Inpractice, it isoftensothatwhileonepartof
the overall product to be delivered is at the project execution stage, the other is already at




Building upon the studied literature and particularly upon Milliken’s (1987) definition of
uncertainty, Ihave evaluated the studiedprojects along severalparameters,which reflect the
interviewees’ lack of knowledge, experience or understanding of how the elements of the
project and its environmentmight be changing (state uncertainty), how the events, issues or









as many as possible of the dimensions of uncertainty or (and) the factors that affect it in a





14 According to Olsson (2007), the adjective aleatory originates from Latinword alea roughlymeaning
chance.
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in a negative sense as lack of, so that the higher given grade stands for higher uncertainty
associatedwiththeissue.Astheliteraturereviewshows,thiswayofreferringtouncertaintyis
commonfortheresearchers(Chapman,2006;Atkinsonetal.,2006).
Itmust be noted that certain formulations of statements in Table 19 in the Appendixmight
subsume both state and effect uncertainty. Following Milliken’s logic (1987), if the project
managercannotpredictfuturedevelopmentsinthecountryofdeliveryorifheorshehaslittle
knowledgeof theregulatoryauthorities, themanagerperceivesstateuncertainty. Inorder for
themanagertoperceiveeffectuncertainty,theremustbesomeconfidenceandunderstanding
thataparticularchangeinthecountryofdelivery’senvironment,whichisviableandrelevant,
might have an impact on theproject’s outcomes.Thus, some level of certainty is required to
perceiveeffectuncertainty.However,myanalysisrevealedthatwhenprojectmanagersdonot
possessknowledgeorunderstandingoftheeventorissue,whichtheyknowisrelevantfortheir
project, theyarevery likely toalsobeuncertainabout its impacton theproject outcomes. In
fact, project management literature (see the review in Williams, 2005) often combines the
uncertainty aboutproject elements (stateuncertainty inMilliken’s terms) and theuncertainty
about how the change in these elementsmight affect the project (effect uncertainty) into one
uncertaintyconstruct.Theexplanationliesinthenatureofprojectwork.
The range of expressions used for describing uncertainty, except the rather straightforward






The statements using the expression lack of understanding are mostly target skills as a
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5.1.1Comparingtheprojects
The categorizations that are currently popular within the project management field are
supposedtodemonstratethedegreeofchallengeinprojectsbasedonathreedimensionalscale
of basicmediumadvanced,which tends to be biased towards the size of the projects under
scrutiny.  In linewithWindischhofer, Perminova andGustafsson’s (2009) argument, such an
approach results in practitioners directing their attention towards mediumsized and large
projects,whileaskingthemselveswhysomeoftheirseeminglybasic,repetitive,routineorjust
small in size projects conclude in failure. In this thesis, all of the cases are considered at the
warranty stage,when the administratorsmake conclusions abouthowsuccessful theprojects
werebothfinanciallyandintermsofcustomersatisfactionamongotherparameters.
Forexample,highlevelsofrepetitivenessandlowerlevelsofnoveltyarecommonforCompany
B’smarine segmentprojects.Theweaknessesand strengthsareknownand consideredwhen
choosingtheappropriatesolutionforthespecificcustomer.Theprojectsaremoderateinsize,
mostlyrepresentingequipmentdeliveries,thustheyareconsideredroutine.Duringoneofthe
workshops, one of the interviewedmanagers,who specialized inmarine segment projects of
CompanyB,hadadifficulttimerememberinganyoftheunexpectedeventsthathadhappened.
Hepartly linkedthis tothefact thatthetechnologiesemployedinthemarinesegmentbythe
CompanyBarewell tested.Therearedifferencesbetweenthe technologiesemployed ineach
casedependingonthecustomerdesiresandotherprojectcollaborators’capacities.Themarine
projects ofCompanyB aremostly equipmentdeliveries orEP (equipment andprocurement)
withalimitedrangeofservicesincluded,whichimpliesthatthereisahighdependencyonthe




similar solutions to a series of ships that it has built for the same customers at the same
shipyard, as in the SOLAS case.Naturally, there are differences in size, volume, capacity of
enginesandsystemsthatareadjustedtotheparticularcustomerneedsandthenfittedintoone
system.Nonetheless, the concept behind the solution does not significantly differ. Thus, the
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complexityalonecannotbeusedasanexplanationforthefailures(afterall,theSOLASproject
was considered routine, as it assumedapplicationofwelltested technologies andworkwith






The Cambodian Endeavour case and Sudan case projects have been recognized as more
complexthanmostofthemarinesegmentprojects,buttheyrequiredfamiliar,routinetasksto
be performed, even though the setup was complex. The level of complexity of these two
projectswasestimatedtobenearlythesame,buttheuncertaintyleveldifferedsignificantly(see
themappingofprojectsinFigure16).TheSudancaseandespeciallytheLackofReflectioncase
also assume a higher level of novelty and variability of parameters, which resulted in
positioning themasmorecomplex.Onecanassume that theuncertaintyprofileofanyof the
studied projects evolved during its lifecycle, reaching a peak at the time of the unforeseen
eventhappening,andloweringaftercertainmeasureswereapplied.
Both the customer and the supplier’s expectations (and thus, success in termsof satisfaction)
regardinghowsuchprojectsshouldbeperformedare,toalargeextent,dependantonhowthe
previousprojectsof thesamekindwereexecuted.Therepetitiveprojects (where thescopeof
supply, andoften thecustomer, isprecisely the sameas in theprecedingproject)havenever




always certain points of reference to previous projects: a known subsupplier or customer,
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Less complexprojects arenot necessarily lacking in uncertainty. There is a groupofprojects
among those that I have studied, namely the SOLAS, Blackout and Japanese Approach case
projects, that were described to me as not presenting any particular concern in terms of
complexity: the scope of delivery was relatively small, financially the projects were not
extensive,and theother relevantelementsof complexityaccording toTable20 (inAppendix)
also received relatively lowscores.Themanagers characterized themaspretty straightforward,
normal, fairlywell,withnoexpecteddifficult issues.Anexampleof suchaproject is the Japanese
Approach case, where no critical situationwas assumed to have happen, partly because the
scopeofdeliverywassmallascomparedtootherprojects.Inadditiontothis,therehadbeena
lack of evidence that the technical issue — the malfunction of the CCUbox, an engine
component—wouldcausetheunforeseenevent,priortotheevent.Therewasnoreasonforthe
managertoregardthisissueasathreatorarisktothisparticularproject,becausehecouldnot
assess the relevance of the component’s unstable performance to the project before the
malfunctiontookplace.Accordingtohim,therewasuncertaintyinCompanyBastowhether
the performance of this particular component would have an impact on the engine’s
functioning (state uncertainty), and consequently, on the projects involving deliveries of the
engines (effectuncertainty).The intervieweequestioned theabilityofCompanyB to find the
relevantactions to solve thisdilemma (responseuncertainty).However, in the courseofnext
similarprojectwiththesamecustomerandidenticalscopeofsupply,themanagerwasaware
thatthisenginecomponentmightcauseaneffectonthewarrantyoutcomes,andofhowexactly
it could impact the overall results of the project. The issue was no longer uncertain.  The
managerwasmorepositiveabout the latterproject,describing itsperformanceas fairlywell,
possiblybecausethe technical issuehadalreadybeenaddressedin thecourseof theprevious
project involving the failure. He reflected upon the factors that he found most valuable to
achievinga successfulproblem (anduncertainty) resolution,and tohim thesewereextensive
collaborationandcommunicationwiththeprojectcustomer.
One could argue even that the technologyrelated uncertainty about the CCUbox was an
exampleofwhatisreferredintheliteratureasunknownunknowns(e.g.SommerandLoch,2003;
Wideman, 1992).However, although themanager at stakemight havenotbeenaware of the
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malfunction possibility before it actually happened, his interview states that there had been
experts in his organization, whowere knowledgeable concerning the issue and its potential
impactonthecompany’sprojects.Tothoseexperts,theuncertaintywasnolongerunconscious
unknown unknowns. According to the interview, it was conscious lack of knowledge (known
unknowns), skills, resourcesorothermeans todevelop theproduct (not capable todevelop the
CCUbox), or ignorance (not willing).  The interviewee attributed resolving the issue to the
interferenceoftheJapanesecustomerandtotheactivecollaborationwiththem.Norwasthere
any perceived customerrelated risk. The Japanese companywas awellknown customer for
CompanyB.
In sum, the Japanese Approach case shows the reverse example of “complexity equals
difficulty”logic.Thecaseprojectwasassumedtobeeasyandcertainbecauseoftheseemingly
lowcomplexity.Atthesametime,theuncertaintyfactor(technologicalandorganizational)was
not taken into consideration and managed accordingly. This view goes hand in hand with
classical project management which regards uncertainty as a dimension of the complexity
construct,wherelowcomplexityequalstolowuncertainty.Thetwodimensionalperspectiveto




exposed tovariouseffectsofuncertainty.Consequently, if theprojectand/or itselements, the
environment and/or any other relevant variables are perceived as uncertain, they need to
receiveadequateattentionfrommanagersinordertoadapttotheirchallenges.
Thesummaryof thecases isprovidedinTable10. InthefollowingsubchaptersIwillexplain
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5.2 Thefactorsinfluencinguncertainty

This chapterdiscusses themainconcepts that emerged fromthedataanalysis.Regarding the
way the interviews were conducted,my aim, as an interviewer, was tomake themanagers
discussuncertaintywithoutgivingthemanyofmyownpreunderstandings.That iswhythe
“storytelling” approach was employed. The consequence of such an approach was that the
researchcollaborators: the interviewees, theparticipants intheworkshops—theexpertswho
contributed with their opinions and knowledge for this study — brought in many other
examples and experiences that concerned not only themain cases of this study, but also the
issuesbeyondthat.
Thediscussionduringtheinterviewsfocusedontheconcreteeventsthattookplacethroughout
all the stages of the case projects: from bidding/sales to the start of the operations by the
customer.At the same time, the examples from the other undertakings that the interviewees
knewaboutorparticipatedinwerementionedmanytimes,especiallyasmeansofcontrasting





main topics, which again, were not forced upon the interviewees. In contrast, they fitted in
logically.Thesewere:
a. risksasforeseennegativeevents,
b. uncertainty in the examples of situations that were not expected to happen and the
reactionofmanagerstothatsituationsintermsofactions,
c. the two aspects of performance: as an outcome of the events taking place during the
projectdelivery, and as a result of implementing certainmanagementpractices, if the
dataallowedtoestablishthose,
d. opportunities as an upside of uncertainty and a result of implementation of certain
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actionswith theaimto improveperformance.The topicofopportunitieswasstrongly
attributedtoperformance. Inotherwords, the intervieweessawtheopportunitiesasa
positiveoutcomeoftheiractionsinresponsetouncertainty.
Following the logic of the coding analysis, I present the attributes thatwere associatedmost
withuncertainty.Then,Iwillexplainthemindividually.
The views on risk and uncertainty derived from different disciplines have their merits and
drawbacks,however,allof themare takenfromastandpointwhichassumesthat thereexists
some sortof common truth,which is relevant forany situationandanyparty involved in it.
This isadeterministicpresumption. Inorder todefineuncertainty forprojectbusiness Ihave
adapted a relativistic view (Popper, 1996; Putnam,1995).Various propensities impact on the
decisionsregardinghowtohandleuncertainty.Themereunderstandingofthisphenomenonis
formed through individual experiences and beliefs. Consequently, each actor involved in
projecthashisorhersownviewonuncertainty.Giventhesecharacteristicsofthephenomenon,
oneshouldnotfallinthetrapofperceivinguncertaintyaseverythingandnothing.Thepurpose
of thisstudyisnot tostudythe issueofuncertaintyasaphilosophicalcategory,butratherto
defineuncertaintyinprojectsfromthepointofviewoftheactorsinvolvedinthem.Thus,the





The analysis of the codeddata on the basis of the verbal reports ofmanagers enabledme to
arrive at a number of elements constituting uncertainty management. In order to provide a
comprehensive answer to my research questions, I will answer them separately. In the first
section, Iwill showhowuncertainty isunderstoodandhandledbymanagersandpropose a
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willbededicatedtotheanalysisofmethodsoractionsthestudiedcompaniesusedtocopewith
uncertainty and the results such methods led to. Then, I will conclude by answering the
researchquestionsofthisthesis. 
Byaddressingthefirsttwoquestions(Howdoprojectprofessionalsmanageuncertainty?How
does uncertainty in projects relate to risk and opportunity?), I strive to show the differences
betweentheconceptsofriskanduncertaintyfromthepractitioners’perspective.Thefactthat
risk and uncertainty are not synonymous terms in the project context and require different




the consequences of the situation. The nonstability of this state implies that the perceiver
strivestoresolvethesituationtomoveintothestateofcertainty,whichiscommonandnatural.
In other words, action is needed. Furthermore, the instability of the phenomenon does not
imply that its outcomes are strictly negative. However, I must admit that some of my
respondentshadatendencytothinkofuncertaintyinanegativeway.Thismightbeduetothe
factthatsomepeoplearelesscomfortableinsituationsofuncertaintyand,thus,interpretthem
only as a risk.At the same time, themajority of the respondents perceived instability of the








of supplyrelated grounds for uncertainty, with the latter being strongly related to
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technicalaspectsoftheworkandoutcomes;





mostly associated with project organizationrelated factors, namely the project network
structure(itreferstoprojectorganizationvariableintheframeworkFigure3).Itrelatestothe
findings in the studied literature that emphasizes organizational structure as an important









not theprojectperformanceperse,but thewaythemanagersperceive thesituation.Therisk
thatisassociatedwiththistypeofuncertaintyliesinurgentchangesinthescopeofsupplyto
bedelivered.Thisisquiteinlinewithhumanpsychology:wetendtoseemorerisksinchange





15 In this context, a contract represents theofficialdivisionofworkbetween theparties adhering to it,
henceitstatesthedivisionofresponsibilitiesbetweentheparties.
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significant impact on the timing of the project (negative— delay, positive— on time). One
interestingaspectthatappearedduringthediscussionsistheproactiveness—orthereflective
processofsensemaking inWeick’s terms—this,as themanagersexplained, isneeded in the
situations of change. This aspect exhibits similarity with the discussion that Eisenhardt and
Brown(1998)provideontimeandcontinuouschangeinorganizations.Ifchangesareperceived
as anormalwayofworking (and this is a feature ofmanagerial sensemaking), then theyno




organization (James and Jones, 1974) and the organizational climate (Denison, 1996) can be
consideredofimportanceformanaginguncertainty.
In the following chapters, I will present the difference between uncertainty, risk and




To summarize, from theproject point of view,uncertainty appears tobe a sourceof risks as
eventshavinganegativeimpactontheproject’soutcomes,oropportunities,aseventsthathave
beneficial impact on project performance. Based on the literature review, the following
definitionofuncertaintyisproposedinthethesis:
Uncertaintyinrelationtoprojectsistheindividual’s(e.g.themanager’s)lackofknowledge
and/or understanding of the relevant project elements, its environment and their
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interrelationship, so that no conclusion can bemade as to if and/or how any of those can
impacttheprojectsuccess.
Uncertainty can arise from sources both internal and external to the project. The external
uncertainty  includes all the factors that lie outside the project organization such as market
conjuncture,thepoliticalandlegalsystemsofthecountryofdelivery,etc.Thesefactorscannotbe
affected directly by the project, rather the project has to adapt to them. In literature this type of
uncertaintyisreferredtoasenvironmentaluncertainty(ine.g.Starbuck,1976)oruncertaintyinducedby





referred to in the literatureassystematicuncertainty. In suchprojects, thestructuredapproach for
informationcreationorastructuredproductitselfbecomesakeyfactorinbetterprojectconformance
(BrowningandEppinger, 2002;Hellström, 2005). In this context, themanagerial actions targeted at
uncertaintyandrisksareseenasthewaytocreatepreviouslyunknowninformation.
Thecontentanalysisoftheinterviewsclearlyshowsthatthemanagersperceiveuncertaintyand
risk in different ways. To begin with, most of the respondents only associated risks with a
negativeimpactontheoutcomesoftheproject.Theeventswithperceivedpositiveimplications
ontheprojectareoftenreferredtoasopportunities.Theempiricalstudydoesnotconfirmthat
managersperceive the event that haspositive effect on theproject’s objectives as risk. In the
projectsthatIobservedriskmanagementisperformedintermsofconsideringthecostsinthe
form of risk coverage: reservations in the budget, insurance policies, hedging, etc.  As one
interviewedprojectmanagerputit:“Riskiscostforus”.Asonecanseefromthedescriptionsin
Table 11, which summarizes the understanding of the main terms by the interviewees, the
meaning of risk is negative. Risk has negative impact not only on the financial aspect of a
certainproject(whichwasalmostalwayscitedasthefirstmeaning),butalsoonotherprojects,
relationshipswith the customerorother stakeholders, supplier’sbrand image.  If the issue is
labeled as risk, it is generally known how it relates or affects the project outcomes. The
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PMBOK, 2004). In otherwords, risk is perceived as a hazard. Furthermore, the interviewees
oftenused theword risk as synonymouswith loss, claim, cost ordamage. In contrast,when
speaking about uncertainty the interviewees assumed lack of knowledge or understanding,
which implieddifficultiesor even inability todrawadefiniteconclusion: theprobabilityofa
loss and the probability of a gain seemed equally viable. In this respect, the concept of




































Uncertainty in relation to projects is the individual’s
(e.g. the manager’s) lack of knowledge and/or
understanding of the relevant project elements, its
environment and their interrelationship, so that no
conclusion can bemade as to if and/or how any of
thosecanimpacttheprojectsuccess.
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5.2.2Individualmanifestationsandtheconceptofuncertainty

Theweakness of the Project UncertaintyManagement approach (Chapman andWard, 2002,
2003)liesinthefactthatitprovidestoolittleempiricalsupportonhowuncertaintyisactually
managed in projects. This gives ground to the critique: why do we need to distinguish
uncertaintyfromriskifwehavenoevidenceofthephenomenon?
The purpose of this empirical study is to provide the evidence for uncertainty as a concept,
whichobjectivelyexistsinprojectmanagementreality,andhasanimpactonhowprojectsare
managed.Ibelievethatuncertaintyitselfisbetterdescribedasacognitiveprocessbecauseofits
perceptual nature. In other words, uncertainty is bound to the reflection process: thinking
through,considering,doubting,etc.Beingsubjective,uncertainty is tiedupwith thepersonal
traits and abilities.What is considered to be uncertain by one person can appear certain for
another.Thatiswhythedescriptionsofuncertaintygiveninthe interviewsaredifferent. Ina
similar vein,March and Shapira (1987) explain that perceptions of risk are strictly personal.
They depend on the individual’s traits, skills, experiences, etc. The researcher in the field of
organizational science tend to support this view (see the review in Table 3). This empirical
studyshowsthatatacertainpointthedescriptionsofuncertaintymightappearcontradictory
orveryclosetothatofarisk.However,iftogodeeperintothedescriptionsofuncertaintyand
risk, it is possible to see that the issues are clearly not the same. It is the emotions and other
individualmanifestationsthatuncertaintyandriskawakeinthemanagers:fear,confusion,regret,
disappointment just to name a few. Clearly, these feelings can be easier labeled as negative
ratherthanpositive.
Uncertainty in the studied projectwas associatedwith a sudden change or challenge,which
broughtconfusionintotheroutineworkanddisturbedtheplans.Atthewarrantystage,italso
meant that any unexpected events could potentially affect the project outcomes and image,
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not only to the ex post facto reflections, but also to the forecasts that the managers made
regarding the events to come. However, emotions blur distinctions only to a certain extent.
Moreover, it is quite natural for thehumanbeing toperceive theunknownanduncertain as
negative,becauseoftheconfusionandinstabilitythatitbrings.
At the same time, emotions as well as the other individualmanifestations are the source of
reflection (Raelin,2001). Vince (2002) shows the connection between emotions and other
individual manifestations, learning and reflection by stating that emotions are generated by
learning and reflection. Swan and Bailey (2004) demonstrate that emotions are in fact the
catalysts for reflection. In this sense, uncertainty in itself calls for themost effective way of
managing: reflective processes of sensemaking, experience sharing, knowledge sharing, etc.
Emotionsarethemselvesthesourcesoflearning(ibid.).Theyaretheenablersofthecreationof
newunderstandingsof theprojectelementsand itsenvironment:within theproject team, the
projectdepartment,theprojectbasedfirm,theprojectorganizationandsoforth.Theresultsof
thisstudyshowthatinfact,whenthevoicedexperiences(bothinformoffactsandopinions)
accumulatenot justonasingleproject level,butonmultipleprojects’ levelencompassingthe
projectfirm,thereflectionandlearningexpandtomultiplelevelsoftheorganization.Theyare
the force that canbring operational levelmanagement and top organizational administrators
together toshare information,experienceandunderstanding thusreducinguncertaintyabout
thecurrentstate.





same time, therewereno reasons to expect the shipyardnot to follow the recommendations.
The challenge came very suddenly. The combination of the two factors — technical and
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preparedfor(e.g.byplanningtheactions).Althoughtheinvestigationrevealedthattherewere
suspicionsregardingthetechnologyamongthetechnicians,thesesuspicionswerenotjustified
sufficiently to be treated by the supplier’s organization (and the project and the warranty
managers)asthreats—risks.Nottomentionthatitwasaprojectinaroutinesetup,similarto
severalonesdelivered to thesamecustomerpreviously.Thus,CompanyBhadnoground to




aim to find ways to adapt to that particular challenge (by troubleshooting and dividing
responsibilitiesbetweentheprojectparties).Theprojectresultedinsuchaseveredelay,thatwhen
thecasewasstudied,theprojectwasalreadyatwarranty,buttheshipwasstillnotdeliveredtothe
customer. This negative project result combinedwith the similar experiences fromothermarine
projectstriggeredorganizationalreflectioninaformofbrainstormingworkshopbetweenthetop
managementandtheoperationallevelexpertstoidentifywaystobetterprescribeandinfluencethe
fulfillment of supplier recommendations by the project stakeholders. Uncertainty resulted in a
positivedevelopmentbytriggeringreflectionandlearningprocesses.Anotherpositivedimension








It can be seen to follow from the previous discussion of the SOLAS case, that the project
performance and uncertainty are related parameters. The coding analysis revealed the
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dependencies between the project performance and uncertainty. The results of the empirical
analysisarepresentedintheAppendix:Table15.Table15andFigure23presentthefactorsthat
affect performance negatively, whereas Table 16 and Figure 24 indicate the parameters that
improveperformance.
According to the coding analysis, themain negative factor that appears to boost uncertainty
emanates from the internal projectbased firm set up.Among the issues thatproved to be of
significanceinthiscategoryaretheinternalintegrationissues.Ascomparedtotheconventional
issuesofintegrationandthebuildingofthefirm’scorecompetencesaroundthem(Bradyand
Davies,2004; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994;  Foote et al., 2001; Galbraith, 2002; Davies, 2004),
internalintegrationisconcernedwiththeabilitytotransferbestpracticeswithinthecompany
(Szulanski, 1996).  It is also potentially related to the supplier organization climate and the
psychologicalclimatethatitsmembershavetodealwith,afactorofinternalcompanypolitics
(James and Jones, 1974; Denison, 1996; Milliken, 1987). As argued by Williams (2005), the
internalpoliticalissuesarerarelyaddressedbytheprescriptiveprojectmanagementscience,as
theyhavesuchastrongpresenceintheeverydayprojectwork.Managersmighthesitatetoact
upon the issue if the actions potentially harm their professional image or the image of a
successful project.  In order to strengthen the brand, companies might pursue delivering a




it is clear that the performance of the project at warranty was influenced by the state
uncertainty.
Following the logic of Grant (1996) and the knowledgebased theory of the firm, internal
integrationof knowledge is the core capabilityof the firmand itsmain task is to secure and
sustainthecompetitiveadvantage.Hence,itaffectstheperformanceoftheprojectandthefirm.
The negative effect of uncertainty associated with internal company issues can be traced to
internal integration problems, which is manifest in a lack of internal communication and
coordination (again,TheLackofReflectioncase isagoodexample,aswellas theSudan, the
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Design Phase Failure, and the Blackout cases).  The reflective, learningoriented processes
supportinginformationandexperienceexchangewithinthecompanyandbetweenprojectsare
needed to address all types of uncertainty in Milliken’s (1987) classification. Similarly, the
successful management of the Cambodian Endeavour project phase suggests that pro
activeness based on reflection is necessary to adapt to the sudden challenges in projects.
Nevertheless, the reflectiveapproachshouldbe supportedby the topmanagement.At times,
proactiveness at the project management level is stopped by the fact that the projectlevel
managersdonothaveenoughpowerwithinanorganization,bothintermsof jobdescription
andpersonalreputation,toreinforcetheneededactions.Thus,thecompaniesneedtocultivate
the suitable systems or processes for the support of projectlevel managers, as well as the
mechanisms of interdepartmental integration so that there is a knowledgesharing platform
betweenthem.Thisisespeciallytrueinthelightoftheunderstandingofthefirmnotonlyasa
knowledgecreatingmechanism,butalsoasaknowledgeapplier (seee.g.ArgyrisandSchön,
1978; Levitt andMarch, 1988,Grant, 1996). TheOffshore case is something of an example of
such a system on a project network level, where all the stakeholders were connected via a
projectmanagementcompanywithanintegratorfunction.





“I think that and in our normal scope of work we did it quite well, with all the time 
schedule and technical and economic [issues] it went very fine this project. But this [item 
in the scope of work], which normally don't belong to our scope, this was more or less a 
surprise…” 
Inengineeringterms,suchchangesinscopeofsupplyareknownunknownsrepresentingthe
effect uncertainty; in other words, they can be, to a certain extent, forecasted based on
experience.However, theyaredifficult tobepreparedforsince the timingof theevent isnot
known(andofcourse,itmightnottakeplaceatall).Theyaffecttheperformancenegativelyin
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caseswherethere is lackofclarityregardingcontract termsordivisionofresponsibilities (for
example, the SOLAS case or the Offshore case), lack of understanding or communication
between thesupplier firmand itscustomeroramongotherstakeholders (theSudancase, the
Design Phase Failure, and Lack of Reflection cases). A positive example of eliminating
customer/operator/usergrounds foruncertainty is theCambodianEndeavourcase,where the
customer was persuaded to follow the directions given by the supplier and thus, many
problemsanduncertaintieswereavoidedrightatthestartoftheproject.Thisisanexampleof





Therewerenounforeseeneventsorsituations thatcould influence thedecisiontoestablishthe




I held in the second round of data collection at the company confirmed that many of their
competitors in the country of delivery actually suffered from the scarcity of an engineering
workforce inthemarket. Infact, forthosecompaniesthis lackofreflectioninspireduncertainty
wasperceivedasathreat.Theissueatstakeisuncertainty,becausethecompanieswereawareof
theirdependencyontheworkforce,buttheywerenotconcernedastowhethertheissuewould
escalate, therefore this it turned into a problem. On the contrary, CompanyA could use this
situationasanopportunitytoestablishitselfmorefirmlyonthenewmarket.Forthiscompany,
theuncertaintywassuccessfullymanagedandturnedintotheopportunitytodobetterthantheir
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Technical uncertainty (which can be paralleled to unknown unknowns in engineering
terminology (Wideman, 1992 or that of Shenhar, 2001) does not come first on the list of
uncertainties   significantly  affecting performance according  to  the  analysis (Table 15 and
Figure23).Itisassumedthatmanagersdealingwithhighlycomplexsystemsandstructures
arebetterprepared(atleastmentally)forfacingproblemswithtechnology.Theexampleofthe
Blackoutcase isveryillustrativeof this issue:onceboth thesupplier’smanagementteamand
thecustomerrealizeandarepreparedforuncertainty,itseffectontheperformanceiseasierto
manageatleastintermsofcustomersatisfaction.Inaddition,thelattercomesasthefirstonthe
list of variables affectinguncertainty positively (see Figure 24 andTable 16), gatheringmore
votesthanthefinancialresultsoftheproject.
ThatiswhyIdonotconsiderambiguityinthesensethatitisreferredtointhedecisiontheory
literature16asaseparate issue in thisanalysis. The industrialengineeringcompanies,suchas
those discussed in this thesis, are experts in their field. Thus, it would not be reasonable to




on the situation. Of course, if an engineering company becomes engaged in, let us say, the
insurance or agricultural business, they might face ambiguity since they naturally will lack
knowledgeand skills in these fields.Nevertheless,when theyoperate inknown terrain, they
managetoturntheuncertaintyintoopportunity.
As for the variables, positively relating to performance, and thus eliminating uncertainty (or
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thecustomerandbenefitsecuredthroughthecontract,whichclearlyrelatestocustomersatisfaction,
there is the reflection versus extensive planning. The latter stresses the importance of pro
activeness in managing uncertainty and performance as is argued in the literature (Maylor,
2001;Atkinsonetal.,2006;Gustafssonetal.,2010;Smythetal.,2010).
Thereareanumberofsuggestionsthat themanagersbroughtupduringthemeetings,which
reflected on how to address uncertainty in projects in order to affect the performance in a





Severalmanagers pointed out the importance of communication aspects, especially in repeat
projects.Onemanagersaid that therehadbeennounforeseensituations inprojectsunderhis
supervisionatanytime.Accordingtohim:
“[from the experience] with the sister vessels we already know that we might need 
several modifications in spare elements. This is the only risk that we face there at the 
moment”.  
More importantly, for this manager, risk does not lie in the fact that there is a need in
modificationsoftheexistingtechnology,sincethereisalwaysroomfortechnicalimprovements.
Ratherhestressedthetimefactor:whensuchimprovementsaredone.
 “Surely, there are some modifications that we are forced to include, but then need to be 
done already at the factory [where the equipment is produced]. It is easier to do it at the 
factory than on the vessel, which is already sailing”.  
The intervieweepointedout thatmostof the timethe improvementsaredonewhenthe final
product has left the production facilities. This is a costly way to improve the product. It is
logistically complicated aswell, since the ship is sailing constantly, and it can be difficult to
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allocateaharborwherethemaintenanceworkcanbeperformed.Atthesametime,headmitted






them are technology or operationrelated. The most common case is the weak product 
components or weak system elements thatmayfailundercertainoperationalconditions.Inthe
observedprojectssuchelementsarethemechanicalcomponentsoftheengine,e.g.bearingsin
the rollers. If a roller brakes down, it will destroy the crankshaft andmay even lead to the
collapseof the engine.The lossof an engine, especiallyduring thewarranty stage, is ahuge
expensebothforsuppliersandtheircustomers.Toavoidhindranceof thenormaloperations,






 “…The information, ability to understand [interpret] the information and ability to 
follow and implement instructions...”  
The suggestions presented above — communication versus planning in time management,
repetitivemaintenance—canbeseenasexamplesofhowuncertaintyisaddressedinpractice.
However,whatappearsasa“redthread”throughouttheprojectdescriptionsistheimportance
of establishing underlying processes and procedures as a means of supporting reflective
thinking at a managerial level. The reflective project managers and their superiors are the
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practitionersthatcan“seetheforestthroughthetrees”:theycanthinkintermsofabroad,long
term perspective for their projects and project portfolios respectively. However, effective
managersshouldnotabstractthemselvesfromdailyroutine.Theprojectmanagementliterature
outlined the need for a project management professional who is a strategist and a good
supervisor; however thepracticalmechanismof enabling the strategist functionhasnotbeen
outlined (e.g. Jaafari, 2001). Once again, the need to integrate organizational top level
administratorswiththeoperationallevelmanagersneedstobestressedinthiscontext,asthe
analysis shows. As Mintzberg (1994) notes, effective strategists are those individuals who
immersethemselvesindailydetailwhilebeingabletoseethestrategicmessagesinvolved.In
thissense,theroutineandtraditionalprojectmanagementprocessesareofimmensesupportfor
managers. In fact,uncertaintymanagementbuildsupon theproject riskmanagement, change
management, timemanagement and the other functions that PMBOK (2004) states. But this
conclusion is validonly ifplanning is seenasa supportive,not themain function, ofproject
management (Maylor, 2001; Andersen, 1996). Uncertainty management — or coping with








Themanagers pointed out the extensive network of the stakeholders involved in the project
deliveries.Thepowerplantprojects,whereCompanyBwasusually a turnkey supplier, can
alsoinvolveseveralparties,besidestheendcustomerandthesubsuppliers.Forexample,the
operationscompany,thelocalbranch,theoutsideconsultants,etc.Forthemarineprojects,the
shipyard is one of the main contact organizations besides the customer, not to mention the
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several main suppliers, subsuppliers, etc. The company, which operates the vessel, is not
necessarily the owner of it. Still, the supplier has to communicate with all of these parties
throughout the lifecycleof theproject: fromtheproject initiationanddesigningphase to the
postproject operations. Inmany cases, it isprecisely the intermediateorganizations, through
which the communication between the end customer and the supplier takes place. The
informationcommunicationisoftenbiasedbytheselongcommunicationchains.Accordingto
thewarrantymanager:
 “…it takes a long time to communicate the information through such long chains [of 
command]… the problem gets escalated before it reaches [the target audience], it 
becomes a big problem”.   
Therefore,establishingasuitableandefficientcommunicationchainintheprojectnetwork is
one of themechanisms that can significantly reduce uncertainty by providing all the parties
withuptodateandrelevantinformation.Theintervieweealsostressedtheneedtoidentifythe
source of the known problem (risk) and, if possible, to solve it without involving extra
unnecessaryparties.At the same time, the experience and ability tomanage the situationon
one’s own should be evaluated appropriately. For example, the routine everyday tasks and
problemsinrelativelyeasynoncomplexprojectsmightnotrequiretopmanagementattention.
However,amanagerwhohas justbeenappointedtoheadacomplexmultimillionproject in
the middle of its execution might need involvement of his peers or even superiors.
Communication becomes a tool for information gathering, verification of information
importanceinthecontextandforimprovementoftheabilitiestojudgetherelevanceonone’s
own.Itisintheinterestsoftheprojectmanagertobeproactiveoncetheissueraisesdoubt:
 “…you can get hold of a problem in an early stage and solve it. Many times the 
[communication] chain is too long with many parties involved in it, the problem will 
grow bigger before we start to deal with it….   You can solve it by phone or by e-mail 
directly”.  
Although the manager mentioned these aspects, he noted that the marine installations are
mostly low risk. This is because he thought that the company possessed sufficient technical
knowledgeandexperiencetoprovidedesirablesolutionsforitscustomers.Inotherwords,he
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addressedthefactthatthefirmneededtotaketheroleoftheexpertforthecustomer.Onthe
other hand, he stressed that the process of the solution delivery is an issue that has to be
flexible,andallowforfinetuning.Similaraspectswerementionedbymostoftherespondents.
The content analysis shows that uncertainty is closely linked to the mechanism of
communication,and thevariablesof informationandexperience.The regionspecificwaysof
working proved to have relevance for uncertainty management from the communication
function point of view. Another mechanism that concerns the cultural perspective and is
attributed to experience in the analysis is organizational adaptation. The analysis shows that
thisisamechanismofuncertaintymanagement.Therespondentswhilediscussing10different
projectsreferredto itasmeansoftakingadvantageofopportunity(Table12 liststhetypesof
organizational adaptation in relation to uncertainty). In other words, they believed that
uncertainty could be resolved and be of benefit to the project if the supplier’s organization
adaptstotheenvironment.Hereisanexample—aquotebyawarrantymanagerfromapower
plantdeliveryintheMiddleEastregion:
“Of course, people have difficulties to adjust sometimes while being surrounded by
different cultures,when theyhave to face differentways ofhowpeople behave.That is
always normal. Some people dont fit in, sowe have to replace them… that happened
nearlyineveryproject.”  
Here,hespeaksaboutpersonnelreplacementsasameansofmanagingprojectorganization—
related uncertainty. The quote illustrates that a project as any organization is an evolving
endeavor, which is constructed and reconstructed continuously. The people constituting it
change,andsoarethebeliefsandinterpretationswhiletheexperienceexpands.Adaptationto
thenewenvironmenttakesplace.
The specific resultsof thedataanalysis (Figure25andTable17)pinpoint that regionspecific
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for securing future business and market position, gaining improved image, etc. The lack of
externalcontinuouscommunicationprovokesuncertaintywithgreaterpossibilitiesfornegative
impact(risk)intermsoflosingcontinuouscontactwithcustomersandstakeholders,andthus
the common understanding of goals. In a similar vein, the literature on trust and value co
creation particularly stresses the importance of continuous, dynamic businesstobusiness
relationships with the customers based on easy communication and cooperation as a risk
reductionmethod both on strategic and operational levels (Smyth,Gustafsson andGanskau,
2010;Gustafsson,Smyth,GanskauandArhippainen,2010).
Coding analysis shows that the project manager’s experience factor seems to be of more
significance for managing uncertainty than the information as such. This finding has a
functional interpretation. The experience as a basis for reflection and making sense of
information in the project and/or firm’s context ismore valuable formanaging the state and
especiallyeffectuncertainty,becauseitaimsatgaininganunderstandingofwhetherandhow
the information is related to thecontext.Thisextends thediscussion in the traditionalproject
risk management literature, where risk (and uncertainty) is strongly associated with
information,andevensometimesparalleledtoinformationcreation (Eppinger,2001;Browning
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andEppinger,2002).Tomanageuncertainty, there isaneednotonlytohavetools toacquire
information, but also to have mechanisms to interpret and make information useful and
applicable in a particular contextual setting. This finding of the thesis extends the






The result of the analysis of the empirical data shows that there are several variables— or
sources of uncertainty as they are referred to in the literature (Atkinson et al., 2006;Meijer,
Hekkert and Koppenjan, 2007)— fromwhich project uncertainty can stem. In other words,
these are the issues that the project managers can be uncertain about. Each of the sources
triggersdifferentmanagerial actions. Sucha categorizationofuncertaintyby the sourcedoes
not contradict with the Milliken’s (1987) framework and correlates with the conceptual




These sources were observed to trigger different uncertainty management processes on
different organizational levels. The internal organizationrelated uncertainty represents a
projectbasedorganizationleveloramultipleprojectlevel,andtheothercategoryisaddressing
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Subsequently, one of the most significant causes of uncertainty appears to be the scope of
supplyrelated technical complexity. The operations management and project management
literaturerefertoitassystematicuncertainty(Bonaccorsi,PammolliandTani,1996).Astructured
approach to creation information of previously unknown information (Eppinger, 2001;
BrowningandEppinger,2002)orevenastructuredproductitself(Sosa,EppingerandRowles,
2004),aresuggestedtobekeyfunctionsinordertobeabletoaddressthisproblem.Thisisthe
reason why current project risk management is in part seen as the creation of previously
unknowninformation(Browningand Eppinger,2002).Thisapproachhasitsmerits.Theimportanceof
the information creation aspect is partly confirmed by the findings of this thesis as only one
elementofuncertaintyhandling.However,thisviewhasstrengthsintermsofriskmanagement
functionasanimportantpartofplanning.
The drivers have relevance not only for uncertainty, but also for risk and opportunity. This
buildsupontheunderstandingofprojectuncertaintyasaconceptencompassingbothproject
riskandopportunitysupportedbythefindings.Fromthisperspective,riskisviewedasaresult
of acting (or not acting)17 under uncertainty as if the latterwould have a potential negative
impact on the project’s results. In some of the studied cases, defensive, passive way of
approaching uncertain situationwas observed. The reactive or passiveways of copingwith
uncertainty has been summarized in the project management literature as delay, denial,
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toresolveuncertainty.IagreewithKutschandHall(2005)thatthereactivewayofcopingwith
uncertaintyandriskisinmanycasesexplainedbythefactthattheinterestsofatleastsomeof
the project parties (including themanager personally) can be negatively affected should the
managerbeproactive.Theissuesthattheauthorslistedsuchastheunspokeninternalpolitical
issues,fearofdamagingprofessionalreputationortherelationshipwiththecustomerandthe




donotact,but ratherhow theyneed toactuponuncertainty,orwhat elements theyneed to






a risk, their reasoningwasbasedon facts.Commonly the followingdescriptionwasgiven in
respect to the risk: “I assume it to be a risk, because…”   followed by a detailed line of
argumentationbasedonevidence.Themanagersreferredtoriskasafact,aconcretesituation,
theoutcomesofwhichwouldaffecttheprojectinnegativeway.Evenreferringtoahypothetical
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dealingwith riskswas seenas theessenceof theprojectmanager’s job. Sowasdealingwith
uncertainty.While speaking of uncertainty the managers referred to an “unforeseen situation
absolutelynotknowninadvance”.Incontrasttorisks,uncertaintyisnotafact,andthuscannotbe
planned for or resolved by an informed guess in an instant. Speaking of coping with






actions in response to the occurred unforeseen situation. Thus, the attitudes and other








availability of information, even relevant, is not sufficient for successful management in an
uncertaincontext.Moreover,unforeseeneventevolveatafastpace,whichsometimesrequire




(Kerzner, 2001). I argue that uncertainty and complexity are interrelated issues. The
categorization inFigure17showsthatuncertainty isassociatedwith the technicalcomplexity
(orscopeofsupplysourcesofuncertaintyasine.g.Table15).However,Ialsofoundthatthe
projects that are similar at the complexity level can have different uncertainty levels. Thus,
Olga Perminova 
Managing Uncertainty in Projects192
looking at complexity and uncertainty as different dimensions of projects helps to better
visualizethechallengesof theprojectcomparedtothesituationwhenuncertainty is included








that can be turned into opportunities for better performance in terms of both customer
satisfaction and decreasing the amount of warranty claims. If these uncertain issues are not
managed, they become realized in the form of risks and ultimatelywarranty costs. Table 12
providestheanswertotheresearchquestionQc:Whatkindofmethodsdoprojectcompaniesusein







haveapositive impacton theoutcomesof theproject,andsubsequently, the firm.Areactive
approachtouncertaintyappearedtoberesultingonlyinnegativeconsequencesfortheproject
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lack of individual’s perceived ability to predict something accurately because of the lack of
information or inability to discriminate between relevant and irrelevant data is relevant in this
context is valuable for interpreting the results. Taking it as a standpoint, the definition of
uncertaintycanbethefollowing:Uncertaintyinrelationtoprojectsistheindividual’s(e.g.themanager’s)
lack of knowledge and/or understanding of the relevant project elements, its environment and their
interrelationship,sothatnoconclusioncanbemadeastoifand/orhowanyofthosecanimpacttheproject
success.   It follows the logic of uncertainty being a context for risks and opportunities in projects
(Perminovaetal.2008 (a)).There isa temptation to say that risksandopportunities areobjective
uncertaintyinUngerandEppinger’s(2006)terms.However,Ithinkthatsuchadefinitiongivestoo
much space for interpretations, and it can easily lead into the trap of misunderstanding the





























Clearly, the perception of uncertainty impacts the way it is managed in projects. The link
betweenrisk,opportunityanduncertainty impliesthatthemanagementroutineshavecertain








warranty manager in terms of risk management is to minimize the negative impact on the
financial performance of the project by preventing losses (claims). This is the job, which is
similar to that of theprojectmanager. In thisperspective, there arenodifferences betweena
projectmanagerandawarrantymanager:theissues,tasks,processesandconstraintsthatthey
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obtainingbenefits (opportunity) from themrather than for themanagingof risks.Experience
moreeffectivelyreducesuncertaintybecauseitassumesthatonenotonlypossessesinformation
and/orhasskillstoacquireanduseit,butalsohastheknowledgetointerpretitandapplyitto
the context in order to receive better results. While information and skills can be studied,
experiencehas tobeachievedbypracticing,bydoing.Theability to recognize therisks,plan







Considering these points, risk management can be seen as a process with an emphasis on









products.Asmanyof theintervieweesexpressedit, theyseetheirroleprimarily inmanaging
claims that come from the customer: to accept themand take appropriate action (e.g. send a
spareparttothecustomer,provideassistanceengineertothesite,etc.),ortorejectthembased
on the termsof thecontract.Thissituationsuggests thatwarrantymanagers themselveshave
verylittleimpactonminimizingoreliminatingthecauseoftheclaim.Moreover,therearevery
few tools or organizational processes for problem detection available to them. They need to
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investigate theproject that enters intowarranty stage to get betterknowledgeof it. It is often
done by communicatingwith the project team, the customer, and the other stakeholders, in
formal (e.g. warranty kickoff meetings) and informal way (discussions in the corridors).
Usually, they have to rely on their professional experience. Most of my interviewees had a
backgroundof beingprojectmanagers prior to taking their current positions. In this respect,
they could relate to how the occurrences at theproject execution stage affected thewarranty
stage.
Whenplansweredisturbedinthecaseprojects,themanagershadtocopewithuncertaintyby
reconsidering the new context in which to establish the relevant facts (investigation by
sensemaking),explainhowtheyrelatedtotheproject(whichofteninvolvescommunication),and
how to achieve the best result possible by implementing actions (action, adaptation to the
situation) and face the time constraint. These actions have experiencebased reflection at the
core. Thus, the logic was different from risk management, which practically focuses on
preventing and planning. Aswas already noted, risks are treated as negative events by the
managers,whereasuncertainty isnotnecessarilynegative.Theunexpectedeventschange the
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Figure18.Theuncertaintymanagementprocess
Theobservationsindicatethatinordertoresolveuncertaintythemanagershavetoemploythe
reflective approach, which represents the process of considering the actions from different




scenario(orreflectioninaction inSchön’s(1983) terms).Atthesametime, thereflectiononthe
resultsofactionsandtheexperience(actioninreflection(ibid.))createspracticalknowledgethat
takes the formof theproceduresandbestpracticesafter theproject.Theanalysis shows that
uncertaintymanagement is strongly linkedwith flexibility inmaking thedecisions that come



















and opportunities) are the constructs used in this study, whereas reflection/making sense,
communication, action and learning are themechanisms linking the constructs. As the analysis
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The stages from uncertainty state to certainty can be labeled processes, because action is
embeddedinthem.Foruncertainty,itisthethinking,considering,makingsenseofthesituation
and communicating it — those are the processes that are inseparable from the whole
understandingofwhatitmeans.Thispresuppositiondoesnotcomeintoconflictwiththepoint
ofviewsuggesting thatuncertaintyor certainty isa stateofmind.Uncertainty isanunstable
state.FollowingthelogicofLaneandMaxfield(2005),inthestateofuncertaintypeoplefeelthe
need to regain stability, return to certainty. “Being uncertain” means that themind instantly
startssearchingforareleasetoescapebacktothefamiliarstateofcertainty.Inotherwords,we
humansreflectonthesituation,makesenseofit,tryingtofindasolutiontotheproblem.The
strategy that isgoing tobechosen—passive (or reactiveas itwaspreviously referred to)or
proactive—dependsontheresultofthereflectiveprocessesandtheexperienceofthemanager.
TheCommunicationstageisimportanthere:evenifthemanagerpossessesenoughknowledge,




an individual perspective. In fact, the uncertainty management process as well as the
understandingofuncertaintyassuch,isasocialphenomenonastheanalysisofthecasesshows.
Figure 20 summarizes themechanisms crucial for copingwith uncertainty— or uncertainty
managementon theprojectbasedorganization level.Theyarenot sequential; rather theyare
continuously ongoing. Uncertainty itself becomes realized in a social context, and is often
regardedassuchnotonlybyonesinglemanager,butalsobytheothermembersoftheproject.
However,handlingofuncertaintyatitsfoundationisanindividualprocesssinceitisdoneby




developed and acted upon (see also Raelin, 2001). Following this logic, uncertainty as a
phenomenon in projects — is a social activity — and has to be communicated from the
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Following the logic of Wittgenstein (1986), achieving the uncertainty state assumes that the
wellknownfactsthatconstitutedthebasisofthesituationtobeconsideredcertainandknown
are not valid any more. Being uncertain requires that one takes certain issues for granted.
Arguingthatsinceonecannotbeabsolutelycertainatagivenpointoftime(hereonecandraw
aparalleltotheHeisenberg’suncertaintyprinciple),thereforeitispossiblehaveaconstantstate
of uncertaintybecomemeaningless as it canbe counteredwith the question:how canwebe
certainthatwearenotcompletelycertain?However,thisdoesnotmeanthatuncertaintydoes
not exist. Uncertainty can rather be seen— or objectified— as a state of affairs that arises
(Perminovaetal.,2008(a)).
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The resultsof the thesis show that theunforeseen,unexpectedevents “visualize”uncertainty
andmakeitpossibletobeperceivedbythemanagers.Theprocessofreflectionisimbeddedin
theperceptionofuncertainty.Theprojects, theirenvironmentandotherrelevantelementsare
reconsidered: new facts come into the picture.Old beliefs and knowledge are revised (made
sense of in a new context), shared (communicated within the project(s), the supplier
organizationand/orfurthertorelevantstakeholders)andappliedtothenewemergingcontexts
(enacted).  In sum, the certainty is reconstructed and the new knowledge is created. If the





At the organizational level, uncertainty triggers the need to address the validity of the
established routines — processes and procedures, forms, rules and strategies — for the
changingsituation.AccordingtoLevittandMarch(1988),organizationalroutinesaregrounded
in interpretationsof thepast, theyreflecthistory, rather thananticipationof the future.Thus,




routines. Using the same logic as Levitt andMarch (1988), the changes in the routines of a
projectbased organization will depend not only on the situations and outcomes of those
situationsthattheyexperience,butontheaspirationsthattheyhaveforthesituationsandtheir
outcomes.
Adaptation to thenewcontextbydealingwithuncertaintywithinprojects andprojectbased
companiestakesplacethroughthe3processes:reflection,communication,actionandlearning
(seeFigure20).Theseprocessesaresimultaneouslyongoingintheorganization,andthusthe
flow presented in the Figure 20  is in away superficial. For example, it is quite difficult to
separate reflection and communication processes since reflection at the organizational level
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involves communicationandviceversa.By reflection inprojectbasedcompany Iunderstand
theprocessesofgatheringfeedbackfromindividualprojects,assessingtheoutcomesfromthe
perspectiveofthefirm’saimsandgoalsandcomparingthemtotheanticipatedoutcomes.The
process involves communication as a crucial step to creating a shared understanding. Karl
Weick(1995)statesthat thereflectiveprocessesat thecompanyaresupportedbyindividuals.
The stimuli for reflection go from the lower — e.g. project or warranty manager, team or
department— level to thehigher level of companydecisionmakers. In the SOLAS case, the
project failure evoked the strategic discussion in the form of workshops regarding the
mechanisms to reinsure fulfillment of recommendations by the shipyards and the other
stakeholders. During the workshops at Company B, the feedback on customer cooperation
issuesfromprojects,especiallytheDesignPhaseFailurecase,raisedtopadministrators’interest
to create a process of collaboration with the customers as a way to ensure active customer
involvement in the project. The Japanese Approach and the Blackout cases show how
collaboration with the customers (which inevitably involves higher administration) can
contribute to value creation not only at the project level, but also becomes a source of
innovativenessandmeansofachievingacompetitiveedgeasastrategiclevelissues.
As Weick argues (1977), understanding and sensemaking affect strategic decisions and,
consequently,theperformanceofthefirm.Reflectionconstructsthegroundsforreformulating









phase does not take place, the recognition of uncertainty on a personal level stays a mere
illusionthatwilleitherreleaseitselfintheformofrisktotheproject’soutcomesordisappearas
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aconsequenceofluck.Byverbalizingituncertaintyclaimsitsrighttoexistence.Inthissense,it
becomesa fact: a concern (risky side) thathas apotential tobecomeapositivebreakthrough
(opportunity side). As the data analysis show, uncertainty always has two sides. It is never
eitherastraightforwardsheerriskoropportunity.Itsexistenceisneverstraightforwardeither.
Evenifthisissueisbroughttothecollectivetable,itcanstillbeconsideredaworthlessconcern
of a single person even if this person is a project manager. At the same time, uncertain
situationscanbeoverlookedbytheprojectorganization.














manageuncertainty—or absorbuncertainty inKeeganandTurner’s (2002) terms.However,
thesuccessoftheseprocessesdependsontheactionsthataretakenattheleveloftheindividual
project.













and opportunity assessment tool or a customer feedback monitoring program. Monitoring
allows an understanding of the underlying trends of today in a given industry, and thus
forecastingthe future,which isperseanuncertaintyreductionmanagement tool.Adaptation
processesresultinamodificationofthecompany’sroutines—processes,strategy,norms,etc.
Theyleadtobettermanagingcompetenceatanorganizationallevelbothintermsofportfolio
managementand improving the skillsof individualmanagers. It is away tounderstandand
strengthen core competences of an organization, which ultimately leads to improving
competitivenessinthemarket.
Byimplementingprojectportfolioanalysisintermsofcomplexityanduncertaintycontinuously










customer,with the stakeholders and between departments at different levels of the supplier
organizationisassociatedwithresolvinguncertainty(seeTable12andTable14).
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Figure 21. The integrated model of uncertainty management 
The  integrated model of uncertainty management combines  the  individual and  the collective, 
organizational processes  into one frame.   While  in the case of uncertainty management on the 
project manager’s level (upper part of the Figure 21) the processes are sequential, the lower part 
does not have a strict timeline. The collective actions in the project‐based organization level are 
continuously  on‐going,  they  are  the  reflection  of  the  results,  challenges  and  changes  that  the 
organization members face and cope with at the level of projects.  The experiences from single 
projects  become  crystallized  in  the  form  of  organizational  processes,  policies,  vision  and 
strategies.  The  process  is  a  part  of  the  socially  constructed  world  where  meanings  and 
significances are shared. Uncertainty management is a process, but also more than just that. It is 
a  proactive,  entrepreneurial  approach  to  dealing  with  the  unknown  and  unexpected,  which 
forms  a  part  of  the  company’s  culture.  It  assumes  a  certain  mindset,  behavior  and  attitude 
towards uncertainty: 
• Enacting responsibility  to  the  project  —  is  acting  in  a  professional  manner  with  due 
diligence  in order  to  fulfill project obligations  with  the main goal being satisfaction of 
the customer and the other stakeholders.   









The credibility of my interpretations and conclusions are ensured by fulfilling the validity
criteria,whichwerealreadyoutlinedinthemethodologychapter.
Thepracticalvaluerequirementpresupposesthataresearcherprioritizestopicsoriginatingfrom











GustafssonandArhippainenT.2007 (a); 2007 (b); 2008).  If to interpretpracticalneedsas the
needs arising in the project research community, this thesis fulfills the validity criteria by
describingtheconceptofuncertaintyinprojectsandthevariablesrelatedtoit,addressingthe
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needtoprovideempiricalevidenceofuncertaintymanagement,andtoexplainhowuncertainty
managementcanenhanceprojectmanagementpractices.
Thesocial interaction criterion implies that theresultsareregularlycheckedwithpractitioners.
Throughcontinuousdialogueandcollaboration in the formofworkshopsandmeetingswith
the representatives of the two companies I ensured that throughout the time span of this
researchthisaspectofvaliditywascovered.Alltheresultsandreportsatdifferentstagesofthe
process development have been presented and discussed together with the companies’




even being implemented in practice, speaks in favor of the credibility of this research as
collaborativemanagementresearch.
Thesocialinteractionalsohasonemoredimensionintheformofinternaldiscussionswiththe






not for the sake ofmentioningmy ownmerits andnot only asmeans of acknowledgingmy
fellowcolleagues in the research field, but rather to stress thepointproclaimedbyBradbury
(2008):themoredialogueisengendered,thebetterarethechancesofthesuccessoftheresearch
and, thus, credibility. It also strengthens the fact that the third and fourth criteria of action
research are met:  active experimentation, which assumes that the result of the research is
brought back to an insider audience to obtain their response and opinion on the result, and
cycles of actionreflection.  Presentation of the research results to peers, also in the form of
articles,conferencepapers,seminarpresentationsservedasacatalyst forreflection in just the
samewayasworkshopsanddiscussionswithpractitioners.Cyclesofreflectionandactionare
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abouthowthemethodswereappliedintheresearch.Theopenmind,intermsofallowingnew
interpretations,continuouslongitudinalreflectionthroughthemethodsdiscussedinthisthesis




active experimentation. This work is based on the collaborative research projects that are
continuing to test and furtherdevelop its results, at least at thepresent time as this thesis is
beingcompleted(Spring2010).Beingdescriptiveinnature,thethesiscombinesthetheoretical
viewsontheconceptofuncertaintyanditselementsandproposestheelementsofuncertainty
management as a business concept.However, further investigationwill require severalmore
yearsofwork,andthereforecannotbeaccomplishedinthisdoctoralthesisproject.Ileavethis
tasktofutureresearch.
Although it is claimed in classic social research that it attempts to generalize to a larger
population froma representative sample (e.g.DavidandHatchuel, 2008), I conclude that the
results of this study are contextspecific. I propose that the conclusions of the work can be
transferredtoprojectbusinessincludingprojectbasedcompanies,firms,industries,etc.(inthe
meaning of these concepts that I described in the Theoretical Framework chapter), and
especially to those engaged in the creation of large complex systems described by Hobday
(1998). However, this does not imply that the convinced audiences in other fields of social
sciencearenotwelcometoapplyandtesttheachievedresultsintheirenvironments.
Thefactthattheprojectshavebeenanalyzedattheearlypostdeliverywarrantystageisbotha
merit and a limitation of this study. Themerit is in the fact that thewarranty phase of the
project is interpretedasan importantstageofaproject lifecycle,whichhasrelevance for the
overallprojectperformance.This is in linewith theresultsof theresearchofShenharandhis
colleagues (1997). On the other hand, it is just one, although convenient, observation and
analysispointontheprojecttimeline.Thestudycouldbenefitfromhavingseveralassessment
points within the uncertaintycomplexity framework, preferably at different stages of the
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management processes. Thirdly, I will present methods that the managers use to tackle the
possiblenegativeimpactofuncertaintyortotakeadvantageofit.Iwillconcludebyanswering








and the empirical analysis:Uncertainty in projects is the individual’s (e.g. the manager’s) lack of
knowledge and/or understanding of the relevant project elements, its environment and their
interrelationship, so that no conclusion can be made as to if and/or how any of these can impact the
projectsuccess.Itisassociatedwiththeunforeseen,unplannedeventsthattakeplaceatdifferent
stages of the project, which do not necessarily affect projects in a negative way. As for
uncertainty, it canbedescribed as a context for risks andopportunitieswithinprojects.Uncertainty
bringsinstability,whichcanbeseenasagroundforflexibility(e.g.Wikström,2005).Inorder




basedon reflectiveprocesses (Schön, 1983;Weick, 1995) are stronglyassociatedwithpositive
outcomes. One of the main achievements of thesis is that it proposes the framework for
understandinghowtheconceptsofrisks,opportunitiesanduncertaintyarerelated(Figure3in
the Theoretical Framework Chapter) based on the literature review as well as provides the










opportunities. This work, which is based on the collaborative research project (PerminovaO.,
GustafssonM.,ArhippainenT.2007(a);2007(b);2008),providesempiricalevidencefortheneed
to address project uncertainty on the project and multiproject level. It also contributes by
definingwhatuncertaintymanagementstands foraswellasbyoutlining itsmechanisms (e.g.
Figure20)basedonboththeliteraturereviewandtheempiricalmultiplecasestudy.
Uncertaintyinprojectsisperceivedbythemanagersinchargeofprojectsasadifferentissueto
that of risk and opportunity. The results show that project risk is associatedwith a negative
impactontheprojectoutcomes.Itis identifiedinthisstudyasanevent,conditionor interaction
withthenegativeconsequencesontheproject’sobjectivesandconsequently,projectsuccess.Addingto
the normative literature on project risk (PMBOK, 2004;APM,2008) and the popularized









The nature of project work assumes risks, thus risk management is seen as a vital part of the
managersinchargeoftheproject.Iftheconceptofriskislimitedtothenegativeinterpretation,itis
appropriate to consider planning and establishing preventive measures based on the relevant
information,which iscontinuouslygatheredandreflectedupon,as themainfunctionsofproject
riskmanagementastheempiricalinvestigationshows.Inthisrespect,managingofriskscontribute
tomanaginguncertainty in termsofpartlyeliminatingstateandeffectuncertainty (inMilliken’s
(1987) terms) by contributing to the investigation practices (different information collection
techniquesandassessmentof itsrelevanceinthecontext,establishingpreventiveactions).Inthis




assign resources to solving the potential problem, the manager has to have the proof of the
probability of the negative impact. The empirical analysis suggests that the complex industrial
projectscanhavealowlevelofuncertaintyeventhoughtherisklevelisestimatedashighandvice



















The proactive approach to managing uncertainty by doing project management activities
ensures that the risks are successfully avoided and the benefits are achieved through
implementationoftheactions.Itmeansthatuncertaintymanagementreflectivefunctionshave
to be performed on a continuous basis, with commitment and responsibility towards the
project,tobeabletoindicatethechangeinthecontextandadapttoit.Monitoringtechniques
(e.g. regular revisions ofplans andofportfolio assessments) aspart of reflective investigation
and loss reduction/preventionactivities (e.g. increasingcompetencesof themanagersand the
project stakeholders via training) are essential here. This thesis emphasizes troubleshooting as
means to correct—orminimize the impactof— thealreadyoccurreddamage,whichwasa
result of the lack of proactive strategy. Yet many practitioners think that this is what risk
management inprojects isallabout.   In thisrespect, the issuespointedoutbyMaylor (2003)




provide flexibility in decisionmaking and allowprojectmanagers to grasp the nature of the
unforeseeneventasariskoranopportunity.
Basedontheliteraturereviewandtheempiricalcasestudy,Uncertaintymanagementisdefined
as a reflective process of considering all of the elements of a current evolving event from
differentanglestofindacceptableactionstoresolvethesituationforthebenefitoftheproject.
Uncertainty management and risk management differ along different parameters. Firstly,
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uncertainty management includes reflective experiencebased processes as opposed to more
mechanistic,plannedconformancebasedriskmanagementprocessesthatarethecornerstoneof
risk management in its traditional understanding (PMBOK, 2004). While a project risk








Uncertainty ismoredependentontheexperienceof themanagersexecutingtheprojects than



































To achieve benefits (opportunities) for
theproject
To prevent and minimize the predicted negative
impactoftheevent(risk)
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6.2 Uncertaintymanagementmethods

In contrast to risk management the main goal of which is to address negative and positive
impactsofevents,uncertaintymanagementmethodsareorientedtowardsbetterunderstanding
the interrelations between the elements and environments of complex industrial projects and
enactingthenewknowledgetoachievebenefitsfortheprojectsoreventheprojectbasedfirm
as such.   Taking an individual relativistic and reflective approach into consideration (e.g.
Popper,1996;Weick,1977;Schön,1983;WikströmandRehn,2002),thethreemainmethods
have been outlined in this thesis: investigation, communication and adaptation. These processes
supportaproactiveattitudetouncertainty,whichaimsatachievingbenefitfromuncertaintyby
minimizingit.Projectriskmanagement,ifthereflectiveprocessesareappliedtoit,canbeseen
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ii. trainingofthecompaniesownstafftoincreasetheoverallexpertiseoftheorganization
(competencemanagement),
iii. implementing regular ongoing procedures aimed at transferring uncertainty into
perceived risk or opportunities including risk/opportunitymanagement as a basis for
informationcollection:regularrisk/opportunityassessmentsatregularpoints(e.g.atthe
endofeachprojectphase),communicationwithprojectstakeholders(e.g.participation
in meetings, follow up of developments), brainstorming meetings with the aim to
involveexpertstogivemorecomplexinterpretationsoffuturescenarios,enablinginter
departmentalcommunication.
The results of the empirical study suggest that if uncertainty has been addressed using the
reactivestrategy,thenthefollowingmitigationmethodshavebeenemployedtominimizethe
negativeimpactoftheunexpectedevent:











This thesis provided the empirical evidence for uncertainty management to stress the
importance of recognizing uncertainty as an essential part of projects which needs to be
managedbyprojectmanagementprofessionals (projectmanagersandwarrantymanagers) to
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ensurethatprojectsmeettheirgoals.Astheresultsofthestudyshow,definingandexplaining
the phenomenon of uncertainty and the way it can bemanaged in projects is an important
element of performanceoriented project management. This thesis contributes to the field of
projectmanagementinseveralways.Firstandforemost,thethesisprovidesadefinitionofthe
conceptofuncertaintyinthecontextoflargescalecomplexprojectsinrelationtotheconcepts
of risk and opportunities by combining the existing definitions with the understanding of
uncertainty from organization theory and strategic management. The thesis outlines the
interrelationshipbetween thestudiedconstructsbyconstructinga framework,on thebasisof
whichthemodelofuncertaintymanagementoftwointerdependentlevelsisproposed(Figure
19 and Figure 21). Second, it provides empirical evidence and justification for uncertainty
managementpracticesaswellasdescribesthemethods,whichprojectbasedcompaniesuseto
addressuncertainty.Thecontributiontotheprojectmanagementliteratureisindescribingthe
reflectivemechanisms transferringuncertainty into certainty, foster flexibilityand robustness.
Third, it explains the relevance and the benefit of the reflective approach (e.g. Popper, 1996;
Weick,1977; Schön, 1983) for managing projects on the example of risk and uncertainty




of it.Warranty is the start of the operation from the customer’s point of view, and it has an
impactonhowtheproject isevaluatedbythemainstakeholders (Shenhar,2001). This thesis




management research and practice. Uncertainty management needs to be performed at this
stagenotonly for thesakeofdecreasingthe financialcostsofaparticularproject,butalsoas
havingalongtermimpactonthecustomerrelationshipsatthecompanylevelbyestablishing
trustamongpartners, supporting thebrand imageof the supplier, etc.The latteraspects require
furtherattentionoftheresearchersinthefield.Aninterestingdimensionandanaturalcontinuation
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and processes of the projectmanagement organizations and their members. The empirical
analysisshowsthatthemanagersdoperceiveuncertaintyandrisksdifferently,andthisaffects
management practices. There are twomain attributes that are associated bothwith risk and
uncertainty: the information available and the experience of the warranty manager or the
projectmanager.Thefindingsshowthatforhandlingriskstheinformationfactorappearstobe
moresignificantthanprofessionalexperience.Inasimilarvein,theprofessionalexperiencehas
more importance formanaginguncertainunexpected situations than informationas such.At
thisjunction,itiscompetenceandknowledgemanagementinassociationwithuncertaintythat
are the two themes which ask for further scientific exploration. Uncertainty has been long
associatedwithentrepreneurialbehavior(Kinght,1921),whichgivesaninteresting
dimension for research in the context of project business.  According to the results, the
managers taking care of projects with a high degree of uncertainty are expected to have








extended by looking at what kind of informal organizational practices exist within project
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alsomakeitexplicitforeachandeverymemberoftheprojectteam.Iarguethatsuchactionsare
not only an important part of a company’s strategy implementation, but also help to utilize
competitive advantages. Furthermore, continuous reflective learning based on reflective
processescanbeconsideredacompetitiveadvantage.Thesameruleappliestotheattitudesof
eachresponsiblepersontowardsrisk,opportunityanduncertainty,whichwillaffecttheability
to foresee both the potential dangers and opportunities. In fact, it is muchmore difficult to
determine what is certain in projects rather than list all the possible risks. Can a solution
providerbecertainatanymomentofthechangesthatmightoccurasregardtheenvironment
of the project, the behavior of the stakeholders, or even customer demands? The obvious
answer is no. Can these questions have answers, which are desirable for the supplier? Yes,
because they are achieved by the reflective process of managing uncertainty. For example,
projectriskmanagementhasbeenassociatedwithimpactprevention(andavoidance)methods.
By employing this logic to the statement of Barber (2005), who concludes that new
breakthroughtechnologyapplied inprojectscarriesrisk,oneshouldconcludethat innovative
projects should be avoided. By rephrasing that innovative projects aremore uncertain (thus







mechanismsbywhichuncertainty ismanaged inprojects ofdifferent types. In connection to
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Projectorganization 15 47 3.1
Unforeseensituations 15 41 2.7
Communication 14 36 2.6
Experience 16 41 2.6
Scopeofsupply 11 26 2.4





NEGATIVE PERFORMANCE SOURCES REFERENCES
REFERENCES
PERSOURCE
Internalprojectfirmuncertainty 14 47 3.4
Customer or operator or user
createdcausesofuncertainty
11 29 2.6
Technicaluncertainty 14 32 2.3














Fulfillingobligationstothecustomer 4 15 3,8
Project participant's benefit secured
throughthecontract
5 18 3,6
Reflectionvsextensiveplanning 14 42 3,0
Managingtime 5 13 2,6




















regionspecificwayofworking 13 35 2.7
commitment 17 39 2.3
lack of information communication
internallywithinsupplierfirm
8 17 2.1
customerrelateduncertainty 9 15 1.7










































































































100 25 25 100 100 25 25 25
Lackofunderstanding(knowledge)oftheresponsibilitiesunder
thecontract
25 25 50 50 25 50 25 25
Lackofexperiencefromtheotherprojectsofthesamekind 75 25 25 50 75 50 25 50
Lackofunderstanding/knowledgeofthemanagementtasksto
beperformed
25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Lackoffamiliaritywiththetaskexecutionprocess 50 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Lackofknowledgeofthepartiesinfluencingtheexecutionofthe
taskinternally(assistancefromdepartments,superiors,peers)




100 25 25 100 25 100 75 100
Lackoffamiliaritywithinternalsupportingprocessesand
procedures(manuals,policies,supportingdocumentation)
25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Lackofknowledgeofthecustomer(theirwayofworking,
experienceindoingprojects,historyofcooperation,demands)








75 25 25 75 25 50 25 50
Lackofunderstandingtherequirementsthatthegeographical
locationoftheprojectsiteimposes
50 25 25 25 25 25 25 50
Lackofknowledgeaboutthecountryofdelivery(politicaland
legalenvironment,wayofworking,culture)
100 25 50 50 25 100 75 100
Lackofknowledgeabouttheregulatoryauthorities 100 25 25 25 25 50 50 75
AVERAGE 68 25 29 50 34 46 38 54
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Unitcost/financialscaleofproject 100 25 100 100 25 25 75 75
Productvolume(inverseof) 75 50 100 75 50 25 50 50
Extendofembeddedsoftwarein
theproduct
75 50 75 75 50 50 75 75
Quantityofsubsystemsand
components
75 25 75 75 25 75 75 75
Degreeofcustomisationof
components
75 25 25 75 50 25 25 25
Degreeofcustomisationoffinal
system
100 25 50 75 25 50 50 50
Varietyofsystemarchitectures 100 50 75 75 50 75 75 75
Quantityofalternativecomponent
designpaths
50 25 50 50 25 50 50 50
Feedbackloopsfromlaterto
earlierstages
100 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Varietyofdistinctknowledge
bases
100 50 75 75 50 75 75 75
Varietyofskillandengineering
outputs
100 50 100 100 50 25 75 75
Intensityofuserinvolvement 75 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Changeinuserrequirements 50 25 25 50 25 50 50 50
Intensityofothersupplier
involvement
100 100 100 25 100 100 50 50
Intensityofregulatory
involvement
100 50 75 75 50 75 75 75
AVERAGE 85 43 68 68 45 53 60 60
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Recent studies in project management show 
that the risk management practices are 
ineffective. When an unexpected event takes 
place, risk management  is rarely enough to 
guide how the managers should act. In these 
situations, project managers face uncertainty 
about the new state in the project, the effects 
of the situations on the project outcomes as 
well as uncertainty about managerial actions 
and their respective effect. This book presents 
and explains the management methods and 
principles to successfully address uncertainty 
to ensure the  project performance.
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